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arXiv:1410.1422 · Physical Review A

Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

P. González, Lorena Rebón, Thiago Ferreira da Silva, Miguel E. Figueroa, C. Saavedra, Marcos Curty, G. Lima, GUILHERME BARRETO XAVIER, W. A. T. Nogueira

Published Aug 18, 2015• 24 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.92.022337

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Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) needs to close the big gap between theory and practice to be a suitable technology for achieving information-theoretic secure communications. Indeed, recent studies on side-channel attacks have exposed the vulnerabilities of QKD implementations against an eavesdropper who may try to attack both the source and the measurement device. Here, we review two potential approaches that, combined, could bring this goal closer: measurement-device-independent QKD and the loss-tolerant QKD protocol. The former removes all possible side-channels from the measurement apparatus and guarantees a high performance over long distances. The latter appears as a robust solution against typical source flaws and it offers similar key rates as those of standard QKD systems. Most importantly, the feasibility of both solutions has already been demonstrated in several lab and field-test experiments.
Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (DDI-QKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side channels, a major security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of DDI-QKD is not based on postselected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that DDI-QKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit devices' imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus, free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in DDI-QKD.
How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200 km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors.
Cryptography plays a crucial and significant part in key transmission between two users. To send the keys in a secure manner, quantum implementations are used. A recent method of distributing keys across users is known as quantum key distribution. There is a substantial disconnect between quantum key distribution (QKD) theory and practice in this regard. Gadgets no longer meet the security evidence's assumptions. This hole is accessed as an input here. A simple and direct measurement methodology that is independent of the QKD device and is primarily based on any potential flaws and/or failures. A quantum language exchange facet channel that is part of the QKD device. Our simplest technique is experimentally give up to one unpaired parameter for each transmitted pulse. This explains the high dissatisfaction with the source. Also, unlike DI (Device Independent) QKD, Stats leaked from user labs critical to ensuring QKD's security avatar. In that sense, its security is more than what DI QKD offers, but it provides a secret.
There is a large gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) because real devices do not satisfy the assumptions required by the security proofs. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple and practical measurement-device-independent-QKD type of protocol, based on the transmission of coherent light, for which we prove its security against any possible imperfection and/or side channel from the quantum communication part of the QKD devices. Our approach only requires to experimentally characterize an upper bound of one single parameter for each of the pulses sent, which describes the quality of the source. Moreover, unlike device-independent (DI) QKD, it can accommodate information leakage from the users' laboratories, which is essential to guarantee the security of QKD implementations. In this sense, its security goes beyond that provided by DI QKD, yet it delivers a secret key rate that is various orders of magnitude greater than that of DI QKD.