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arXiv:1507.02893

How to check quantum mechanics independently (Reply to arXiv:1505.04293)

Yuri Ozhigov

Published Jun 17, 2015• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This is the reply to the paper of Andrei Khrennikov arXiv:1505.04293 in which he expresses dissatisfaction with that the rough data in quantum experiments is not easily available and compares it with the open rough data in genetics. I try to explain why quantum experiments rough data is closed and why it differs radically from the biological. I also tried to answer the more thorny issue: is it possible to check quantum mechanics independently of other humans, e.g. trusting nobody.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1507.02893

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This is the reply to the paper of Andrei Khrennikov arXiv:1505.04293 in which he expresses dissatisfaction with that the rough data in quantum experiments is not easily available and compares it with the open rough data in genetics. I try to explain why quantum experiments rough data is closed and why it differs radically from the biological. I also tried to answer the more thorny issue: is it possible to check quantum mechanics independently of other humans, e.g. trusting nobody.
We reply to the comments by M. Sienicki and K. Sienicki (arXiv:2512.07881) and by K. Sienicki (arXiv:2601.06104) on our work on quantum-mechanical statistics in human language (arXiv:2407.14924) and on quantum structure in AI-generated language (arXiv:2511.21731). We thank the authors for their careful reading and address what we consider to be the main points of criticism: the exploratory nature of the protocol used in the experiments with large language models; the role of marginal-law violations, and of the Contextuality-by-Default criterion, in the identification of entanglement; the limited diagnostic value of a Bose-Einstein fit taken in isolation; the meaning of assigning the lowest energy levels to the most frequent words; and the relation between the vector spaces used by LLMs and quantum state spaces. We also correct a typographical error in Table 3 of arXiv:2511.21731, which does not affect the reported CHSH value.
This dialogue took place at Växjö, 19 November 2001. The main aim of our meeting in Växjö was to clarify our viewpoints on foundations of quantum mechanics. The most attractive in our discussion was the extreme difference in our quantum experiences. On one side, pure mathematician (specializing in foundations of probability theory), Andrei Khrennikov; on the other side, pure experimenter (specializing in neutron and electron interferometry), Johann Summhammer. On one hand, an attempt to test mathematical models for larger and larger domains of physical reality. On the other hand, an attempt to create this reality from experimental information - roughly speaking from clicks of detectors.
We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one’s computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a particular notion of randomness properly characterizes one’s empirical data. Indeed, we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of one’s quantum-mechanical experiments are randomly determined. This illustrates a radical sort of empirical underdetermination faced by fundamentally stochastic theories like quantum mechanics.