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arXiv:1701.06500

Particles, Cutoffs and Inequivalent Representations. Fraser andWallace on Quantum Field Theory

Matthias Egg, Vincent Lam, Andréa Oldofredi

Published Jan 1, 2017• 0 citations
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Abstract

We critically review the recent debate between Doreen Fraser and David Wallace on the interpretation of quantum field theory, with the aim of identifying where the core of the disagreement lies. We show that, despite appearances, their conflict does not concern the existence of particles or the occurrence of unitarily inequivalent representations. Instead, the dispute ultimately turns on the very definition of what a quantum field theory is. We further illustrate the fundamental differences between the two approaches by comparing them both to the Bohmian program in quantum field theory.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1701.06500

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We critically review the recent debate between Doreen Fraser and David Wallace on the interpretation of quantum field theory, with the aim of identifying where the core of the disagreement lies. We show that, despite appearances, their conflict does not concern the existence of particles or the occurrence of unitarily inequivalent representations. Instead, the dispute ultimately turns on the very definition of what a quantum field theory is. We further illustrate the fundamental differences between the two approaches by comparing them both to the Bohmian program in quantum field theory.
The debate between Fraser and Wallace (2011) over the foundations of quantum field theory (QFT) has spawned increased focus on both the axiomatic and conventional formalisms. The debate has set the tone for future foundational analysis, and has forced philosophers to “pick a side”. The two are seen as competing research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in how each handles renormalization. In this paper I argue that the terms set by the Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading. AQFT and CQFT should be viewed as complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis. Further, the focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly misleading. Though their methods differ, both axiomatic and conventional QFT seek to use the same physical principles to explain the same domain of phenomena.
There are significant problems involved in determining the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT). An ontology involving particles seems to be ruled out due to the problem of defining localized position operators, issues involving interactions in QFT, and, perhaps, the appearance of unitarily inequivalent representations. While this might imply that fields are the most natural ontology for QFT, the wavefunctional interpretation of QFT has significant drawbacks. A modified field ontology is examined where determinables are assigned to open bounded regions of spacetime instead of spacetime points.
I examine some problems standing in the way of a successful `field interpretation' of quantum field theory. The most popular extant proposal depends on the Hilbert space of `wavefunctionals.' But since wavefunctional space is unitarily equivalent to many-particle Fock space, two of the most powerful arguments against particle interpretations also undermine this form of field interpretation. 1. Introduction 2. Field Interpretations and Field Operators 3. The Wavefunctional Interpretation 4. Fields and Inequivalent Representations 4.1. The Rindler representation 4.2. Spontaneous symmetry breaking 4.3. Coherent representations 5. The Fate of Fields in Interacting QFT 6. Conclusions
This chapter considers another route to a particle interpretation of quantum field theory, one mediated by the existence of techniques (such as the use of Feynman diagrams to guide calculation) and explanations (such as the appeal to cosmological particle creation to account for decelerating cosmic expansion) best understood in terms of particles. Looking close at these techniques and explanations, the chapter argues that they rely on the presence of unitarily inequivalent representations, the very presence, Chapters 8 and 9 contended, that frustrates fundamental particle interpretation.
The availability of unitarily inequivalent representations of the canonical commutation relations constituting a quantization of a classical field theory raises questions about how to formulate and pursue quantum field theory. In a minimally technical way, I explain how these questions arise and how advocates of the Hilbert space and of the algebraic approaches to quantum theory might answer them. Where these answers differ, I sketch considerations for and against each approach, as well as considerations which might temper their apparent rivalry.
Despite its name, Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has been built to describe interactions between localizable particles. For this reason the actual formalism of QFT is partly based on a suitable generalization of the one already used for systems of point particles. This circumstance gives rise to a number of conceptual problems, stemming essentially from the fact that the existence within QFT of non-equivalent representations implies the existence of field theories allowing, within the same theory, different, inequivalent, descriptions of particles. This led some authors to claim that in QFT the concept itself of particle should be abandoned. In this paper we will shortly discuss the validity of this claim, as well as the possibilities, so far existing, of building alternative versions of QFT, not designed in advance to allow some kind of particle representation. We will also spend some words about the generalizations of the concept itself of particle which could grant for a better cohabitation of particles and fields within a wider formulation of QFT. The latter is indispensable if we want to extend the range of application of QFT from particle physics or simple condensed matter physics to other domains of scientific research.