Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1404.6614 · IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

The oblivious transfer capacity of the wiretapped binary erasure channel

Manoj Mishra, Bikash Kumar Dey, Vinod M. Prabhakaran, Suhas N. Diggavi

Published Jun 1, 2014• 15 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We consider oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve when there is a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition to the secrecy constraints of Alice and Bob, Eve should not learn the private data of Alice and Bob. When the broadcast channel consists of two independent binary erasure channels, we derive the oblivious transfer capacity for both 2-privacy (where the eavesdropper may collude with either party) and 1-privacy (where there are no collusions).

DOI
10.1109/isit.2014.6875091

Related papers

On the oblivious transfer capacity of the degraded wiretapped binary erasure channel

Manoj Mishra, Bikash Kumar Dey, Vinod M. Prabhakaran +1 more

We study oblivious transfer (OT) between Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve over a degraded wiretapped binary erasure channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition to the privacy goals of oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob, we require privacy of Alice and Bob's private data from Eve. In previous work we derived the OT capacity (in the honest-but-curious model) of the wiretapped binary independent erasure channel where the erasure processes of Bob and Eve are independent. Here we derive a lower bound on the OT capacity in the same secrecy model when the wiretapped binary erasure channel is degraded in favour of Bob.

arXiv:1504.04499•IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2015•1 citation

Capacity Results for the Wiretapped Oblivious Transfer

Tianyou Pei, Wei Kang, Nan Liu

In this paper, we study the problem of the 1-of-2 string oblivious transfer (OT) between Alice and Bob in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. The eavesdropper Eve is not allowed to get any information about the private data of Alice or Bob. When Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious users, we propose a protocol that satisfies 1-private (neither Alice nor Bob colludes with Eve) OT requirements for the binary erasure symmetric broadcast channel, in which the channel provides dependent erasure patterns to Bob and Eve. We find that when the erasure probabilities of the channel are within a certain range, the derived lower and upper bounds on the wiretapped OT capacity meet. Our results generalize and improve upon the results on 1-private wiretapped OT capacity by Mishra et al. Finally, we propose a protocol for a larger class of wiretapped channels and derive a lower bound on the wiretapped OT capacity.

arXiv:2207.06363•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Oct 28, 2024•2 citations

Wiretapped Oblivious Transfer

Manoj Mishra, Bikash Kumar Dey, Vinod M. Prabhakaran +1 more

In this paper, we study the problem of obtaining 1-of-2 string oblivious transfer (OT) between users Alice and Bob, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. The resource enabling OT in our setup is a noisy broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. Apart from the OT requirements between the users, Eve is not allowed to learn anything about the users' inputs. When Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious and the noisy broadcast channel is made up of two independent binary erasure channels (connecting Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve), we derive the 1-of-2 string OT capacity for both 2-privacy (when Eve can collude with either Alice or Bob) and 1-privacy (when no such collusion is allowed). We generalize these capacity results to 1-of-N string OT and study other variants of this problem. When Alice and/or Bob are malicious, we present a different scheme based on interactive hashing. This scheme is shown to be optimal for certain parameter regimes. We present a new formulation of multiple, simultaneous OTs between Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy. For this new setup, we present schemes and outer bounds that match in all but one regime of parameters. Finally, we consider the setup where the broadcast channel is made up of a cascade of two independent binary erasure channels (connecting Alice-Bob and Bob-Eve) and 1-of-2 string OT is desired between Alice and Bob with 1-privacy. For this setup, we derive an upper and lower bound on the 1-of-2 string OT capacity which match in one of two possible parameter regimes.

arXiv:1604.05668•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jan 17, 2017•7 citations

On the oblivious transfer capacity region of the binary erasure broadcast channel

Manoj Mishra, Bikash Kumar Dey, Vinod M. Prabhakaran +1 more

We study oblivious transfer (OT) using a binary erasure broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Charlie. Alice wants to establish independent OTs with Bob and Charlie with 2-privacy, i.e., where secrecy needs to be maintained even against pairs of parties in addition to against parties working on their own. We give an achievable rate-region in the honest-but-curious setting and show its optimality for a range of erasure probabilities.

IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)•Nov 1, 2014•7 citations

Wiretapped Commitment Over Binary Channels

Anuj Kumar Yadav, Manideep Mamindlapally, Amitalok J. Budkuley

We propose the problem of wiretapped commitment, where two parties, say committer Alice and receiver Bob, engage in a commitment protocol using a noisy channel as a resource, in the presence of an eavesdropper, say Eve. Noisy versions of Alice's transmission over the wiretap channel are received by both Bob and Eve. We seek to determine the maximum commitment throughput in the presence of eavesdropper, i.e., wiretapped commitment capacity, where in addition to the standard security requirements for two-party commitment, one seeks to ensure that Eve doesn't learn about the commit string. A key interest in this work is to explore the effect of collusion (or lack of it) between the eavesdropper Eve and either Alice or Bob. Toward the same, we present results on the wiretapped commitment capacity under the so-called Y-private regime (when Alice or Bob cannot collude with Eve) and the 2-private regime (when Alice or Bob may collude with Eve).

