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arXiv:1608.05780

QBISM, BOHR, AND THE QUANTUM OMELETTE TOSSED BY DE RONDE

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Nov 20, 2018• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In his recent paper "QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette" [1608.00548v1] de Ronde makes a variety of questionable claims concerning QBism, Bohr, and the present author's critical appraisal of QBism [1409.3312v1]. These claims are examined. Subsequently an outline is presented of what one might see if one looks into the quantum domain through the window provided by the quantum-mechanical correlations between outcome-indicating events in the classical domain.

DOI
10.1142/9789813276895_0013

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In his recent paper "QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette" [1608.00548v1] de Ronde makes a variety of questionable claims concerning QBism, Bohr, and the present author's critical appraisal of QBism [1409.3312v1]. These claims are examined. Subsequently an outline is presented of what one might see if one looks into the quantum domain through the window provided by the quantum-mechanical correlations between outcome-indicating events in the classical domain.
In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."
QBism may be the most significant contribution to the search for meaning in quantum mechanics since Bohr, even as Bohr's philosophy remains the most significant revision of Kant's theory of science. There are two ironies here. Bohr failed to realize the full extent of the affinity of his way of thinking with Kant's, and QBists fail to realize the full extent of their agreement with Bohr. While Bohr's discovery of contextuality updates Kant's transcendental philosophy in a way that leaves the central elements of the latter intact, Kant's insight into the roles that our cognitive faculties play in constructing physical theories can considerably alleviate the difficulties that Bohr's writings present to his readers. And while throwing a QBist searchlight on Bohr's writings can further alleviate these difficulties (as well as reveal the presence in them of the salient elements of QBist thought), Bohr's writings can in turn provide answers to important questions that QBism leaves unanswered (and also allay some of QBism's excesses). In the final sections I confront the two most impenetrable mysteries yet unearthed: making sense of quantum mechanics, and the dual mystery of making sense of (i) the existence of consciousness in a seemingly material world and (ii) the existence in consciousness of a seemingly material world. Here the relevant arguments are framed in the context of the philosophy of the Upanishads, according to which we (as Schrödinger put it) "are all really only various aspects of the One." There is no world that exists out of relation to consciousness, but there are different poises of consciousness. In particular, there is a poise of consciousness peculiar to the human species at this point in time, and there are poises of consciousness that are yet to evolve (and that may be essential to averting the calamities towards which humanity appears to be heading).
Recently I posted a paper entitled "External observer reflections on QBism". As any external observer, I was not able to reflect all features of QBism properly. The comments I received from one of QBism's creators, C. A. Fuchs, were very valuable to me in better understanding the views of QBists. Some of QBism's features are very delicate and extracting them from articles of QBists is not a simple task. Therefore, I hope that the second portion of my reflections on QBism (or, strictly speaking, my reflections on Fuchs reflections on my earlier reflections) might be interesting and useful for other experts in quantum foundations and quantum information theory (especially, taking into account my previous aggressively anti-QBism position). In the present paper I correct some of my earlier posted critical comments on QBism. At the same time, other critical comments gained new validation through my recent deeper understanding of QBists views on a number of problems.
The lately developed part of Quantum Bayesianism named QBism has been proclaimed by its authors a powerful interpretation of Quantum Physics. This article presents analysis of some aspects of QBism. The considered examples show inconsistencies in some basic statements of the discussed interpretation. In particular, the main quantum mechanical conundrum of measurement and the observer is, contrary to the claims, not resolved within the framework of QBism. The conclusion is made that the basic tenets of QBism as applied in Physics are unsubstantiated.