Many quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols require random choice of measurement basis for each pulse or each train of pulses. In some QKD protocols, such as the Round-Robin Differential Phase Shift (RRDPS) QKD protocol, this requirement is a bit challenging as randomly choosing hundreds of settings for every, say, 100 pulses may be too fast with current technologies. In this paper, we solve this issue by proving the security of QKD protocols with slow basis choice without compromising the secret key rate. We also show that the random choice of the bases for the state preparation can be made slow if the signals do not leak any information on the basis. Examples of QKD protocols that our technique can apply include the RRDPS protocol and BB84-type protocols, and our technique relaxes demands for the implementation of QKD systems.
Many quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols require random choice of measurement basis for each pulse or each train of pulses. In some QKD protocols, such as the Round-Robin Differential Phase Shift (RRDPS) QKD protocol, this requirement is a bit challenging as randomly choosing hundreds of settings for every, say, 100 pulses may be too fast with current technologies. In this paper, we solve this issue by proving the security of QKD protocols with slow basis choice without compromising the secret key rate. We also show that the random choice of the bases for the state preparation can be made slow if the signals do not leak any information on the basis. Examples of QKD protocols that our technique can apply include the RRDPS protocol and BB84-type protocols, and our technique relaxes demands for the implementation of QKD systems.
The round-robin-differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has attracted intensive study due to its distinct security characteristics; e.g., information leakage is bounded without learning the error rate of key bits. Nevertheless, its practicality and performance are still not satisfactory. Here, by observing the phase randomization of the encoding states and its connection with eavesdropper's attack, we develop an improved bound on information leakage. Interestingly, our theory is especially useful for implementations with short trains of pulses, and running without monitoring signal disturbance is still available. As a result, the practicality and performance of RRDPS are improved. Furthermore, we realize a proof-of-principle experiment with up to 140 km of fiber, which has been the longest achievable distance of RRDPS until now, whereas the original theory predicted that no secret key could be generated in our experiment. Our results will help in bringing practical RRDPS closer to practical implementations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the establishment of common cryptographic keys among distant parties. Many of the QKD protocols that were introduced in the past, involve the challenge of monitoring the signal disturbance over the communication line, in order to evaluate the information leakage to a potential eavesdropper. Recently, a QKD protocol that circumvents the need for monitoring signal disturbance, has been proposed and demonstrated in initial experiments. Here, we propose an improved version of this so-called round-robin differential phase-shifting (RRDPS) protocol, in which both time and phase degrees of freedom are utilized to enlarge the Hilbert-space dimensionality, without increasing experimental complexity or relaxing security assumptions. We derive the security proofs of the round-robin differential phase-time-shifting (RRDPTS) protocol in the collective attack scenario, and benchmark it against RRDPS for different experimental parameters. Furthermore, a proof-of-concept experiment of the RRDPTS protocol, using weak coherent pulses and decoy state method, is demonstrated over 80 km of fiber link. Our results show that the RRDPTS protocol can achieve higher secret key rate in comparison with the RRDPS, in the condition of high quantum bit error rate.
The differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocol was proposed aiming at simple implementation, but it can tolerate only a small disturbance in a quantum channel. The round-robin DPS (RRDPS) protocol could be a good solution for this problem, which in fact can tolerate even up to 50 of a bit error rate. Unfortunately, however, such a high tolerance can be achieved only when we compromise the simplicity, i.e., Bob's measurement must involve a large number of random delays (∣R∣ denotes its number), and in a practical regime of ∣R∣ being small, the tolerance is low. In this paper, we propose a DPS protocol to achieve a higher tolerance than the one in the original DPS protocol, in which the measurement setup is less demanding than the one of the RRDPS protocol for the high tolerance regime. We call our protocol the small-number-random DPS (SNRDPS) protocol, and in this protocol, we add only a small amount of randomness to the original DPS protocol, i.e., $2\ensuremath{\le}|\mathcal{R}|\ensuremath{\le}10$. In fact, we found that the performance of the SNRDPS protocol is significantly enhanced over the original DPS protocol only by employing a few additional delays such as ∣R∣=2. Also, we found that the key generation rate of the SNRDPS protocol outperforms the RRDPS protocol without monitoring the bit error rate when it is less than 5 and $|\mathcal{R}|\ensuremath{\le}10$. Our protocol is an intermediate protocol between the original DPS protocol and the RRDPS protocol, and it increases the variety of the DPS-type protocols with quantified security.
In conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, security is guaranteed by estimating the amount of leaked information. Such estimation tends to overrate, leading to a fundamental threshold of the bit error rate, which becomes a bottleneck of practical QKD development. This bottleneck is broken through by the recent work of round-robin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol, which eliminates the fundamental threshold of the bit error rate. The key challenge for the implementation of the RRDPS scheme lies in the realization of a variable-delay Mach--Zehnder interferometer, which requires active and random choice of many delays. By designing an optical system with multiple switches and employing an active phase stabilization technology, we successfully construct a variable-delay interferometer with 127 actively selectable delays. With this measurement, we experimentally demonstrate the RRDPS protocol and obtain a final key rate of 15.54 bps with a total loss of 18 dB and an error rate of 8.9%.
Recently, a round-robin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol was proposed [ Nature 509 , 475 (2014)], in which the amount of leakage is bounded without monitoring the signal disturbance. Introducing states of the phase-encoded Bennett–Brassard 1984 protocol (PE-BB84) to the RRDPS, this paper presents another quantum key distribution protocol called round-robin differential quadrature phase-shift (RRDQPS) quantum key distribution. Regarding a train of many pulses as a single packet, the sender modulates the phase of each pulse by one of {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}, then the receiver measures each packet with a Mach–Zehnder interferometer having a phase basis of 0 or π/2. The RRDQPS protocol can be implemented with essential similar hardware to the PE-BB84, so it has great compatibility with the current quantum system. Here we analyze the security of the RRDQPS protocol against the intercept-resend attack and the beam-splitting attack. Results show that the proposed protocol inherits the advantages arising from the simplicity of the RRDPS protocol and is more robust against these attacks than the original protocol.
Round-robin-differential-phase (RRDPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has attracted intensive studies due to its distinct security characteristic, e.g., information leakage in RRDPS can be bounded without learning error rate of key bits. Nevertheless, its implementation is still far from practical due to the complication of its measurement device. Moreover, on the theoretical side, its security is still not clear in view of error rate. Here, by observing a potential phase randomization in the encoding states, we develop a theory to bound information leakage quite tightly and differently. Besides, the error rate is incorporated to improve the secret key rate, which is significant for the understanding of RRDPS. Based on our novel security proof, the practicality and performance of RRDPS can be both improved dramatically. Furthermore, we realize an experiment up to 140km fiber distance which is the longest achievable distance of RRDPS system until now, while the original security proof predicts no secret key can be generated in our experiment. Our results pave an avenue towards practical RRDPS.