A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions required to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings. Here, we show how to use quantum information, together with the assumption of stateless (i.e., reusable) hardware tokens, to build statistically secure OTMs. This is in sharp contrast with the classical case, where stateless hardware tokens alone cannot yield OTMs. In addition, our scheme is technologically simple. We prove security in the quantum universal composability framework, employing semi-definite programming results of Molina, Vidick and Watrous [TQC 2013] and combinatorial techniques of Pastawski et al. [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2012].
A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions required to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings. Here, we show how to use quantum information, together with the assumption of stateless (i.e., reusable) hardware tokens, to build statistically secure OTMs. This is in sharp contrast with the classical case, where stateless hardware tokens alone cannot yield OTMs. In addition, our scheme is technologically simple. We prove security in the quantum universal composability framework, employing semi-definite programming results of Molina, Vidick and Watrous [TQC 2013] and combinatorial techniques of Pastawski et al. [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2012].
A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions required to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings. Here, we propose a scheme for using quantum information, together with the assumption of stateless ( i.e. , reusable) hardware tokens, to build statistically secure OTMs. Via the semidefinite programming-based quantum games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [STOC 2007], we prove security for a malicious receiver making at most 0.114 n adaptive queries to the token (for n the key size), in the quantum universal composability framework, but leave open the question of security against a polynomial amount of queries. Compared to alternative schemes derived from the literature on quantum money, our scheme is technologically simple since it is of the "prepare-and-measure" type. We also give two impossibility results showing certain assumptions in our scheme cannot be relaxed.
One-time memories (OTM's) are simple tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement one-time programs, a very general form of software protection and program obfuscation. Here we investigate the possibility of building OTM's using quantum mechanical devices. It is known that OTM's cannot exist in a fully-quantum world or in a fully-classical world. Instead, we propose a new model based on isolated qubits - qubits that can only be accessed using local operations and classical communication (LOCC). This model combines a quantum resource (single-qubit measurements) with a classical restriction (on communication between qubits), and can be implemented using current technologies, such as nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond. In this model, we construct OTM's that are information-theoretically secure against one-pass LOCC adversaries that use 2-outcome measurements.
Few primitives are as intertwined with the foundations of cryptography as Oblivious Transfer (OT). Not surprisingly, with the advent of quantum information processing, a major research path has emerged, aiming to minimize the requirements necessary to achieve OT by leveraging quantum resources, while also exploring the implications for secure computation. Indeed, OT has been the target of renewed focus regarding its newfound quantum possibilities (and impossibilities), both towards its computation and communication complexity. For instance, non-interactive OT, known to be impossible classically, has been strongly pursued. In its most extreme form, non-interactive chosen-input OT (one-shot OT) is equivalent to a One-Time Memory (OTM). OTMs have been proposed as tamper-proof hardware solutions for constructing One-Time Programs -- single-use programs that execute on an arbitrary input without revealing anything about their internal workings. In this work, we leverage quantum resources in the Noisy-Quantum-Storage Model to achieve: 1. Unconditionally-secure two-message non-interactive OT -- the smallest number of messages known to date for unconditionally-secure chosen-input OT. 2. Computationally-secure one-shot OT/OTM, with everlasting security, assuming only one-way functions and sequential functions -- without requiring trusted hardware, QROM, or pre-shared entanglement. 3. One-Time Programs without the need for hardware-based solutions or QROM, by compiling our OTM construction with the [GKR08, GIS+10] compiler.
One-time memories (OTM’s) are a simple type of tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware, which can be used to implement many forms of secure computation, such as one-time programs. Here we investigate the possibility of building OTM’s using isolated qubits — qubits that can only be accessed using local operations and classical communication (LOCC). Isolated qubits can be implemented using current technologies, such as nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond. We construct OTM’s that are information-theoretically secure against one-pass LOCC adversaries using 2-outcome measurements. (Also, these OTM’s can be prepared and accessed by honest parties using only LOCC operations.) This result is somewhat surprising, as OTM’s cannot exist in a fully-quantum world or in a fully-classical world; yet they can be built from the combination of a quantum resource (single-qubit measurements) with a classical restriction (on communication between qubits). Our construction resembles Wiesner’s original idea of quantum conjugate coding, implemented using random error-correcting codes; our proof of security uses entropy chaining to bound the supremum of a suitable empirical process. In addition, we conjecture that our random codes can be replaced by some class of efficiently-decodable codes, to get computationally-efficient OTM’s that are secure against computationally-bounded LOCC adversaries. In addition, we construct data-hiding states, which allow an LOCC sender to encode an (n O(1))bit messsage into n qubits, such that at most half of the message can be extracted by a one-pass LOCC receiver, but the whole message can be extracted by a general quantum receiver.
We construct simulation-secure one-time memories (OTM) in the random oracle model, and present a plausible argument for their security against quantum adversaries with bounded and adaptive depth. Our contributions include: (1) A simple scheme where we use only single-qubit Wiesner states and conjunction obfuscation (constructible from LPN): no complex entanglement or quantum cryptography is required. (2) A new POVM bound where e prove that any measurement achieving (1−ε) success on one basis has conjugate-basis guessing probability at most 2m1+O(ε41). (3) Simultation-secure OTMs in the quantum random oracle model where an adversary can only query the random oracle classically. (4) Adaptive depth security where, via an informal application of a lifting theorem from Arora et al., we conjecture security against adversaries with polynomial quantum circuit depth between random oracle queries.
Security against adaptive, depth-bounded, quantum adversaries captures many realistic attacks on OTMs built from single-qubit states; our work thus paves the way for practical and truly secure one-time programs. Moreover, depth bounded adaptive adversarial models may allow for encoding one-time memories into error corrected memory states, opening the door to implementations of one-time programs which persist for long periods of time.
Abstract. A one-time program is a hypothetical device by which a user may evaluate a circuit on exactly one input of his choice, before the device self-destructs. One-time programs cannot be achieved by software alone, as any software can be copied and re-run. However, it is known that every circuit can be compiled into a one-time program using a very basic hypothetical hardware device called a one-time memory. At first glance it may seem that quantum information, which cannot be copied, might also allow for one-time programs. But it is not hard to see that this intuition is false: one-time programs for classical or quantum circuits based solely on quantum information do not exist, even with computational assumptions. This observation raises the question, “what assumptions are required to achieve one-time programs for quantum circuits? ” Our main result is that any quantum circuit can be compiled into a one-time program assuming only the same basic one-time memory devices used for classical circuits. Moreover, these quantum one-time programs achieve statistical universal composability (UC-security) against any malicious user. Our construction employs methods for computation on authenticated quantum data, and we present a new quantum authentication scheme called the trap scheme for this purpose. As a corollary, we establish UC-security of a recent protocol for delegated quantum computation. 1