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arXiv:1611.01111

The measurement problem is the measurement problem is the measurement problem

Veronika Baumann, Arne Hansen, Stefan Wolf

Published Nov 3, 2016• 52 citations
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Abstract

Recently, it has been stated that single-world interpretations of quantum theory are logically inconsistent. The claim is derived from contradicting statements of agents in a setup combining two Wigner's-friend experiments. Those statements stem from applying the measurement-update rule subjectively, i.e., only for the respective agent's own measurement. We argue that the contradiction expresses the incompatibility of collapse and unitarity - resulting in different formal descriptions of a measurement - and does not allow to dismiss any specific interpretation of quantum theory.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1611.01111

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Recently, it has been stated that single-world interpretations of quantum theory are logically inconsistent. The claim is derived from contradicting statements of agents in a setup combining two Wigner's-friend experiments. Those statements stem from applying the measurement-update rule subjectively, i.e., only for the respective agent's own measurement. We argue that the contradiction expresses the incompatibility of collapse and unitarity - resulting in different formal descriptions of a measurement - and does not allow to dismiss any specific interpretation of quantum theory.
Quantum mechanics famously posits two distinct evolution rules for the state of a system: a deterministic, unitary time evolution under the Schr¨odinger equation, and a probabilistic “collapse” of the wavefunction upon measurement as dictated by the Born rule. The apparent inconsistency of these two dynamical laws – one continuous and one discontinuous – constitutes the quantum measurement problem. This foundational problem, which underlies the emergence of definite outcomes from quantum superpositions, has persisted since the theory’s inception. In this review, we present a comprehensive and rigorous examination of the measurement problem and survey the leading approaches that seek to resolve or circumvent it. We begin by formulating the measurement problem and its conceptual challenges. We then discuss in detail the major interpretations of quantum mechanics and theoretical frameworks addressing the problem: the Copenhagen interpretation, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory, objective collapse models, the role of decoherence and environment-induced superselection, and epistemic approaches such as QBism. For each interpretation, we describe the core principles and mathematical formalism, assessing how (and whether) it attempts to solve the measurement problem. We also review modern developments and experiments relevant to quantum measurements, including tests of Bell inequalities, observations of decoherence and macroscopic superpositions, weak measurements and quantum eraser experiments, and thought experiments ‘a la Wigner’s friend. We highlight how these results inform the ongoing debate. Finally, we discuss open problems and challenges that remain in fully resolving the measurement problem.
The measurement problem is seen as an ambiguity of quantum mechanics, or, beyond that, as a contradiction within the theory: Quantum mechanics offers two conflicting descriptions of the Wigner's-friend experiment. As we argue in this note there are, however, obstacles from within quantum mechanics and regarding our perspective onto doing physics towards fully describing a measurement. We conclude that the ability to exhaustively describe a measurement is an assumption necessary for the common framing of the measurement problem and ensuing suggested solutions.
Recent extended formulations of the Wigner's friend thought experiment throw the measurement problem of quantum mechanics into sharper relief. Here I respond to an invitation by Renner to provide a consistent and concrete set of rules for quantum mechanics which can avoid the apparent paradox formulated by Frauchiger and Renner [Nat. Comm. 9, 3711 (2018)]. I propose a slight addition to standard textbook quantum mechanics, in the form of two rules, which avoids the paradox. The first specifies when a given quantum dynamics can be interpreted as a measurement. Potentially any dynamics can, but doing so depends on the context of other performed operations. The second requires that a joint context be used to determine whether several different dynamical evolutions can all be interpreted as measurement. The paradox is then avoided because not every participant in the Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment regards the stated dynamical descriptions of the experiment as measurements.
The Wigner's friend thought experiment was intended to illustrate the difficulty one has in describing an agent as a quantum system when that agent performs a measurement. While it does pose a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory, most modern interpretations have no trouble in resolving the difficulty. Recently, a number of extensions of Wigner's ideas have been proposed. We provide a gentle introduction to six such arguments, modifying the specifics of many of them so that they are as simple and unified as possible. In particular, we show that all of the arguments hinge on assumptions about correlations between measurement outcomes that are not accessible to any observer, even in principle. We then provide a critical analysis of each argument, focusing especially on how well one can motivate the required assumptions regarding these inaccessible correlations. Although we argue that some of these assumptions are not entirely well-motivated, all of the arguments do shed light on the nature of quantum theory, especially when concerning the description of agents and their measurements.
One of the reasons for the heated debates around the interpretations of quantum theory is a simple confusion between the notions of formalism versus interpretation. In this note, we make a clear distinction between them and show that there are actually two inequivalent quantum formalisms, namely the relative-state formalism and the standard formalism with the Born and measurement-update rules. We further propose a different probability rule for the relative-state formalism and discuss how Wigner's-friend-type experiments could show the inequivalence with the standard formalism. The feasibility in principle of such experiments, however, remains an open question.
Wigner-friend scenarios -- in which external agents describe a closed laboratory containing a friend making a measurement -- highlight the difficulties inherent to quantum theory when accounting for measurements. In non-relativistic scenarios, the difficulty is to accommodate unitary evolution for a closed system with a definite outcome obtained by the friend. In relativistic scenarios the tensions between quantum theory and relativity induce additional constraints. A generic property of relativistic scenarios is the frame-dependence of state update upon a measurement. Based on a definite example, we will show that this property leads to inconsistent accounts for outcomes obtained in different reference frames. We will further argue that these results point to some fundamental inadequacy when attempting to model actions taken by a complex agent as unitary operations made on simple wavefunctions.