Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1605.04889 · Journal of Modern Physics

Counterfactual Definiteness and Bell’s Inequality

K. Hess, Hans A. De Raedt, Kristel F. L. Michielsen

Published Jan 1, 2016• 12 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Counterfactual definiteness must be used as at least one of the postulates or axioms that are necessary to derive Bell-type inequalities. It is considered by many to be a postulate that not only is commensurate with classical physics (as for example Einstein’s special relativity), but also separates and distinguishes classical physics from quantum mechanics. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Bell’s choice of mathematical functions and independent variables implicitly includes counterfactual definiteness. However, his particular choice of variables reduces the generality of his theory, as well as the physics of all Bell-type theories, so significantly that no meaningful comparison of these theories with actual Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments can be made.

DOI
10.4236/jmp.2016.713150

Related papers

Einstein-Local Counter-Arguments and Counter-Examples to Bell-Type Proofs

K. Hess

J. S. Bell’s well-known proofs of inequalities (and related work) are shown to be invalidated by two counter-arguments (-examples) that are based on Einstein-local propositions: Bell-type inequalities of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments must include, as virtually all physical theories do, elements of physical reality and their mathematical representations that relate to continua as opposed to exclusively finite numbers. Furthermore, Bell-type inequalities must be valid for all possible experimental geometries that lead to the quantum result. Based on these propositions, violations of Bell-type inequalities are demonstrated without violating Einstein locality, without conspiracy type theories and even for the case that all known “loopholes” are closed.

Journal of Modern Physics•Jan 1, 2023•2 citations

What do we learn from computer simulations of Bell experiments?

Marian Kupczyński

Contrary to counterfactual definiteness quantum theory teaches us that measuring instruments are not passively reading predetermined values of physical observables. Counterfactual definiteness allows proving Bell inequalities. If the contextual character of quantum measurements is correctly taken into account the proofs of these inequalities may not be done. In recent computer simulations of idealized Bell experiment predetermined successive outcomes of measurements for each setting and predetermined time delays of their registrations are calculated. Time windows and time delays are used to select various samples. Correlations, estimated using these selected samples are consistent with the predictions of quantum theory and the time window dependence is similar to the dependence observed in some real experiments. It is an important example how correlations can be explained without evoking quantum non-locality. However by using a suitable post-selection one may prove anything. Since before the post-selection generated samples may not violate Bell inequalities as significantly as finite samples generated using quantum predictions thus one may not conclude that counterfactual definiteness is not able to distinguish classical from quantum physics. Moreover we show that for each choice of a time window there exists a contextual hidden variable probabilistic model consistent with the post-selection procedure used by the authors what explains why they are able to reproduce quantum predictions.

arXiv:1611.03444•Nov 10, 2016•1 citation

The EPR paradox, Bell’s inequality, and the question of locality

Guy Blaylock

Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.

arXiv:0902.3827•American Journal of Physics•Dec 14, 2009•59 citations

Counterfactual restrictions and Bell’s theorem

Jonte R. Hance

Abstract We show that the ability to consider counterfactual situations is a necessary assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that, to allow Bell inequality violations while maintaining all other assumptions, we just require certain measurement choices be counterfactually restricted, rather than the full removal of counterfactual definiteness. We illustrate how the counterfactual definiteness assumption formally arises from the statistical independence assumption. Counterfactual restriction therefore provides a way to interpret statistical independence violation different to what is typically assumed (i.e. that statistical independence violation means either retrocausality or superdeterminism). We tie counterfactual restriction to contextuality, and show the similarities to that approach.

arXiv:1909.06608•Journal of Physics Communications•Dec 1, 2024•12 citations

EPR, Bell, and quantum locality

Robert B. Griffiths

Maudlin has claimed that no local theory can reproduce the predictions of standard quantum mechanics that violate Bell’s inequality for Bohm’s version (two spin-half particles in a singlet state) of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem. It is argued that, on the contrary, standard quantum mechanics itself is a counterexample to Maudlin’s claim, because it is local in the appropriate sense (measurements at one place do not influence what occurs elsewhere there) when formulated using consistent principles in place of the inconsistent appeals to “measurement” found in current textbooks. This argument sheds light on the claim of Blaylock that counterfactual definiteness is an essential ingredient in derivations of Bell’s inequality.

