When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of being detected. With such a channel, a one-time pad can safely be reused many times as long as no eavesdrop is detected, and, planning ahead, part of the capacity of these uncompromised transmissions can be used to send fresh random bits with which to replace the one-time pad when an eavesdrop finally is detected. Unlike other schemes for stretching a one-time pad, this scheme does not depend on complexity-theoretic assumptions such as the difficulty of factoring.
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of being detected. With such a channel, a one-time pad can safely be reused many times as long as no eavesdrop is detected, and, planning ahead, part of the capacity of these uncompromised transmissions can be used to send fresh random bits with which to replace the one-time pad when an eavesdrop finally is detected. Unlike other schemes for stretching a one-time pad, this scheme does not depend on complexity-theoretic assumptions such as the difficulty of factoring.
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of disturbing the transmission in such a way as to be detected. Such a quantum channel can be used in conjunction with ordinary insecure classical channels to distribute random key information between two users with the assurance that it remains unknown to anyone else, even when the users share no secret information initially. We also present a protocol for coin-tossing by exchange of quantum messages, which is secure against traditional kinds of cheating, even by an opponent with unlimited computing power, but ironically can be subverted by use of a still subtler quantum phenomenon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox.
Classical one-time-pad key can only be used once. We show in this Letter that with quantum mechanical information media classical one-time-pad key can be repeatedly used. We propose a specific realization using single photons. The reason why quantum mechanics can make the classical one-time-pad key repeatable is that quantum states can not be cloned and eavesdropping can be detected by the legitimate users. This represents a significant difference between classical cryptography and quantum cryptography and provides a new tool in designing quantum communication protocols and flexibility in practical applications. Note added: This work was submitted to PRL as LU9745 on 29 July 2004, and the decision was returned on 11 November 2004, which advised us to resubmit to some specialized journal, probably, PRA, after revision. We publish it here in memory of Prof. Fu-Guo Deng (1975.11.12-2019.1.18), from Beijing Normal University, who died on Jan 18, 2019 after two years heroic fight with pancreatic cancer. In this work, we designed a protocol to repeatedly use a classical one-time-pad key to transmit ciphertext using single photon states. The essential idea was proposed in November 1982, by Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard, Seth Breidbart, which was rejected by Fifteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, and remained unpublished until 2014, when they published the article, Quantum Cryptography II: How to re-use a one-time pad safely even if P=NP, Natural Computing (2014) 13:453-458, DOI 10.1007/s11047-014-9453-6. We worked out this idea independently. This work has not been published, and was in cooperated into quant-ph 0706.3791 (Kai Wen, Fu Guo Deng, Gui Lu Long, Secure Reusable Base-String in Quantum Key Distribution), and quant-ph 0711.1632 (Kai Wen, Fu-Guo Deng, Gui Lu Long, Reusable Vernam Cipher with Quantum Media).
Cryptographic protocols can be classified by the type of security against eavesdropping which they provide. There exist mathematically secure schemes whose security relies on mathematical proofs (like the Vernam cipher discussed below) or conjectures (like public key RSA encryption) about the complexity of deciphering the message without possessing the correct key. The majority of current secure public Internet connections rely on such schemes. Alternatively, a cryptographic setup may provide a physically secure method for communicating. In these setups the security is provided by the physical laws governing the communication protocol. Here we first discuss a provably secure classical communication protocol and then quantum methods for distributing the necessary keys. The BB84 protocol relies on the impossibility of perfectly distinguishing non-orthogonal quantum states from one copy of the quantum system. The scheme was invented in 1984 and is the first of its kind. In contrast, the Ekert91 protocol makes use of Bell correlations between entangled pairs of photons. These correlations are destroyed when Eve attempts to make a measurement on one of the particles but also when imperfections, such as decoherence processes, affect the scheme. As long as no such “elements of reality” are introduced, and Bell correlations violating local realism can be generated by Alice and Bob, no eavesdropper can be present. One-time pads and the Vernam cipher The Vernam cipher is a cryptographic protocol which allows the encryption and decryption protocol to be publicly known. The security of the protocol relies entirely on the key which is private and not publicly known. Alice and Bob share identical n -bit secret key strings (one-time pad).
Quantum Cryptography is based on the use of subatomic particles (photons) and their intrinsic quantum properties (photon polarization) to develop an unbreakable system. It is not possible to measure the quantum state of any system without affecting the system. This property provides secure transmission of key between sender and receiver. Quantum Cryptography is a way to combine the relative ease and convenience of key exchange in public key cryptography with the ultimate security of a one-time pad. Quantum techniques for key distribution, the classically impossible task of distributing secret information over an insecure channel whose transmissions are subject to inspection by an eavesdropper, between parties who share no secret key initially. Quantum Cryptography uses the principles of Quantum Mechanics to implement a cryptographic system. The key problem which is solved by using quantum techniques is that of eavesdropping detection. The bits are represented as qubits, physically modeled by photons, and communicated over a quantum channel. The polarization states of photons represent 0's and 1's. Keyword: Asymmetric key, Cryptography, Protocols, Quantum, symmetric key
Quantum cryptography Ð quantum key distribution (QKD) Ð was one of the first fields of study of quantum information theory.It reached a mature scientific level and has been implemented in commercial systems for secure quantum communications.The key distribution problem is the central issue of symmetric cryptography.Quantum cryptography solves this problem on the basis of the fundamental laws of nature: the principles of quantum mechanics.Quantum key distribution is essentially matching two independent random sequences on the transmitting and receiving sides by exchanging quantum states.Required in addition to the quantum channel is an authentic classical communication channel.Both communication channels are open and vulnerable to a perpetrator's attack.To ensure the authenticity of the classical channel at initial system startup, a seed key is required, which is used to provide information-theoretic authentication.In essence, quantum cryptography systems are mechanisms for expanding this seed key.Subsequent sessions generate a quantum key, part of which is used for authentication, while another part is employed for other cryptographic purposes, such as encryption.An issue fundamental for quantum cryptography is the number of quantum key distribution sessions that can be conducted from the initial system launch until a new system reboot, when the cryptographic properties of the quantum keys reach a critical level, after which they can no longer be used for cryptographic purposes, and a new system reboot is needed.Although a number of reviews on quantum cryptography are currently available, this issue has not been discussed in detail.It is shown that for realistic parameters of quantum cryptography systems that are currently achievable, a QKD system can operate for I.