Unlike mathematics, in which the notion of truth might be abstract, in physics, the emphasis must be placed on algorithmic procedures for obtaining numerical results subject to the experimental verifiability. For, a physical science is exactly that: algorithmic procedures (built on a certain mathematical formalism) for obtaining verifiable conclusions from a set of basic hypotheses. By admitting non-constructivist statements, a physical theory loses its concrete applicability and thus verifiability of its predictions. Accordingly, the requirement of constructivism must be indispensable to any physical theory. Nevertheless, in at least some physical theories, and especially in quantum mechanics, one can find examples of non-constructive statements. The present paper demonstrates a couple of such examples dealing with macroscopic quantum states (i.e., with the applicability of the standard quantum formalism to macroscopic systems). As it is shown, in these examples the proofs of the existence of macroscopic quantum states are based on logical principles allowing one to decide the truth of predicates over an infinite number of things.
Unlike mathematics, in which the notion of truth might be abstract, in physics, the emphasis must be placed on algorithmic procedures for obtaining numerical results subject to the experimental verifiability. For, a physical science is exactly that: algorithmic procedures (built on a certain mathematical formalism) for obtaining verifiable conclusions from a set of basic hypotheses. By admitting non-constructivist statements, a physical theory loses its concrete applicability and thus verifiability of its predictions. Accordingly, the requirement of constructivism must be indispensable to any physical theory. Nevertheless, in at least some physical theories, and especially in quantum mechanics, one can find examples of non-constructive statements. The present paper demonstrates a couple of such examples dealing with macroscopic quantum states (i.e., with the applicability of the standard quantum formalism to macroscopic systems). As it is shown, in these examples the proofs of the existence of macroscopic quantum states are based on logical principles allowing one to decide the truth of predicates over an infinite number of things.
According to mathematical constructivism, a mathematical object can exist only if there is a way to compute (or "construct") it; so, what is non-computable is non-constructive. In the example of the quantum model, whose Fock states are associated with Fibonacci numbers, this paper shows that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is non-constructive since it permits an undecidable (or effectively impossible) subset of Hilbert space. On the other hand, as it is argued in the paper, if one believes that testability of predictions is the most fundamental property of any physical theory, one need to accept that quantum mechanics must be an effectively calculable (and thus mathematically constructive) theory. With that, a way to reformulate quantum mechanics constructively, while keeping its mathematical foundation unchanged, leads to hypercomputation. In contrast, the proposed in the paper superselection rule, which acts by effectively forbidding a coherent superposition of quantum states corresponding to potential and actual infinity, can introduce computable constructivism in a quantum mechanical theory with no need for hypercomputation.
The logic of approximation gives a precise mathematical formulation to the notion of approximate truth and to deductions based on it. We study properties of quantum propositions expressed in this logic, in connection to a modal accessibility predicate which induces a metric on the set of states of a mechanical system. We then relate the logic to some quantum logical calculi, and discuss possible applications to probability theory and to the Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics. Natural deductions in mathematical logic are concerned with expressions of the form Ft-$ (read: ‘I’ yields @‘), where @ is a formula of a certain formal language L and I is a set of formulae of L . Semantically, the expression Ft@ means: ‘if all formulae in the set F are true then $J is also true’. In this paper we deal with natural deductions applied to the natural sciences, in particular to physics. The problem is that in the context of scientific theories we cannot always speak about (absolute) truth: we have to take into account the uncertainties and errors arising in experiments and
The non-classical nature of quantum theory has led to a number of efforts to formalize the logic of statements whose universe of discourse is the subatomic (see, for example, [3], [6], [8], and [10]).It might be hoped that ideally the fruit of such efforts would be a formalism not totally divorced from the classical logic, but incorporating or incorporated in it in such a manner as to unify the logic of the micro-and the macro-worlds.Indeed, this has been the general direction taken by these efforts, including that which we principally examine and expand upon here.*Josef Jauch, [6], pp.67-89, developed a "propositional calculus of quantum mechanics".He objected to calling a system like his a "logic of quantum mechanics"; however, our use of 'logic' here is not, I think, the use to which Jauch objected.A logic, for our present purposes, is a mathematical formalism having a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction; its actual application as normative of argumentation in reality is a matter of empirical judgment.This seems close to the way Jauch wished to use "propositional calculus" but more general, allowing for extension to a quantification theory of quantum mechanics, for example.Although Jauch's presentation of a propositional calculus of quantum mechanics is mathematically interesting and suggestive, there are a number of problems connected with it.It is our purpose to engage some of these problems and to present a rigorously defined formalism intended to come close to doing the job intended by Jauch for his logic.The success or lack of success of this effort as related to actual application of this formalism in the foundations of quantum theory is, I think, a matter for the physicists to decide; the empirical judgment involved in this application is not in the scope of this paper.If a formalism is to have a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction, it seems clear that it must include a relation which, when it holds between two elements of the formalism, may be reasonably interpreted as expressing that one of the elements 'follows from' the other, in •The author wishes to thank Robert Piziak for advice and comments in the course of research for this paper.
