Macro-realism is the position that certain macroscopic observables must always possess definite values: e.g. the table is in some definite position, even if we do not know what that is precisely. The traditional understanding is that by assuming macro-realism one can derive the Leggett-Garg inequalities, which constrain the possible statistics from certain experiments. Since quantum experiments can violate the Leggett-Garg inequalities, this is taken to rule out the possibility of macro-realism in a quantum universe. However, recent analyses have exposed loopholes in the Leggett-Garg argument, which allow many types of macro-realism to be compatible with quantum theory and hence violation of the Leggett-Garg inequalities. This paper takes a different approach to ruling out macro-realism and the result is a no-go theorem for macro-realism in quantum theory that is stronger than the Leggett-Garg argument. This approach uses the framework of ontological models: an elegant way to reason about foundational issues in quantum theory which has successfully produced many other recent results, such as the PBR theorem.
Macro-realism is the position that certain macroscopic observables must always possess definite values: e.g. the table is in some definite position, even if we do not know what that is precisely. The traditional understanding is that by assuming macro-realism one can derive the Leggett-Garg inequalities, which constrain the possible statistics from certain experiments. Since quantum experiments can violate the Leggett-Garg inequalities, this is taken to rule out the possibility of macro-realism in a quantum universe. However, recent analyses have exposed loopholes in the Leggett-Garg argument, which allow many types of macro-realism to be compatible with quantum theory and hence violation of the Leggett-Garg inequalities. This paper takes a different approach to ruling out macro-realism and the result is a no-go theorem for macro-realism in quantum theory that is stronger than the Leggett-Garg argument. This approach uses the framework of ontological models: an elegant way to reason about foundational issues in quantum theory which has successfully produced many other recent results, such as the PBR theorem.
Macroscopic realism is the thesis that macroscopically observable properties must always have definite values. The idea was introduced by Leggett and Garg (1985), who wished to show a conflict with the predictions of quantum theory, by using it to derive an inequality that quantum theory violates. However, Leggett and Garg's analysis required not just the assumption of macroscopic realism per se, but also that the observable properties could be measured non-invasively. In recent years there has been increasing interest in experimental tests of the violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality, but it has remained a matter of controversy whether this second assumption is a reasonable requirement for a macroscopic realist view of quantum theory. In a recent critical assessment Maroney and Timpson (2014) identified three different categories of macroscopic realism, and argued that only the simplest category could be ruled out by Leggett-Garg inequality violations. Allen, Maroney, and Gogioso (2016) then showed that the second of these approaches was also incompatible with quantum theory in Hilbert spaces of dimension 4 or higher. However, we show that the distinction introduced by Maroney and Timpson between the second and third approaches is not noise tolerant, so unfortunately Allen's result, as given, is not directly empirically testable. In this paper we replace Maroney and Timpson's three categories with a parameterization of macroscopic realist models, which can be related to experimental observations in a noise tolerant way, and recover the original definitions in the noise-free limit. We show how this parameterization can be used to experimentally rule out classes of macroscopic realism in Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or higher, without any use of the non-invasive measurability assumption. Even for relatively low precision experiments, this will rule out the original category of macroscopic realism, that is tested by the Leggett-Garg inequality, while as the precision of the experiments increases, all cases of the second category and many cases of the third category, will become experimentally ruled out.
Macroscopic Realism (MR) says that a macroscopic system is always determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable states available to it. The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality was derived to allow experimental test of whether or not this doctrine is true; it is also often thought of as a temporal version of a Bell-inequality. Despite recent interest in the inequality, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation. Here we resolve this controversy, which arises due to an insufficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far. We argue that LG's initial characterisation of MR does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, so we articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position in its place. We show that much weaker conditions than LG's are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three distinct species of MR-ist position, and argue that it is only the first of these which can be refuted by LG inequality violation. This first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out remains of interest, however. A crucial role is played in LG's argument by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational level, and the stronger notion of invasiveness at the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would be required to rule out MR per se but this property is not entailed by MR, and its presence cannot be established in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels, Bell's and LG's inequalities are not methodologically on a par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for the pedagogy of quantum superposition.
The violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality confirms the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macro-realism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and noninvasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails for systems in a superposition of macroscopically distinct states—or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong negation of macro-realism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell’s locality premise. We follow recent work and propose the validity of a subset of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) and Leggett–Garg premises, referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett–Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a weaker (less restrictive) sense. Weak MR is distinguished from deterministic macroscopic realism (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits that a predetermined value for the outcome of a measurement can be attributed to the system after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the “element of reality” defined by EPR for system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A by performing a measurement on system B. Weak MR posits that this element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the measurement setting at B has occurred. We demonstrate compatibility of systems violating Leggett–Garg inequalities with wMR but point out that dMR has been shown to be falsifiable. Other tests of wMR are proposed, the predictions of wMR agreeing with quantum mechanics. Finally, we compare wMR with macro-realism models discussed elsewhere. An argument in favour of wMR is presented: wMR resolves a potential contradiction pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macro-realism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.
In 1985, Leggett and Garg put forward the concept of macroscopic realism (macrorealism) and, in analogy to Bell's theorem, derived a necessary condition in terms of inequalities, which are now known as the Leggett-Garg inequalities. In this paper, we discuss another necessary condition called no-signaling in time. It solely bases on comparing the probability distribution for a macrovariable at some time for the cases where previously a measurement has or has not been performed. Although the concept is analogous to the no-signaling condition in the case of Bell tests, it can be violated according to quantum mechanical predictions even in situations where no violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities is possible.
The descriptions of the quantum realm and the macroscopic classical world di�er signi
�cantly not only in their mathematical formulations, but also in their foundational concepts
and philosophical consequences. The assumptions of local realism, non-contextuality
and macroscopic realism (macro-realism) along with the quantum mechanical violations
of these assumptions are discussed.
A complete generalization is provided of Wigner's argument inferring quantum nonlocality,
originally restricted for the EPR-Bohm entangled state, based on assuming joint
probability distributions for all the relevant dichotomic observables. Such Generalized
Wigner Inequality (GWI) turns out to be the N-partite local realist inequality which is
violated by quantum mechanics for all pure entangled states for any N.
We then exploit the non-trivial manifestation of quantum non-locality via local contextuality
on three qubit system. Here, we propose an experimental scheme to realize this
feature by deriving a new local realist inequality. The way quantum entanglement can
be used for global contextual value assigning is discussed in a quantum pseudo-telepathy
game.
In the second part of this report, we formulate Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) in terms
of joint probability and demonstrate its quantum mechanical violation for two state oscillation,
which is initial state dependent, unlike the case of standard LGI. It has been
shown that, the newly formulated LGI reveals robustness against unsharp measurement
for testing compatibility between macro-realism and quantum mechanics. Finally we
show that, the recently proposed No-signaling in time condition, contradicts with quantum
mechanical predictions for any degree of unsharpness in measurement.
Macrorealism is a classical world view asserting that the properties of macro-objects exist independently and irrespective of observation. One practical approach to test this view in quantum theory is to observe the quantum coherence for a macro-object in an interference experiment. An elegant and conceptually appealing approach for testing the notion of macrorealism in quantum theory is through the violation of Leggett-Garg inequality. However, a conclusive Leggett-Garg test hinges on how the noninvasive measurability criteria are guaranteed in an experiment and remains a debated issue to date. In this work, we connect the practical and the conceptual approaches for testing the macrorealism through the weak value. We argue that whenever a quantum effect is observed in an interference experiment there is an existence of anomalous weak value. Further, we demonstrate that whenever such weak value exists, one obtains the violation of a Leggett-Garg inequality in any interference experiment. Since in a path-only interference experiment effectively no prior measurement is performed, the Leggett-Garg test of macrorealism presented here is without assuming the noninvasive measurability. We provide a rigorous discussion about the assumptions involved in the Leggett-Garg scenario and how our scheme fits into it. Further, we provide a simple argument about the macrorealistic understanding of our results by using the recently developed approach involving quasiprobability.