In 1862, George Boole derived an inequality for variables that represents a demarcation line between possible and impossible experience. This inequality forms an important milestone in the epistemology of probability theory and probability measures. In 1985 Leggett and Garg derived a physics related inequality, mathematically identical to Boole’s, that according to them represents a demarcation between macroscopic realism and quantum mechanics. We show that a wide gulf separates the “sense impressions” and corresponding data, as well as the postulates of macroscopic realism, from the mathematical abstractions that are used to derive the inequality of Leggett and Garg. If the gulf can be bridged, one may indeed derive the said inequality, which is then clearly a demarcation between possible and impossible experience: it cannot be violated and is not violated by quantum theory. This implies that the Leggett-Garg inequality does not mean that the SQUID flux is not there when nobody looks, as Leggett and Garg suggest, but instead that the probability measures may not be what Leggett and Garg have assumed them to be, when no data can be secured that directly relate to them. We show that similar considerations apply to other quantum interpretation-puzzles such as two-slit experiments.In 1862, George Boole derived an inequality for variables that represents a demarcation line between possible and impossible experience. This inequality forms an important milestone in the epistemology of probability theory and probability measures. In 1985 Leggett and Garg derived a physics related inequality, mathematically identical to Boole’s, that according to them represents a demarcation between macroscopic realism and quantum mechanics. We show that a wide gulf separates the “sense impressions” and corresponding data, as well as the postulates of macroscopic realism, from the mathematical abstractions that are used to derive the inequality of Leggett and Garg. If the gulf can be bridged, one may indeed derive the said inequality, which is then clearly a demarcation between possible and impossible experience: it cannot be violated and is not violated by quantum theory. This implies that the Leggett-Garg inequality does not mean that the SQUID flux is not there when nobody looks, as Leggett and Garg suggest, but instead that the probability measures may not be what Leggett and Garg have assumed them to be, when no data can be secured that directly relate to them. We show that similar considerations apply to other quantum interpretation-puzzles such as two-slit experiments.

Jan 1, 201613 citations

Condition for macroscopic realism beyond the Leggett-Garg inequalities

Johannes Kofler, Časlav Brukner

In 1985, Leggett and Garg put forward the concept of macroscopic realism (macrorealism) and, in analogy to Bell's theorem, derived a necessary condition in terms of inequalities, which are now known as the Leggett-Garg inequalities. In this paper, we discuss another necessary condition called no-signaling in time. It solely bases on comparing the probability distribution for a macrovariable at some time for the cases where previously a measurement has or has not been performed. Although the concept is analogous to the no-signaling condition in the case of Bell tests, it can be violated according to quantum mechanical predictions even in situations where no violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities is possible.In 1985, Leggett and Garg put forward the concept of macroscopic realism (macrorealism) and, in analogy to Bell's theorem, derived a necessary condition in terms of inequalities, which are now known as the Leggett-Garg inequalities. In this paper, we discuss another necessary condition called no-signaling in time. It solely bases on comparing the probability distribution for a macrovariable at some time for the cases where previously a measurement has or has not been performed. Although the concept is analogous to the no-signaling condition in the case of Bell tests, it can be violated according to quantum mechanical predictions even in situations where no violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities is possible.

arXiv:1207.3666Physical Review AMay 13, 2013196 citations

Realism with Quantum Faces: The Leggett–Garg Inequalities as a Case Study for Feyerabend's Views

Elise M. Crull

In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.

International Studies in the Philosophy of ScienceJul 17, 20243 citations

Extended Boole-Bell Inequalities Applicable to Quantum Theory

Hans A. De Raedt, K. Hess, Kristel F. L. Michielsen

We address the basic meaning of apparent contradictions of quantum theory and probability frameworks as expressed by Bell's inequalities. We show that these contradictions have their origin in the incomplete considerations of 1:he premises of the derivation of the inequalities. A careful consideration of past work, including that of Boole and Vorob'ev, has lead us to the formulation of extended Boole-Bell inequalities that are binding for both classical and quantum models. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken experiment and a macroscopic quantum coherence experiment proposed by Leggett and (Garg are both shown to obey the extended Boole-Bell inequalities. These examples as well as additional discussions also provide reasons for apparent violations of these inequalities.We address the basic meaning of apparent contradictions of quantum theory and probability frameworks as expressed by Bell's inequalities. We show that these contradictions have their origin in the incomplete considerations of 1:he premises of the derivation of the inequalities. A careful consideration of past work, including that of Boole and Vorob'ev, has lead us to the formulation of extended Boole-Bell inequalities that are binding for both classical and quantum models. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken experiment and a macroscopic quantum coherence experiment proposed by Leggett and (Garg are both shown to obey the extended Boole-Bell inequalities. These examples as well as additional discussions also provide reasons for apparent violations of these inequalities.

Journal of Computational and Theoretical NanoscienceMar 23, 201155 citations

Extended Boole-Bell inequalities applicable to quantum theory

Hans A. De Raedt, K. Hess, Kristel F. L. Michielsen

We address the basic meaning of apparent contradictions of quantum theory and probability frameworks as expressed by Bell's inequalities. We show that these contradictions have their origin in the incomplete considerations of the premisses of the derivation of the inequalities. A careful consideration of past work, including that of Boole and Vorob'ev, has lead us to the formulation of extended Boole-Bell inequalities that are binding for both classical and quantum models. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken experiment and a macroscopic quantum coherence experiment proposed by Leggett and Garg are both shown to obey the extended Boole-Bell inequalities. These examples as well as additional discussions also provide reasons for apparent violations of these inequalities.We address the basic meaning of apparent contradictions of quantum theory and probability frameworks as expressed by Bell's inequalities. We show that these contradictions have their origin in the incomplete considerations of the premisses of the derivation of the inequalities. A careful consideration of past work, including that of Boole and Vorob'ev, has lead us to the formulation of extended Boole-Bell inequalities that are binding for both classical and quantum models. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken experiment and a macroscopic quantum coherence experiment proposed by Leggett and Garg are both shown to obey the extended Boole-Bell inequalities. These examples as well as additional discussions also provide reasons for apparent violations of these inequalities.

