Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1701.07347 · IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Wiretap channel capacity: Secrecy criteria, strong converse, and phase change

Eric Graves, Tan F. Wong

Published Jun 1, 2017• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This paper employs equal-image-size source partitioning techniques to derive the capacities of the general discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) under four different secrecy criteria. These criteria respectively specify requirements on the expected values and tail probabilities of the differences, in absolute value and in exponent, between the joint probability of the secret message and the eavesdropper's observation and the corresponding probability if they were independent. Some of these criteria reduce back to the standard leakage and variation distance constraints that have been previously considered in the literature. The capacities under these secrecy criteria are found to be different when non-vanishing error and secrecy tolerances are allowed. Based on these new results, we are able to conclude that the strong converse property generally holds for the DM-WTC only under the two secrecy criteria based on constraining the tail probabilities. Under the secrecy criteria based on the expected values, an interesting phase change phenomenon is observed as the tolerance values vary.

DOI
10.1109/isit.2017.8006627

Related papers

A new wiretap channel model and its strong secrecy capacity

Mohamed Nafea, Aylin Yener

In this paper, a new wiretap channel (WTC) model with a discrete memoryless (DM) main channel and a wiretapper who noiselessly observes a fixed portion, of her choice, of the transmitted symbols, while observing the remaining transmitted symbols through another DM channel (DMC), is considered. The strong secrecy capacity of the model is identified. The achievability is established using the output statistics of random binning framework which exploits the duality between source and channel coding problems. The converse is derived by upper bounding the secrecy capacity of an equivalent model with the secrecy capacity of a DM-WTC. This result generalizes both the classical DM-WTC and the WTC-II with a DM main channel.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2016•11 citations

Semantic-Security Capacity for Wiretap Channels of Type II

Ziv Goldfeld, Paul Cuff, Haim Henri Permuter

The secrecy capacity of the type II wiretap channel (WTC II) with a noisy main channel is currently an open problem. Herein its secrecy-capacity is derived and shown to be equal to its semantic-security (SS) capacity. In this setting, the legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM) channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The secrecy criterion is achieved simultaneously for all possible eavesdropper subset choices. The SS criterion demands negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations even when maximized over all message distributions. A key tool for the achievability proof is a novel and stronger version of Wyner's soft covering lemma. Specifically, a random codebook is shown to achieve the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly exponentially small in the blocklength. Since the combined number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, SS for the WTC II is established by using the union bound and invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. The direct proof shows that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity of the classic WTC with a DM erasure channel (EC) to the eavesdropper are achievable. The converse follows by establishing the capacity of this DM wiretap EC as an upper bound for the WTC II. From a broader perspective, the stronger soft-covering lemma constitutes a tool for showing the existence of codebooks that satisfy exponentially many constraints, a beneficial ability for many other applications in information theoretic security.

arXiv:1509.03619•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•May 10, 2016•71 citations

Semantic-security capacity for wiretap channels of type II

Ziv Goldfeld, Paul Cuff, Haim Henri Permuter

The secrecy capacity of the type II wiretap channel (WTC II) with a noisy main channel is currently an open problem. Herein its secrecy-capacity is derived and shown to be equal to its semantic-security (SS) capacity. In this setting, the legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM) channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The secrecy criterion is achieved simultaneously for all possible eavesdropper subset choices. On top of that, SS requires negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations even when maximized over all message distributions. A key tool for the achievability proof is a novel and stronger version of Wyner's soft covering lemma. Specifically, the lemma shows that a random codebook achieves the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength. Since the combined number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, SS for the WTC II is established by using the union bound and invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. The direct proof shows that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity of the classic WTC with a DM erasure channel (EC) to the eavesdropper are achievable. The converse follows by establishing the capacity of this DM wiretap EC as an upper bound for the WTC II.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2016•11 citations

The Secrecy Capacity of Cost-Constrained Wiretap Channels

Sreejith Sreekumar, Alexander Bunin, Ziv Goldfeld +2 more

In many information-theoretic channel coding problems, adding an input cost constraint to the operational setup amounts to restricting the optimization domain in the capacity formula. This paper shows that, in contrast to common belief, such a simple modification does not hold for the cost-constrained (CC) wiretap channel (WTC). The secrecy-capacity of the discrete memoryless (DM) WTC without cost constraints is described by a single auxiliary random variable. For the CC DM-WTC, however, we show that two auxiliaries are necessary to achieve capacity. Specifically, we first derive the secrecy-capacity formula, proving the direct part via superposition coding. Then, we provide an example of a CC DM-WTC whose secrecy-capacity cannot be achieved using a single auxiliary. This establishes the fundamental role of superposition coding over CC WTCs.

arXiv:2004.04330•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Nov 23, 2020•9 citations

Partial strong converse for the non-degraded wiretap channel

Yi-Peng Wei, Şennur Ulukuş

We prove the partial strong converse property for the discrete memoryless non-degraded wiretap channel, for which we require the leakage to the eavesdropper to vanish but allow an asymptotic error probability ε ∈ [0, 1) to the legitimate receiver. We show that when the transmission rate is above the secrecy capacity, the probability of correct decoding at the legitimate receiver decays to zero exponentially. Therefore, the maximum transmission rate is the same for ε ∈ [0, 1), and the partial strong converse property holds. Our work is inspired by a recently developed technique based on information spectrum method and Chernoff-Cramer bound for evaluating the exponent of the probability of correct decoding.

arXiv:1610.04215•Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing•Sep 1, 2016•2 citations

Strong secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel II with DMC main channel

