Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1405.3569 · Journal of Physics Conference Series

Any realistic model of a physical system must be computationally realistic

Arkady Bolotin

Published Jan 21, 2015• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is argued that any possible definition of a realistic physics theory – i.e., a mathematical model representing the real world – cannot be considered comprehensive unless it is supplemented with requirement of being computationally realistic. That is, the mathematical structure of a realistic model of a physical system must allow the collection of all the system's physical quantities to compute all possible measurement outcomes on some computational device not only in an unambiguous way but also in a reasonable amount of time. In the paper, it is shown that a deterministic quantum model of a microscopic system evolving in isolation should be regarded as realistic since the NP-hard problem of finding the exact solution to the Schrödinger equation for an arbitrary physical system can be surely solved in a reasonable amount of time in the case, in which the system has just a small number of degrees of freedom. In contrast to this, the deterministic quantum model of a truly macroscopic object ought to be considered as non-realistic since in a world of limited computational resources the intractable problem possessing that enormous amount of degrees of freedom would be the same as mere unsolvable.

DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/574/1/012088

Related papers

Any realistic theory must be computationally realistic: a response to N. Gisin's definition of a Realistic Physics Theory

Arkady Bolotin

It is argued that the recent definition of a realistic physics theory by N. Gisin cannot be considered comprehensive unless it is supplemented with requirement that any realistic theory must be computationally realistic as well.

arXiv:1401.1747•Jan 8, 2014•1 citation

Computational solution to quantum foundational problems

Arkady Bolotin

This paper argues that the requirement of applicableness of quantum linearity to any physical level from molecules and atoms to the level of macroscopic extensional world, which leads to a main foundational problem in quantum theory referred to as the "measurement problem", actually has a computational character: It implies that there is a generic algorithm, which guarantees exact solutions to the Schrodinger equation for every physical system in a reasonable amount of time regardless of how many constituent microscopic particles it comprises. From the point of view of computational complexity theory, this requirement is equivalent to the assumption that the computational complexity classes P and NP are equal, which is widely believed to be very unlikely. As demonstrated in the paper, accepting the different computational assumption called the Exponential Time Hypothesis (that involves P!=NP) would justify the separation between a microscopic quantum system and a macroscopic apparatus (usually called the Heisenberg cut) since this hypothesis, if true, would imply that deterministic quantum and classical descriptions are impossible to overlap in order to obtain a rigorous derivation of complete properties of macroscopic objects from their microstates.

arXiv:1403.7686•Mar 30, 2014•0 citations

Computational Solution to Quantum Foundational Problems

Arkady Bolotin

This paper argues that the requirement of applicableness of quantum linearity to any physical level from molecules and atoms to the level of macroscopic extensional world, which leads to a main foundational problem in quantum theory referred to as the "measurement problem", actually has a computational character: It implies that there is a generic algorithm, which guarantees exact solutions to the Schr ödinger equation for every physical system in a reasonable amount of time regardless of how many constituent microscopic particles it comprises.From the point of view of computational complexity theory, this requirement is equivalent to the assumption that the computational complexity classes P and NP are equal, which is widely believed to be very unlikely.As demonstrated in the paper, accepting the different computational assumption called the Exponential Time Hypothesis (that involves P =NP) would justify the separation between a microscopic quantum system and a macroscopic apparatus (usually called the Heisenberg cut) since this hypothesis, if true, would imply that deterministic quantum and classical descriptions are impossible to overlap in order to obtain a rigorous derivation of complete properties of macroscopic objects from their microstates.

Physical Science International Journal•Jan 10, 2014•2 citations

Scientific Realism and the Quantum

French, Steven, Saatsi, Juha

Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 27, 2020•62 citations

Compatible quantum theory

Richard M. Friedberg, Pierre C. Hohenberg

Formulations of quantum mechanics (QM) can be characterized as realistic, operationalist, or a combination of the two. In this paper a realistic theory is defined as describing a closed system entirely by means of entities and concepts pertaining to the system. An operationalist theory, on the other hand, requires in addition entities external to the system. A realistic formulation comprises an ontology, the set of (mathematical) entities that describe the system, and assertions, the set of correct statements (predictions) the theory makes about the objects in the ontology. Classical mechanics is the prime example of a realistic physical theory. A straightforward generalization of classical mechanics to QM is hampered by the inconsistency of quantum properties with classical logic, a circumstance that was noted many years ago by Birkhoff and von Neumann. The present realistic formulation of the histories approach originally introduced by Griffiths, which we call 'compatible quantum theory (CQT)', consists of a 'microscopic' part (MIQM), which applies to a closed quantum system of any size, and a 'macroscopic' part (MAQM), which requires the participation of a large (ideally, an infinite) system. The first (MIQM) can be fully formulated based solely on the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values, relying in an essential way on Gleason's theorem and on an application to dynamics due in large part to Nistico. Thus, the present formulation, in contrast to earlier ones, derives the Born probability formulas and the consistency (decoherence) conditions for frameworks. The microscopic theory does not, however, possess a unique corpus of assertions, but rather a multiplicity of contextual truths ('c-truths'), each one associated with a different framework. This circumstance leads us to consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate and therefore incomplete, though logically coherent. The completion of the theory requires a macroscopic mechanism for selecting a physical framework, which is part of the macroscopic theory (MAQM). The selection of a physical framework involves the breaking of the microscopic 'framework symmetry', which can proceed either phenomenologically as in the standard quantum measurement theory, or more fundamentally by considering the quantum system under study to be a subsystem of a macroscopic quantum system. The decoherent histories formulation of Gell-Mann and Hartle, as well as that of Omnès, are theories of this fundamental type, where the physical framework is selected by a coarse-graining procedure in which the physical phenomenon of decoherence plays an essential role. Various well-known interpretations of QM are described from the perspective of CQT. Detailed definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.

