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arXiv:1409.0245 · BRILL eBooks

Is Mereology Empirical? Composition for Fermions.

Adam Caulton

Published Nov 21, 2015• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

How best to think about quantum systems under permutation invariance is a question that has received a great deal of attention in the literature.But very little attention has been paid to taking seriously the proposal that permutation invariance reflects a representational redundancy in the formalism.Under such a proposal, it is far from obvious how a constituent quantum system is represented.Consequently, it is also far from obvious how quantum systems compose to form assemblies, i.e. what is the formal structure of their relations of parthood, overlap and fusion.In this paper, I explore one proposal for the case of fermions and their assemblies.According to this proposal, fermionic assemblies which are not entangled-in some heterodox, but natural sense of 'entangled'-provide a prima facie counterexample to classical mereology.This result is puzzling; but, I argue, no more intolerable than any other available interpretative option.

DOI
10.1163/9789004310827_013

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Qualitative individuation in permutation-invariant quantum mechanics

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In this article I expound an understanding of the quantum mechanics of so-called "indistinguishable" systems in which permutation invariance is taken as a symmetry of a special kind, namely the result of representational redundancy. This understanding has heterodox consequences for the understanding of the states of constituent systems in an assembly and for the notion of entanglement. It corrects widespread misconceptions about the inter-theoretic relations between quantum mechanics and both classical particle mechanics and quantum field theory. The most striking of the heterodox consequences are: (i) that fermionic states ought not always to be considered entangled; (ii) it is possible for two fermions or two bosons to be discerned using purely monadic quantities; and that (iii) fermions (but not bosons) may always be so discerned.

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Abstract The emerging field of quantum mereology considers part-whole relations in quantum systems. Entangled quantum systems pose a peculiar problem in the field, since their total states are not reducible to that of their parts. While there exist several established proposals for modelling entangled systems, like monistic holism or relational holism, there is considerable unclarity, which further positions are available. Using the lambda operator and plural logic as formal tools, we review and develop conceivable models and evaluate their consistency and distinctness. The main result is an exhaustive taxonomy of six distinct and precise models that both provide information about the mereological features as well as about the entangled property. The taxonomy is well-suited to serve as the basis for future systematic investigations.

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How Symmetry Undid the Particle: A Demonstration of the Incompatibility of Particle Interpretations and Permutation Invariance

Benjamin C. Jantzen

The idea that the world is made of particles — little discrete, interacting objects that compose the material bodies of everyday experience — is a durable one. Following the advent of quantum theory, the idea was revised but not abandoned. It remains manifest in the explanatory language of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology. Aside from its durability, there is good reason for the scientific realist to embrace the particle interpretation: such a view can account for the prominent epistemic fact that only limited knowledge of a portion of the material universe is needed in order to make reliable predictions about that portion. Thus, particle interpretations can support an abductive argument from the epistemic facts in favor of a realist reading of physical theory. However, any particle interpretation with this property is untenable. The empirical adequacy of modern particle theories requires adoption of a postulate known as permutation invariance (PI) — the claim that interchanging the role of two particles of the same kind in a dynamical state description results in a description of the identical state. It is the central claim of this essay that PI is incompatible with any particle interpretation strong enough to account for the epistemic facts. This incompatibility extends across all physical theories. To frame and motivate the inconsistency argument, I begin by fixing the relevant notion of particle. To single out those accounts of greatest appeal to the realist, I develop the logically weakest particle ontology that entails the epistemic fact that the world is piecewise predictable, an ontology I call ‘minimal atomism’ (MA). The entire series of scientific conceptions of the particle, from Newton’s mechanically interacting corpuscles to the ‘centers of force’ in classical field theories, all comport with MA. As long as PI is left out, even quantum mechanics can be viewed this way. To assess the impact of PI on this picture, I present a framework for rigorously connecting interpretations to physical theories. In particular, I represent MA as a set of formal conditions on the models of physical theories, the mathematical structures taken to represent states of the world. I also formulate PI — originally introduced as a postulate of non-relativistic quantum mechanics — in theory independent terms. With all of these pieces in hand, I am then able to present a proof of the inconsistency of PI and MA. In the second part of the essay, I survey responses to the inconsistency result open to the scientific realist. The two most plausible approaches involve abandoning particles in one way or another. The first alternative interpretation considered takes the property bearing objects of the world to be regions of space rather than particles. In this view, the properties once attributed to particles in quantum states are attributed instead to one or more regions of space. PI no longer obtains in this case, at least not as a statement about the permutation symmetry of property bearers. Rather, the new interpretation naturally imposes an analogous constraint on quantum states. The second major approach to evading the inconsistency result is to dispense with objects altogether. This is the recommendation of so-called ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (OSR). The central OSR thesis is that structure rather than entities are the basic ontological components of the world. OSR is intended to embrace the ‘miracle’ argument in favor of scientific realism (it would be a miracle if a scientific theory were predictively successful unless it were also approximately true with regard to its description of reality) while avoiding the pessimistic meta-induction (most predictively successful theories along with their associated ontologies have been overturned, so we should expect the same of our current theories). I demonstrate that one principal motivation for OSR based on the under-determination of interpretations in QM is actually dissolved by the incompatibility result. At the same time, I suggest reasons to think that OSR fares no better with respect to the pessimistic meta-induction than traditional realism does. Thus, while PI and MA may be incompatible, object ontologies remain the best option for the realist.