Dan Nong He, Yuan Luo, Ning Cai

This paper considers an extension of wiretap channel II, where the source message W is transmitted to the legitimate receiver via a discrete memoryless main channel (DMC). Receiving YN, the receiver needs to recover W with small error probability. Meanwhile, an eavesdropper is able to observe arbitrary subsequence of YNwith size μ = Nα, where 0 <; α <; 1 is a constant real number. The encoding-decoding scheme is designed to satisfy a strong secrecy criterion, i.e. the information of each block (instead of each bit) exposed to the eavesdropper is negligible or arbitrarily close to 0 when N is sufficiently large. We focus on the secrecy capacity of this model.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2016•9 citations
This paper employs equal-image-size source partitioning techniques to derive the capacities of the general discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) under four different secrecy criteria. These criteria respectively specify requirements on the expected values and tail probabilities of the differences, in absolute value and in exponent, between the joint probability of the secret message and the eavesdropper's observation and the corresponding probability if they were independent. Some of these criteria reduce back to the standard leakage and variation distance constraints that have been previously considered in the literature. The capacities under these secrecy criteria are found to be different when non-vanishing error and secrecy tolerances are allowed. Based on these new results, we are able to conclude that the strong converse property generally holds for the DM-WTC only under the two secrecy criteria based on constraining the tail probabilities. Under the secrecy criteria based on the expected values, an interesting phase change phenomenon is observed as the tolerance values vary.
In this paper, a new wiretap channel (WTC) model with a discrete memoryless (DM) main channel and a wiretapper who noiselessly observes a fixed portion, of her choice, of the transmitted symbols, while observing the remaining transmitted symbols through another DM channel (DMC), is considered. The strong secrecy capacity of the model is identified. The achievability is established using the output statistics of random binning framework which exploits the duality between source and channel coding problems. The converse is derived by upper bounding the secrecy capacity of an equivalent model with the secrecy capacity of a DM-WTC. This result generalizes both the classical DM-WTC and the WTC-II with a DM main channel.
The secrecy capacity of the type II wiretap channel (WTC II) with a noisy main channel is currently an open problem. Herein its secrecy-capacity is derived and shown to be equal to its semantic-security (SS) capacity. In this setting, the legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM) channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The secrecy criterion is achieved simultaneously for all possible eavesdropper subset choices. The SS criterion demands negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations even when maximized over all message distributions. A key tool for the achievability proof is a novel and stronger version of Wyner's soft covering lemma. Specifically, a random codebook is shown to achieve the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly exponentially small in the blocklength. Since the combined number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, SS for the WTC II is established by using the union bound and invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. The direct proof shows that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity of the classic WTC with a DM erasure channel (EC) to the eavesdropper are achievable. The converse follows by establishing the capacity of this DM wiretap EC as an upper bound for the WTC II. From a broader perspective, the stronger soft-covering lemma constitutes a tool for showing the existence of codebooks that satisfy exponentially many constraints, a beneficial ability for many other applications in information theoretic security.
The secrecy capacity of the type II wiretap channel (WTC II) with a noisy main channel is currently an open problem. Herein its secrecy-capacity is derived and shown to be equal to its semantic-security (SS) capacity. In this setting, the legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM) channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The secrecy criterion is achieved simultaneously for all possible eavesdropper subset choices. On top of that, SS requires negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations even when maximized over all message distributions. A key tool for the achievability proof is a novel and stronger version of Wyner's soft covering lemma. Specifically, the lemma shows that a random codebook achieves the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength. Since the combined number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, SS for the WTC II is established by using the union bound and invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. The direct proof shows that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity of the classic WTC with a DM erasure channel (EC) to the eavesdropper are achievable. The converse follows by establishing the capacity of this DM wiretap EC as an upper bound for the WTC II.
In many information-theoretic channel coding problems, adding an input cost constraint to the operational setup amounts to restricting the optimization domain in the capacity formula. This paper shows that, in contrast to common belief, such a simple modification does not hold for the cost-constrained (CC) wiretap channel (WTC). The secrecy-capacity of the discrete memoryless (DM) WTC without cost constraints is described by a single auxiliary random variable. For the CC DM-WTC, however, we show that two auxiliaries are necessary to achieve capacity. Specifically, we first derive the secrecy-capacity formula, proving the direct part via superposition coding. Then, we provide an example of a CC DM-WTC whose secrecy-capacity cannot be achieved using a single auxiliary. This establishes the fundamental role of superposition coding over CC WTCs.
We prove the partial strong converse property for the discrete memoryless non-degraded wiretap channel, for which we require the leakage to the eavesdropper to vanish but allow an asymptotic error probability ε ∈ [0, 1) to the legitimate receiver. We show that when the transmission rate is above the secrecy capacity, the probability of correct decoding at the legitimate receiver decays to zero exponentially. Therefore, the maximum transmission rate is the same for ε ∈ [0, 1), and the partial strong converse property holds. Our work is inspired by a recently developed technique based on information spectrum method and Chernoff-Cramer bound for evaluating the exponent of the probability of correct decoding.
This paper considers an extension of wiretap channel II, where the source message W is transmitted to the legitimate receiver via a discrete memoryless main channel (DMC). Receiving YN, the receiver needs to recover W with small error probability. Meanwhile, an eavesdropper is able to observe arbitrary subsequence of YNwith size μ = Nα, where 0 <; α <; 1 is a constant real number. The encoding-decoding scheme is designed to satisfy a strong secrecy criterion, i.e. the information of each block (instead of each bit) exposed to the eavesdropper is negligible or arbitrarily close to 0 when N is sufficiently large. We focus on the secrecy capacity of this model.