Scholars have wondered for a long time whether quantum mechanics (QM) subtends a quantum concept of truth which originates quantum logic (QL) and is radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept of truth. We show in this paper that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language of pragmatically decidable assertive formulas, which formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically justified or unjustified in the framework of QM. According to this interpretation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic concept of empirical justification within QM rather than properties of a quantum concept of truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist perspective, according to which nonstandard logics can be interpreted as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth, avoiding competition with classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of the standard concept of quantum truth are also obtained.
Formulations of quantum mechanics (QM) can be characterized as realistic, operationalist, or a combination of the two. In this paper a realistic theory is defined as describing a closed system entirely by means of entities and concepts pertaining to the system. An operationalist theory, on the other hand, requires in addition entities external to the system. A realistic formulation comprises an ontology, the set of (mathematical) entities that describe the system, and assertions, the set of correct statements (predictions) the theory makes about the objects in the ontology. Classical mechanics is the prime example of a realistic physical theory. A straightforward generalization of classical mechanics to QM is hampered by the inconsistency of quantum properties with classical logic, a circumstance that was noted many years ago by Birkhoff and von Neumann. The present realistic formulation of the histories approach originally introduced by Griffiths, which we call 'compatible quantum theory (CQT)', consists of a 'microscopic' part (MIQM), which applies to a closed quantum system of any size, and a 'macroscopic' part (MAQM), which requires the participation of a large (ideally, an infinite) system. The first (MIQM) can be fully formulated based solely on the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values, relying in an essential way on Gleason's theorem and on an application to dynamics due in large part to Nistico. Thus, the present formulation, in contrast to earlier ones, derives the Born probability formulas and the consistency (decoherence) conditions for frameworks. The microscopic theory does not, however, possess a unique corpus of assertions, but rather a multiplicity of contextual truths ('c-truths'), each one associated with a different framework. This circumstance leads us to consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate and therefore incomplete, though logically coherent. The completion of the theory requires a macroscopic mechanism for selecting a physical framework, which is part of the macroscopic theory (MAQM). The selection of a physical framework involves the breaking of the microscopic 'framework symmetry', which can proceed either phenomenologically as in the standard quantum measurement theory, or more fundamentally by considering the quantum system under study to be a subsystem of a macroscopic quantum system. The decoherent histories formulation of Gell-Mann and Hartle, as well as that of Omnès, are theories of this fundamental type, where the physical framework is selected by a coarse-graining procedure in which the physical phenomenon of decoherence plays an essential role. Various well-known interpretations of QM are described from the perspective of CQT. Detailed definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.
The purpose of this dissertation is to construct a radically new type of mathematics whose underlying logic differs from the ordinary classical logic used in standard mathematics, and which we feel may be more natural for applications in quantum mechanics. Specifically, we begin by constructing a first order quantum logic, the development of which closely parallels that of ordinary (classical) first order logic --- the essential differences are in the nature of the logical axioms, which, in our construction, are motivated by quantum theory. After showing that the axiomatic first order logic we develop is sound and complete (with respect to a particular class of models), this logic is then used as a foundation on which to build (axiomatic) mathematical systems --- and we refer to the resulting new mathematics as "quantum mathematics." As noted above, the hope is that this form of mathematics is more natural than classical mathematics for the description of quantum systems, and will enable us to address some foundational aspects of quantum theory which are still troublesome --- e.g. the measurement problem --- as well as possibly even inform our thinking about quantum gravity.\n\nAfter constructing the underlying logic, we investigate properties of several mathematical systems --- e.g. axiom systems for abstract algebras, group theory, linear algebra, etc. --- in the presence of this quantum logic. In the process, we demonstrate that the resulting quantum mathematical systems have some strange, but very interesting features, which indicates a richness in the structure of mathematics that is classically inaccessible. Moreover, some of these features do indeed suggest possible applications to foundational questions in quantum theory. \n\nWe continue our investigation of quantum mathematics by constructing an axiomatic quantum set theory, which we show satisfies certain desirable criteria. Ultimately, we hope that such a set theory will lead to a foundation for quantum mathematics in a sense which parallels the foundational role of classical set theory in classical mathematics. One immediate application of the quantum set theory we develop is to provide a foundation on which to construct quantum natural numbers, which are the quantum analog of the classical counting numbers. It turns out that in a special class of models, there exists a 1-1 correspondence between the quantum natural numbers and bounded observables in quantum theory whose eigenvalues are (ordinary) natural numbers. This 1-1 correspondence is remarkably satisfying, and not only gives us great confidence in our quantum set theory, but indicates the naturalness of such models for quantum theory itself. We go on to develop a Peano-like arithmetic for these new "numbers," as well as consider some of its consequences. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our results, and discussing directions for future work.