In this paper we attempt to discuss what has Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem to say about physical invariance and quantum individuality. In particular, we will discuss the impossibility of making reference to objective physical properties within the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics. Through an analysis of the meaning of physical invariance and quantum contextuality we will derive a Corollary to KS theorem that proves that a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as an object possessing (objective) physical properties. As a consequence, the notion of quantum object can be only defined in terms of nomological properties. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of this Corollary to KS theorem for the ongoing debate about quantum individuality.
In this paper we attempt to discuss what has Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem to say about physical invariance and quantum individuality. In particular, we will discuss the impossibility of making reference to objective physical properties within the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics. Through an analysis of the meaning of physical invariance and quantum contextuality we will derive a Corollary to KS theorem that proves that a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as an object possessing (objective) physical properties. As a consequence, the notion of quantum object can be only defined in terms of nomological properties. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of this Corollary to KS theorem for the ongoing debate about quantum individuality.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of contextuality is related to a purely formal understanding of contextuality as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread epistemic reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
The concept of individuality in quantum mechanics shows radical differences from the one used in classical physics. In particular, it is not possible to consider the fundamental particles described by quantum theory as individual distinguishable objects. In this paper we present arguments in favor of quantum non-individuality, which -in addition to those based on quantum statistics- relate to the Kochen-Specker theorem and the principle of superposition. Then, we analyze the possibility of referring to 'possible individuals' instead of 'actual individuals', and show that the Modal-Kochen-Specker theorem precludes this interpretational move.
Quantum contextuality is one of the fundamental notions in quantum mechanics. Proofs of the Kochen–Specker theorem and noncontextuality inequalities are two means for revealing the contextuality phenomenon in quantum mechanics. It has been found that some proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem, such as those based on rays, can be converted to a state-independent noncontextuality inequality, but it remains open whether this is true in general, i.e., whether any proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem can always be converted to a noncontextuality inequality. In this paper, we address this issue. We prove that all kinds of proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem, based on rays or any other observables, can always be converted to state-independent noncontextuality inequalities. Besides, our constructive proof also provides a general approach for deriving a state-independent noncontextuality inequality from a proof of the KS theorem.
Quantum contextuality is a concept used to describe the property of hidden-variable theory that measurement outcomes predetermined by the hidden variables depend on the measurement context. The term measurement context can have different meanings, giving rise to different flavours of quantum contextuality. The first discovered flavour is Kochen-Specker (KS) contextuality where measurement outcomes will depend on what compatible measurements are jointly performed with the selected measurement. Another flavour, here to be compared with KS contextuality, is that referred to in Bohmian mechanics where outcomes of some specific measurements are not completely specified by the model state, but depend also on specifics of the measurement device used. It has been claimed that this type of Bohmian contextuality is necessary to enable KS contextuality in a hidden variable model. In this paper we show that this is not the case. The recently proposed Contextual Ontological Model (COM) [Hindlycke and Larsson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2022] produces KS contextual predictions but does not have the Bohmian contextuality; the outcome of every measurement allowed by COM can be predicted from the model state itself. This distinguishes Bohmian contextuality from KS contextuality, and enables individual study of the two concepts.