arXiv:2406.13608•IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 7, 2024•1 citation

Quantum-State Oblivious Transfer over Quantum Erasure Channels

Remi A. Chou

We study quantum-state oblivious transfer over the quantum erasure channel under information-theoretic security guarantees. Specifically, Alice holds two quantum systems, Bob wishes to recover one of them, and the parties have access to independent channel uses and authenticated public classical communication, with no initial shared entanglement. We consider both honest-but-curious and malicious behavior. We establish finite-blocklength converse and achievability bounds, which match in the honest-but-curious setting. The malicious setting construction combines interactive hashing with tests of whether Bob received selected channel outputs, and distributes each input across several qubits so that erasures conceal an entire input from a dishonest receiver, even when the inputs are entangled with an external reference. We also derive fixed-error asymptotic expansions and show that both malicious and honest-but-curious settings have the same capacity.

quant-pharXiv:2610.04667•Oct 6, 2026•0 citations
We consider oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve when there is a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition to the secrecy constraints of Alice and Bob, Eve should not learn the private data of Alice and Bob. When the broadcast channel consists of two independent binary erasure channels, we derive the oblivious transfer capacity for both 2-privacy (where the eavesdropper may collude with either party) and 1-privacy (where there are no collusions).
We study oblivious transfer (OT) between Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve over a degraded wiretapped binary erasure channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition to the privacy goals of oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob, we require privacy of Alice and Bob's private data from Eve. In previous work we derived the OT capacity (in the honest-but-curious model) of the wiretapped binary independent erasure channel where the erasure processes of Bob and Eve are independent. Here we derive a lower bound on the OT capacity in the same secrecy model when the wiretapped binary erasure channel is degraded in favour of Bob.
In this paper, we study the problem of the 1-of-2 string oblivious transfer (OT) between Alice and Bob in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. The eavesdropper Eve is not allowed to get any information about the private data of Alice or Bob. When Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious users, we propose a protocol that satisfies 1-private (neither Alice nor Bob colludes with Eve) OT requirements for the binary erasure symmetric broadcast channel, in which the channel provides dependent erasure patterns to Bob and Eve. We find that when the erasure probabilities of the channel are within a certain range, the derived lower and upper bounds on the wiretapped OT capacity meet. Our results generalize and improve upon the results on 1-private wiretapped OT capacity by Mishra et al. Finally, we propose a protocol for a larger class of wiretapped channels and derive a lower bound on the wiretapped OT capacity.
In this paper, we study the problem of obtaining 1-of-2 string oblivious transfer (OT) between users Alice and Bob, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. The resource enabling OT in our setup is a noisy broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. Apart from the OT requirements between the users, Eve is not allowed to learn anything about the users' inputs. When Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious and the noisy broadcast channel is made up of two independent binary erasure channels (connecting Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve), we derive the 1-of-2 string OT capacity for both 2-privacy (when Eve can collude with either Alice or Bob) and 1-privacy (when no such collusion is allowed). We generalize these capacity results to 1-of-N string OT and study other variants of this problem. When Alice and/or Bob are malicious, we present a different scheme based on interactive hashing. This scheme is shown to be optimal for certain parameter regimes. We present a new formulation of multiple, simultaneous OTs between Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy. For this new setup, we present schemes and outer bounds that match in all but one regime of parameters. Finally, we consider the setup where the broadcast channel is made up of a cascade of two independent binary erasure channels (connecting Alice-Bob and Bob-Eve) and 1-of-2 string OT is desired between Alice and Bob with 1-privacy. For this setup, we derive an upper and lower bound on the 1-of-2 string OT capacity which match in one of two possible parameter regimes.
We propose the problem of wiretapped commitment, where two parties, say committer Alice and receiver Bob, engage in a commitment protocol using a noisy channel as a resource, in the presence of an eavesdropper, say Eve. Noisy versions of Alice's transmission over the wiretap channel are received by both Bob and Eve. We seek to determine the maximum commitment throughput in the presence of eavesdropper, i.e., wiretapped commitment capacity, where in addition to the standard security requirements for two-party commitment, one seeks to ensure that Eve doesn't learn about the commit string. A key interest in this work is to explore the effect of collusion (or lack of it) between the eavesdropper Eve and either Alice or Bob. Toward the same, we present results on the wiretapped commitment capacity under the so-called Y-private regime (when Alice or Bob cannot collude with Eve) and the 2-private regime (when Alice or Bob may collude with Eve).
We study quantum-state oblivious transfer over the quantum erasure channel under information-theoretic security guarantees. Specifically, Alice holds two quantum systems, Bob wishes to recover one of them, and the parties have access to independent channel uses and authenticated public classical communication, with no initial shared entanglement. We consider both honest-but-curious and malicious behavior. We establish finite-blocklength converse and achievability bounds, which match in the honest-but-curious setting. The malicious setting construction combines interactive hashing with tests of whether Bob received selected channel outputs, and distributes each input across several qubits so that erasures conceal an entire input from a dishonest receiver, even when the inputs are entangled with an external reference. We also derive fixed-error asymptotic expansions and show that both malicious and honest-but-curious settings have the same capacity.