arXiv:1405.1961•Reports on Progress in Physics•Aug 22, 2014•6 citations

A local-realistic model for quantum theory

Paul Raymond-Robichaud

We provide a rigorous definition of local realism. We show that the universal wave function cannot be a complete description of a local reality. Finally, we construct a local-realistic model for quantum theory.

arXiv:2010.14303•Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences•Jun 1, 2021•18 citations
It is argued that any possible definition of a realistic physics theory – i.e., a mathematical model representing the real world – cannot be considered comprehensive unless it is supplemented with requirement of being computationally realistic. That is, the mathematical structure of a realistic model of a physical system must allow the collection of all the system's physical quantities to compute all possible measurement outcomes on some computational device not only in an unambiguous way but also in a reasonable amount of time. In the paper, it is shown that a deterministic quantum model of a microscopic system evolving in isolation should be regarded as realistic since the NP-hard problem of finding the exact solution to the Schrödinger equation for an arbitrary physical system can be surely solved in a reasonable amount of time in the case, in which the system has just a small number of degrees of freedom. In contrast to this, the deterministic quantum model of a truly macroscopic object ought to be considered as non-realistic since in a world of limited computational resources the intractable problem possessing that enormous amount of degrees of freedom would be the same as mere unsolvable.
This paper argues that the requirement of applicableness of quantum linearity to any physical level from molecules and atoms to the level of macroscopic extensional world, which leads to a main foundational problem in quantum theory referred to as the "measurement problem", actually has a computational character: It implies that there is a generic algorithm, which guarantees exact solutions to the Schrodinger equation for every physical system in a reasonable amount of time regardless of how many constituent microscopic particles it comprises. From the point of view of computational complexity theory, this requirement is equivalent to the assumption that the computational complexity classes P and NP are equal, which is widely believed to be very unlikely. As demonstrated in the paper, accepting the different computational assumption called the Exponential Time Hypothesis (that involves P!=NP) would justify the separation between a microscopic quantum system and a macroscopic apparatus (usually called the Heisenberg cut) since this hypothesis, if true, would imply that deterministic quantum and classical descriptions are impossible to overlap in order to obtain a rigorous derivation of complete properties of macroscopic objects from their microstates.
This paper argues that the requirement of applicableness of quantum linearity to any physical level from molecules and atoms to the level of macroscopic extensional world, which leads to a main foundational problem in quantum theory referred to as the "measurement problem", actually has a computational character: It implies that there is a generic algorithm, which guarantees exact solutions to the Schr ödinger equation for every physical system in a reasonable amount of time regardless of how many constituent microscopic particles it comprises.From the point of view of computational complexity theory, this requirement is equivalent to the assumption that the computational complexity classes P and NP are equal, which is widely believed to be very unlikely.As demonstrated in the paper, accepting the different computational assumption called the Exponential Time Hypothesis (that involves P =NP) would justify the separation between a microscopic quantum system and a macroscopic apparatus (usually called the Heisenberg cut) since this hypothesis, if true, would imply that deterministic quantum and classical descriptions are impossible to overlap in order to obtain a rigorous derivation of complete properties of macroscopic objects from their microstates.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Formulations of quantum mechanics (QM) can be characterized as realistic, operationalist, or a combination of the two. In this paper a realistic theory is defined as describing a closed system entirely by means of entities and concepts pertaining to the system. An operationalist theory, on the other hand, requires in addition entities external to the system. A realistic formulation comprises an ontology, the set of (mathematical) entities that describe the system, and assertions, the set of correct statements (predictions) the theory makes about the objects in the ontology. Classical mechanics is the prime example of a realistic physical theory. A straightforward generalization of classical mechanics to QM is hampered by the inconsistency of quantum properties with classical logic, a circumstance that was noted many years ago by Birkhoff and von Neumann. The present realistic formulation of the histories approach originally introduced by Griffiths, which we call 'compatible quantum theory (CQT)', consists of a 'microscopic' part (MIQM), which applies to a closed quantum system of any size, and a 'macroscopic' part (MAQM), which requires the participation of a large (ideally, an infinite) system. The first (MIQM) can be fully formulated based solely on the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values, relying in an essential way on Gleason's theorem and on an application to dynamics due in large part to Nistico. Thus, the present formulation, in contrast to earlier ones, derives the Born probability formulas and the consistency (decoherence) conditions for frameworks. The microscopic theory does not, however, possess a unique corpus of assertions, but rather a multiplicity of contextual truths ('c-truths'), each one associated with a different framework. This circumstance leads us to consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate and therefore incomplete, though logically coherent. The completion of the theory requires a macroscopic mechanism for selecting a physical framework, which is part of the macroscopic theory (MAQM). The selection of a physical framework involves the breaking of the microscopic 'framework symmetry', which can proceed either phenomenologically as in the standard quantum measurement theory, or more fundamentally by considering the quantum system under study to be a subsystem of a macroscopic quantum system. The decoherent histories formulation of Gell-Mann and Hartle, as well as that of Omnès, are theories of this fundamental type, where the physical framework is selected by a coarse-graining procedure in which the physical phenomenon of decoherence plays an essential role. Various well-known interpretations of QM are described from the perspective of CQT. Detailed definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.