arXiv:1007.4281•American Journal of Physics•Aug 19, 2011•67 citations

On removing the classical-quantum boundary

Khaled Mnaymneh

We argue that it is adherence to the axiom of counterfactual definiteness and not to that of locality and realism that results in Bell inequality violations. Furthermore, this axiom is not supported in classical mechanics because of deeper implications that arise from the principle of stationary action. This means that the Bell inequality fails classically, effectively removing the classical-quantum boundary–a conclusion prophesized by Bell himself. An implication here is that a local hidden variable theory, in the configuration space of classical mechanics, may not be ruled out. Basing our idea on Jacobi’s “initial variable” framework, we propose that a classical path of stationary action that recedes into the infinite past and stretches into an infinite future implies a reality that lacks counterfactual definiteness. We then corroborate this with recent experimental results, through which it could be understood that our world could be such a reality.

arXiv:2312.11288•AIP Advances•Oct 1, 2024•0 citations
Counterfactual definiteness must be used as at least one of the postulates or axioms that are necessary to derive Bell-type inequalities. It is considered by many to be a postulate that not only is commensurate with classical physics (as for example Einstein’s special relativity), but also separates and distinguishes classical physics from quantum mechanics. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Bell’s choice of mathematical functions and independent variables implicitly includes counterfactual definiteness. However, his particular choice of variables reduces the generality of his theory, as well as the physics of all Bell-type theories, so significantly that no meaningful comparison of these theories with actual Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments can be made.
J. S. Bell’s well-known proofs of inequalities (and related work) are shown to be invalidated by two counter-arguments (-examples) that are based on Einstein-local propositions: Bell-type inequalities of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments must include, as virtually all physical theories do, elements of physical reality and their mathematical representations that relate to continua as opposed to exclusively finite numbers. Furthermore, Bell-type inequalities must be valid for all possible experimental geometries that lead to the quantum result. Based on these propositions, violations of Bell-type inequalities are demonstrated without violating Einstein locality, without conspiracy type theories and even for the case that all known “loopholes” are closed.
Contrary to counterfactual definiteness quantum theory teaches us that measuring instruments are not passively reading predetermined values of physical observables. Counterfactual definiteness allows proving Bell inequalities. If the contextual character of quantum measurements is correctly taken into account the proofs of these inequalities may not be done. In recent computer simulations of idealized Bell experiment predetermined successive outcomes of measurements for each setting and predetermined time delays of their registrations are calculated. Time windows and time delays are used to select various samples. Correlations, estimated using these selected samples are consistent with the predictions of quantum theory and the time window dependence is similar to the dependence observed in some real experiments. It is an important example how correlations can be explained without evoking quantum non-locality. However by using a suitable post-selection one may prove anything. Since before the post-selection generated samples may not violate Bell inequalities as significantly as finite samples generated using quantum predictions thus one may not conclude that counterfactual definiteness is not able to distinguish classical from quantum physics. Moreover we show that for each choice of a time window there exists a contextual hidden variable probabilistic model consistent with the post-selection procedure used by the authors what explains why they are able to reproduce quantum predictions.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
Abstract We show that the ability to consider counterfactual situations is a necessary assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that, to allow Bell inequality violations while maintaining all other assumptions, we just require certain measurement choices be counterfactually restricted, rather than the full removal of counterfactual definiteness. We illustrate how the counterfactual definiteness assumption formally arises from the statistical independence assumption. Counterfactual restriction therefore provides a way to interpret statistical independence violation different to what is typically assumed (i.e. that statistical independence violation means either retrocausality or superdeterminism). We tie counterfactual restriction to contextuality, and show the similarities to that approach.
Maudlin has claimed that no local theory can reproduce the predictions of standard quantum mechanics that violate Bell’s inequality for Bohm’s version (two spin-half particles in a singlet state) of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem. It is argued that, on the contrary, standard quantum mechanics itself is a counterexample to Maudlin’s claim, because it is local in the appropriate sense (measurements at one place do not influence what occurs elsewhere there) when formulated using consistent principles in place of the inconsistent appeals to “measurement” found in current textbooks. This argument sheds light on the claim of Blaylock that counterfactual definiteness is an essential ingredient in derivations of Bell’s inequality.
We argue that it is adherence to the axiom of counterfactual definiteness and not to that of locality and realism that results in Bell inequality violations. Furthermore, this axiom is not supported in classical mechanics because of deeper implications that arise from the principle of stationary action. This means that the Bell inequality fails classically, effectively removing the classical-quantum boundary–a conclusion prophesized by Bell himself. An implication here is that a local hidden variable theory, in the configuration space of classical mechanics, may not be ruled out. Basing our idea on Jacobi’s “initial variable” framework, we propose that a classical path of stationary action that recedes into the infinite past and stretches into an infinite future implies a reality that lacks counterfactual definiteness. We then corroborate this with recent experimental results, through which it could be understood that our world could be such a reality.