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Invariance under quantum permutations rules out parastatistics

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Quantum systems invariant under particle exchange are either Bosons or Fermions, even though quantum theory in principle admits more general behavior under permutations. But why do we not observe such paraparticles in nature? The analysis of this question was previously limited primarily to specific quantum field theory models. Here we give two distinct model-independent arguments that rule out parastatistics, i.e. fundamentally indistinguishable quantum systems transforming under higher-dimensional representations of the symmetric group, which draw on quantum information theory and recent research on internal quantum reference frames. First, we introduce a notion of complete invariance: quantum systems should not only preserve their local state under permutations, but also the quantum information they carry about other systems, in analogy to the notion of complete positivity in quantum information theory. Second, we demand that quantum systems are invariant under quantum permutations, i.e. permutations conditioned on values of permutation-invariant observables. For both, we show that the respective principle is fulfilled if and only if the particle is a Boson or Fermion. Our results show how quantum reference frames can shed light on a longstanding problem of quantum physics, they underline the crucial role played by the compositional structure of quantum information, and demonstrate the explanatory power but also subtle limitations of recently proposed quantum covariance principles.

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Permutation interpretation of quantum mechanics

Vladimir V. Kornyak

We analyse quantum concepts in a constructive finite background. Introduction of continuum or other actual infinities into physics leads to non-constructivity without any need for them in description of empirical observations. We argue that quantum behavior is a natural consequence of symmetries of dynamical systems. It is a result of fundamental impossibility to trace identity of indistinguishable objects in their evolution — only information about invariant combinations of such objects is available. General mathematical arguments imply that any quantum dynamics can be reduced to a sequence of permutations. Quantum phenomena, such as interferences, arise in invariant subspaces of permutation representations of the symmetry group of a system. Observable quantities can be expressed in terms of the permutation invariants. We demonstrate that for description of quantum phenomena there is no need to use such non-constructive number system as complex numbers. It is sufficient to employ the cyclotomic numbers — a minimal extension of the natural numbers which is suitable for quantum mechanics.

