Even though a method to perfectly sign quantum messages has not been known, the arbitrated quantum signature scheme has been considered as one of the good candidates. However, its forgery problem has been an obstacle to the scheme becoming a successful method. In this paper, we consider one situation, which is slightly different from the forgery problem, that we use to check whether at least one quantum message with signature can be forged in a given scheme, although all the messages cannot be forged. If there are only a finite number of forgeable quantum messages in the scheme, then the scheme can be secured against the forgery attack by not sending forgeable quantum messages, and so our situation does not directly imply that we check whether the scheme is secure against the attack. However, if users run a given scheme without any consideration of forgeable quantum messages, then a sender might transmit such forgeable messages to a receiver and in such a case an attacker can forge the messages if the attacker knows them. Thus it is important and necessary to look into forgeable quantum messages. We show here that there always exists such a forgeable quantum message-signature pair for every known scheme with quantum encryption and rotation, and numerically show that there are no forgeable quantum message-signature pairs that exist in an arbitrated quantum signature scheme.
Even though a method to perfectly sign quantum messages has not been known, the arbitrated quantum signature scheme has been considered as one of the good candidates. However, its forgery problem has been an obstacle to the scheme becoming a successful method. In this paper, we consider one situation, which is slightly different from the forgery problem, that we use to check whether at least one quantum message with signature can be forged in a given scheme, although all the messages cannot be forged. If there are only a finite number of forgeable quantum messages in the scheme, then the scheme can be secured against the forgery attack by not sending forgeable quantum messages, and so our situation does not directly imply that we check whether the scheme is secure against the attack. However, if users run a given scheme without any consideration of forgeable quantum messages, then a sender might transmit such forgeable messages to a receiver and in such a case an attacker can forge the messages if the attacker knows them. Thus it is important and necessary to look into forgeable quantum messages. We show here that there always exists such a forgeable quantum message-signature pair for every known scheme with quantum encryption and rotation, and numerically show that there are no forgeable quantum message-signature pairs that exist in an arbitrated quantum signature scheme.
Many arbitrated quantum signature schemes implemented with the help of a trusted third party have been developed up to now. In order to guarantee unconditional security, most of them take advantage of the optimal quantum one-time encryption based on Pauli operators. However, in this paper we point out that the previous schemes provide security only against a total break attack and show in fact that there exists an existential forgery attack that can validly modify the transmitted pair of message and signature. In addition, we also provide a simple method to recover security against the proposed attack.
When we want to sign a quantum message that we create, we can use arbitrated quantum signature schemes which are possible to sign for not only known quantum messages but also unknown quantum messages. However, since the arbitrated quantum signature schemes need the help of a trusted arbitrator in each verification of the signature, it is known that the schemes are not convenient in practical use. If we consider only known quantum messages such as the above situation, there can exist a quantum signature scheme with more efficient structure. In this paper, we present a new quantum signature scheme for known quantum messages without the help of an arbitrator. Differing from arbitrated quantum signature schemes based on the quantum one-time pad with the symmetric key, since our scheme is based on quantum public-key cryptosystems, the validity of the signature can be verified by a receiver without the help of an arbitrator. Moreover, we show that our scheme provides the functions of quantum message integrity, user authentication and non-repudiation of the origin as in digital signature schemes.
Arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes aim at ensuring the authenticity of a message with the help of an arbitrator. Moreover, they aim at preventing repudiation, both from a sender that denies the origin of a message, and from a receiver who disavows its reception. Such protocols use quantum communication and are often designed to protect quantum messages. In this paper, we study four recently submitted AQS schemes and propose attacks on their security.
Firstly, we look at Zhang, Sun, Zhang and Jia's AQS scheme which aims at signing quantum messages with chained CNOT encryption. We show that the sender can repudiate her messages and make false allegation of reception. Moreover, we show that a dishonest receiver can forge signatures.
Secondly, we analyse Ding, Xin, Yang and Sang's AQS protocol to sign classical messages based on GHZ states. We show that both the sender and the receiver have simple repudiation strategies.
Thirdly, we study Lu, Li, Yu and Han's AQS scheme that uses controlled teleportation to protect quantum messages. We expose forgeries, false allegation attacks and the possibility of repudiation by both parties.
Fourthly, we focus on the AQS scheme by Zhang, Xin, Sun, Li and Li designed to sign classical messages without entangled states. We show that one can disavow the reception of messages, and that information-theoretic security is not achieved for other security goals.
As a new model for signing quantum messages, arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) has recently received a lot of attention. In this paper we study the cryptanalysis of previous AQS protocols from the aspects of forgery and disavowal. We show that in these protocols the receiver, Bob, can realize existential forgery of the sender's signature under known message attack. Bob can even achieve universal forgery when the protocols are used to sign a classical message. Furthermore, the sender, Alice, can successfully disavow any of her signatures by simple attack. The attack strategies are described in detail and some discussions about the potential improvements of the protocols are given. Finally we also present several interesting topics on AQS protocols that can be studied in future.
Arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes use quantum cryptography to ensure their security, and the schemes provide that the signature receiver verifies the signature with the arbitrator's assistance.Very recently, Gao and Choi found in some previous AQS schemes, the receiver, Bob can counterfeit the signer's signature under known message.Additionally, the paper gives the security analysis of the AQS scheme, and results show that not only the receiver, but also the attacker can forge the signature in the AQS scheme.Furthermore, the signer can successfully disavow any message she ever signed.To conquer these shortcomings, this paper gives a new AQS scheme without quantum entangled state; it uses special quantum logic gate and new quantum one-time pads to ensure its security.Compares with other previous AQS schemes, the new scheme has following advantages: (1) the new scheme guarantees the receiver and the attacker cannot forge the signature; (2) Because the new scheme does not use quantum entangled states, so it can reduce the complexity of implementation and provides a higher efficiency in transmission; (3) The receiver, Bob has verified the signature's integrity, so Alice cannot disavow her having signed message.
Arbitrated signature provides that the signatory signs a message with his private key by quantum cryptography, while the signature receiver verifies the signature with the arbitrator’s assistance. In this work, security analysis was given to the arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) and results showed that the receiver Bob and the attacker can forge the signature. Then this paper gives a new quantum one-time pads encryption method, which is suit for the quantum signature. At last, a new AQS protocol using Einstein-Podoisky-Rosen (EPR) pairs is proposed. By using of quantum key distribution (QKD) and new quantum one-time pads, the new scheme can resist Shor’s attack. The new scheme has following advantages: (1) The scheme reduces the complexity of implementation and provides a higher efficiency in transmission; (2) Compares with some AQS schemes, the scheme can avoid being disavowed by the receiver; (3) Compares with other AQS schemes, the scheme also guarantees the arbitrator cannot forge the signature and it also ensure the receiver and other attacker cannot forge the signature.