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arXiv:1509.08137 · Nature Photonics

Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

L. C. Comandar, Marco Lucamarini, Bernd Fröhlich, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe, Winci Tam, Zhiliang L. Yuan, Richard V. Penty, Andrew J. Shields

Published Apr 4, 2016• 250 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1038/nphoton.2016.50

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables private communications with information-theoretic security. To guarantee the practical security of QKD, it is essential that QKD systems are implemented in accordance with theoretical requirements and are robust with regard to side-channel attacks. Here we study a prominent attack on QKD transmitters known as the laser-seeding attack (LSA). It consists in injecting photons into the laser of the transmitter in an attempt to modify the outgoing light in some way that is beneficial to the eavesdropper. In this work we measure the response of a QKD transmitter to the LSA as a function of the optical power injected, allowing us to quantify the level of optical attenuation required to mitigate the attack. Further, we use a laser-rate-equation model to numerically simulate the effects of the LSA on a gain-switched laser. With this model we are able to reproduce previous experimental results, as well as generate new insight into the LSA by examining the effects of the LSA when the QKD transmitter is operated with different laser current driving parameters.
For effective quantum communication, the security of the photon source is particularly important in the era of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and twin-field QKD (TF-QKD). In practice, the security of the source can still be cracked by an adversary. This study experimentally demonstrates that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser-seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser yields increased intensities of the prepared states. Theory shows that the unnoticed intensity increase compromises the security of the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols.
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