Journal of Physics Conference Series•Feb 8, 2012•2 citations
How best to think about quantum systems under permutation invariance is a question that has received a great deal of attention in the literature.But very little attention has been paid to taking seriously the proposal that permutation invariance reflects a representational redundancy in the formalism.Under such a proposal, it is far from obvious how a constituent quantum system is represented.Consequently, it is also far from obvious how quantum systems compose to form assemblies, i.e. what is the formal structure of their relations of parthood, overlap and fusion.In this paper, I explore one proposal for the case of fermions and their assemblies.According to this proposal, fermionic assemblies which are not entangled-in some heterodox, but natural sense of 'entangled'-provide a prima facie counterexample to classical mereology.This result is puzzling; but, I argue, no more intolerable than any other available interpretative option.
In this article I expound an understanding of the quantum mechanics of so-called "indistinguishable" systems in which permutation invariance is taken as a symmetry of a special kind, namely the result of representational redundancy. This understanding has heterodox consequences for the understanding of the states of constituent systems in an assembly and for the notion of entanglement. It corrects widespread misconceptions about the inter-theoretic relations between quantum mechanics and both classical particle mechanics and quantum field theory. The most striking of the heterodox consequences are: (i) that fermionic states ought not always to be considered entangled; (ii) it is possible for two fermions or two bosons to be discerned using purely monadic quantities; and that (iii) fermions (but not bosons) may always be so discerned.
Abstract The emerging field of quantum mereology considers part-whole relations in quantum systems. Entangled quantum systems pose a peculiar problem in the field, since their total states are not reducible to that of their parts. While there exist several established proposals for modelling entangled systems, like monistic holism or relational holism, there is considerable unclarity, which further positions are available. Using the lambda operator and plural logic as formal tools, we review and develop conceivable models and evaluate their consistency and distinctness. The main result is an exhaustive taxonomy of six distinct and precise models that both provide information about the mereological features as well as about the entangled property. The taxonomy is well-suited to serve as the basis for future systematic investigations.
The idea that the world is made of particles — little discrete, interacting objects that compose the material bodies of everyday experience — is a durable one. Following the advent of quantum theory, the idea was revised but not abandoned. It remains manifest in the explanatory language of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology. Aside from its durability, there is good reason for the scientific realist to embrace the particle interpretation: such a view can account for the prominent epistemic fact that only limited knowledge of a portion of the material universe is needed in order to make reliable predictions about that portion. Thus, particle interpretations can support an abductive argument from the epistemic facts in favor of a realist reading of physical theory. However, any particle interpretation with this property is untenable. The empirical adequacy of modern particle theories requires adoption of a postulate known as permutation invariance (PI) — the claim that interchanging the role of two particles of the same kind in a dynamical state description results in a description of the identical state. It is the central claim of this essay that PI is incompatible with any particle interpretation strong enough to account for the epistemic facts. This incompatibility extends across all physical theories. To frame and motivate the inconsistency argument, I begin by fixing the relevant notion of particle. To single out those accounts of greatest appeal to the realist, I develop the logically weakest particle ontology that entails the epistemic fact that the world is piecewise predictable, an ontology I call ‘minimal atomism’ (MA). The entire series of scientific conceptions of the particle, from Newton’s mechanically interacting corpuscles to the ‘centers of force’ in classical field theories, all comport with MA. As long as PI is left out, even quantum mechanics can be viewed this way. To assess the impact of PI on this picture, I present a framework for rigorously connecting interpretations to physical theories. In particular, I represent MA as a set of formal conditions on the models of physical theories, the mathematical structures taken to represent states of the world. I also formulate PI — originally introduced as a postulate of non-relativistic quantum mechanics — in theory independent terms. With all of these pieces in hand, I am then able to present a proof of the inconsistency of PI and MA. In the second part of the essay, I survey responses to the inconsistency result open to the scientific realist. The two most plausible approaches involve abandoning particles in one way or another. The first alternative interpretation considered takes the property bearing objects of the world to be regions of space rather than particles. In this view, the properties once attributed to particles in quantum states are attributed instead to one or more regions of space. PI no longer obtains in this case, at least not as a statement about the permutation symmetry of property bearers. Rather, the new interpretation naturally imposes an analogous constraint on quantum states. The second major approach to evading the inconsistency result is to dispense with objects altogether. This is the recommendation of so-called ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (OSR). The central OSR thesis is that structure rather than entities are the basic ontological components of the world. OSR is intended to embrace the ‘miracle’ argument in favor of scientific realism (it would be a miracle if a scientific theory were predictively successful unless it were also approximately true with regard to its description of reality) while avoiding the pessimistic meta-induction (most predictively successful theories along with their associated ontologies have been overturned, so we should expect the same of our current theories). I demonstrate that one principal motivation for OSR based on the under-determination of interpretations in QM is actually dissolved by the incompatibility result. At the same time, I suggest reasons to think that OSR fares no better with respect to the pessimistic meta-induction than traditional realism does. Thus, while PI and MA may be incompatible, object ontologies remain the best option for the realist.
Quantum systems invariant under particle exchange are either Bosons or Fermions, even though quantum theory in principle admits more general behavior under permutations. But why do we not observe such paraparticles in nature? The analysis of this question was previously limited primarily to specific quantum field theory models. Here we give two distinct model-independent arguments that rule out parastatistics, i.e. fundamentally indistinguishable quantum systems transforming under higher-dimensional representations of the symmetric group, which draw on quantum information theory and recent research on internal quantum reference frames. First, we introduce a notion of complete invariance: quantum systems should not only preserve their local state under permutations, but also the quantum information they carry about other systems, in analogy to the notion of complete positivity in quantum information theory. Second, we demand that quantum systems are invariant under quantum permutations, i.e. permutations conditioned on values of permutation-invariant observables. For both, we show that the respective principle is fulfilled if and only if the particle is a Boson or Fermion. Our results show how quantum reference frames can shed light on a longstanding problem of quantum physics, they underline the crucial role played by the compositional structure of quantum information, and demonstrate the explanatory power but also subtle limitations of recently proposed quantum covariance principles.
We analyse quantum concepts in a constructive finite background. Introduction of continuum or other actual infinities into physics leads to non-constructivity without any need for them in description of empirical observations. We argue that quantum behavior is a natural consequence of symmetries of dynamical systems. It is a result of fundamental impossibility to trace identity of indistinguishable objects in their evolution — only information about invariant combinations of such objects is available. General mathematical arguments imply that any quantum dynamics can be reduced to a sequence of permutations. Quantum phenomena, such as interferences, arise in invariant subspaces of permutation representations of the symmetry group of a system. Observable quantities can be expressed in terms of the permutation invariants. We demonstrate that for description of quantum phenomena there is no need to use such non-constructive number system as complex numbers. It is sufficient to employ the cyclotomic numbers — a minimal extension of the natural numbers which is suitable for quantum mechanics.