Blind quantum computing allows for secure cloud networks of quasi-classical clients and a fully fledged quantum server. Recently, a new protocol has been proposed, which requires a client to perform only measurements. We demonstrate a proof-of-principle implementation of this measurement-only blind quantum computing, exploiting a photonic setup to generate four-qubit cluster states for computation and verification. Feasible technological requirements for the client and the device-independent blindness make this scheme very applicable for future secure quantum networks.
Blind quantum computing allows for secure cloud networks of quasi-classical clients and a fully fledged quantum server. Recently, a new protocol has been proposed, which requires a client to perform only measurements. We demonstrate a proof-of-principle implementation of this measurement-only blind quantum computing, exploiting a photonic setup to generate four-qubit cluster states for computation and verification. Feasible technological requirements for the client and the device-independent blindness make this scheme very applicable for future secure quantum networks.
To date, blind quantum computing demonstrations require clients to have weak quantum devices. Here we implement a proof-of-principle experiment for completely classical clients. Via classically interacting with two quantum servers that share entanglement, the client accomplishes the task of having the number 15 factorized by servers who are denied information about the computation itself. This concealment is accompanied by a verification protocol that tests servers' honesty and correctness. Our demonstration shows the feasibility of completely classical clients and thus is a key milestone towards secure cloud quantum computing.
Current cloud-based quantum processors offer access to advanced hardware hosted on a remote server, but do not guarantee data or algorithm privacy. Blind quantum computation provides information-theoretic privacy by enabling a client to execute an algorithm without disclosing information about either the task or the final result. Here, we execute a measurement-based blind quantum computation protocol on a superconducting processor comprising two flip-chip-bonded modules, one acting as a server and the other as a client. The server generates a two-dimensional cluster state and forwards it to the client. Using this resource, the client implements a universal gate set with only adaptive single-qubit rotations and measurements. To illustrate this approach, we execute a three-qubit instance of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm. We analyze the server's quantum state after each rotation of a measurement-based single-qubit gate to verify that negligible information about the computation is revealed to the server, consistent with the one-way flow of information that guarantees blindness. This proof-of-principle demonstration establishes key elements of blind quantum computation in superconducting-circuit architectures, indicating that intermediate-scale implementations of blind protocols may become feasible with realistic near-term improvements in gate fidelities.
Blind quantum computing is a new secure quantum computing protocol where a client who does not have any sophisticated quantum technology can delegate her quantum computing to a server without leaking any privacy. It is known that a client who has only a measurement device can perform blind quantum computing [T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Phys. Rev. A 87, 050301(R) (2013)]. It has been an open problem whether the protocol can enjoy the verification, i.e., the ability of the client to check the correctness of the computing. In this paper, we propose a protocol of verification for the measurement-only blind quantum computing.
Blind quantum computation is a new secure quantum computing protocol which enables Alice (who does not have sufficient quantum technology) to delegate her quantum computation to Bob (who has a full-fledged quantum computer) in such a way that Bob cannot learn anything about Alice's input, output, and algorithm. In previous protocols, Alice needs to have a device which generates quantum states, such as single-photon states. Here we propose another type of blind computing protocol where Alice does only measurements, such as the polarization measurements with a threshold detector. In several experimental setups, such as optical systems, the measurement of a state is much easier than the generation of a single-qubit state. Therefore our protocols ease Alice's burden. Furthermore, the security of our protocol is based on the no-signaling principle, which is more fundamental than quantum physics. Finally, our protocols are device independent in the sense that Alice does not need to trust her measurement device in order to guarantee the security.
Verifiable blind quantum computing is a secure delegated quantum computing where a client with a limited quantum technology delegates her quantum computing to a server who has a universal quantum computer. The client's privacy is protected (blindness), and the correctness of the computation is verifiable by the client despite her limited quantum technology (verifiability). There are mainly two types of protocols for verifiable blind quantum computing: the protocol where the client has only to generate single-qubit states and the protocol where the client needs only the ability of single-qubit measurements. The latter is called the measurement-only verifiable blind quantum computing. If the input of the client's quantum computing is a quantum state, whose classical efficient description is not known to the client, there was no way for the measurement-only client to verify the correctness of the input. Here we introduce a protocol of measurement-only verifiable blind quantum computing where the correctness of the quantum input is also verifiable.
Blind quantum computing (BQC) allows a client to delegate quantum computations to a remote server without revealing the input, computation, or output. In addition to being blind, the client can sometimes also verify that the server has performed their instructions correctly, a property known as verifiability. A key part of realizing such verifiable BQC (VBQC) is choosing the design of the client device: many architectures have been proposed, each with different hardware requirements, security properties, and performance characteristics, making it difficult to identify which is most suitable for a given implementation. In this work, we present a comparative analysis of client architectures for VBQC with a matter-qubit server. We restrict our analysis to single-server, single-client protocols with information-theoretic security based on measurement-based quantum computation. We identify three main categories of client: emission-based, measurement-based, and rotation-based, each with multiple variants depending on how the client interacts with the server. We evaluate each across different dimensions: we compare guarantees of existing corresponding security proofs, we derive equations for the rate at which each client can execute a protocol, we provide an overview of each architecture's error behaviour, and discuss hardware cost and design considerations. Client architectures implementing measurement-based remote state preparation and reflection-based teleportation emerge as strong default candidates, but as the right choice remains context-dependent, we provide a framework for navigating considerations to guide the selection of the most suitable architecture for a given setting.