arXiv:0901.2546Jan 16, 20093 citations

Bipartite Leggett-Garg and macroscopic Bell-inequality violations using cat states: Distinguishing weak and deterministic macroscopic realism

Manushan Thenabadu, M. D. Reid

We consider tests of Leggett-Garg's macrorealism and of macroscopic local realism, where for spacelike separated measurements the assumption of macroscopic noninvasive measurability is justified by that of macroscopic Bell locality. We give a mapping between the Bell and Leggett-Garg experiments for microscopic qubits based on spin- $1/2$ eigenstates and gedanken experiments for macroscopic qubits based on two macroscopically distinct coherent states $|\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ and $|\ensuremath{-}\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ (as $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rightarrow}\ensuremath{\infty}$). In this mapping, the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ of the Stern-Gerlach analyzer or polarizing beam splitter is realized by a local interaction $H=\mathrm{\ensuremath{\Omega}}{\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}}^{4}$ where $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}$ is the number of quanta. By adjusting the time of interaction, one alters the measurement setting $\ensuremath{\theta}$. We thus predict violations of Leggett-Garg and Bell inequalities in a macroscopic regime where coarse-grained measurements $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ need only discriminate between two macroscopically distinct coherent states. To interpret the violations, we distinguish between different definitions of macroscopic realism. Deterministic macroscopic local realism (dMR) assumes the system is in a state with a definite outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ for the measurement $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ prior to the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, and is negated by the violations. Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) assumes a definite outcome for systems prepared in a superposition ${\ensuremath{\psi}}_{\text{pointer}}$ of two macroscopically distinct eigenstates of $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$, after the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$. We find that wMR can be viewed consistently with the violations and with the predictions of quantum mechanics for two tests of wMR. A model is presented in which wMR holds and the macroscopic violations emerge over the course of the unitary dynamics occurring at both sites. Implications for the realism of the micro-macro state generated during a quantum measurement are discussed. Finally, we point out an EPR-type paradox, which demonstrates inconsistency between wMR and the completeness of quantum mechanics at a microscopic level.We consider tests of Leggett-Garg's macrorealism and of macroscopic local realism, where for spacelike separated measurements the assumption of macroscopic noninvasive measurability is justified by that of macroscopic Bell locality. We give a mapping between the Bell and Leggett-Garg experiments for microscopic qubits based on spin-$1/2$ eigenstates and gedanken experiments for macroscopic qubits based on two macroscopically distinct coherent states $|\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ and $|\ensuremath{-}\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ (as $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rightarrow}\ensuremath{\infty}$). In this mapping, the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ of the Stern-Gerlach analyzer or polarizing beam splitter is realized by a local interaction $H=\mathrm{\ensuremath{\Omega}}{\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}}^{4}$ where $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}$ is the number of quanta. By adjusting the time of interaction, one alters the measurement setting $\ensuremath{\theta}$. We thus predict violations of Leggett-Garg and Bell inequalities in a macroscopic regime where coarse-grained measurements $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ need only discriminate between two macroscopically distinct coherent states. To interpret the violations, we distinguish between different definitions of macroscopic realism. Deterministic macroscopic local realism (dMR) assumes the system is in a state with a definite outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ for the measurement $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ prior to the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, and is negated by the violations. Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) assumes a definite outcome for systems prepared in a superposition ${\ensuremath{\psi}}_{\text{pointer}}$ of two macroscopically distinct eigenstates of $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$, after the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$. We find that wMR can be viewed consistently with the violations and with the predictions of quantum mechanics for two tests of wMR. A model is presented in which wMR holds and the macroscopic violations emerge over the course of the unitary dynamics occurring at both sites. Implications for the realism of the micro-macro state generated during a quantum measurement are discussed. Finally, we point out an EPR-type paradox, which demonstrates inconsistency between wMR and the completeness of quantum mechanics at a microscopic level.

arXiv:2012.14997Physical Review AMay 16, 202212 citations

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eigenstates and gedanken experiments for macroscopic qubits based on two macroscopically distinct coherent states $|\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ and $|\ensuremath{-}\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ (as $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rightarrow}\ensuremath{\infty}$). In this mapping, the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ of the Stern-Gerlach analyzer or polarizing beam splitter is realized by a local interaction $H=\mathrm{\ensuremath{\Omega}}{\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}}^{4}$ where $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}$ is the number of quanta. By adjusting the time of interaction, one alters the measurement setting $\ensuremath{\theta}$. We thus predict violations of Leggett-Garg and Bell inequalities in a macroscopic regime where coarse-grained measurements $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ need only discriminate between two macroscopically distinct coherent states. To interpret the violations, we distinguish between different definitions of macroscopic realism. Deterministic macroscopic local realism (dMR) assumes the system is in a state with a definite outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ for the measurement $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ prior to the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, and is negated by the violations. Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) assumes a definite outcome for systems prepared in a superposition ${\ensuremath{\psi}}_{\text{pointer}}$ of two macroscopically distinct eigenstates of $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$, after the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$. We find that wMR can be viewed consistently with the violations and with the predictions of quantum mechanics for two tests of wMR. A model is presented in which wMR holds and the macroscopic violations emerge over the course of the unitary dynamics occurring at both sites. Implications for the realism of the micro-macro state generated during a quantum measurement are discussed. Finally, we point out an EPR-type paradox, which demonstrates inconsistency between wMR and the completeness of quantum mechanics at a microscopic level.