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arXiv:1401.5894 · Advanced Studies in Theoretical Physics

"Quantum machine" to solve quantum "measurement problem"?

Johan Hansson

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently a study of the first superposed mechanical quantum object ("machine") visible to the naked eye was published. However, as we show, it turns out that if the object would actually be observed, i.e. would interact with an optical photon, the quantum behavior should vanish. This, the actual observation, has long been suspected in many interpretations of quantum mechanics to be what makes the transition quantum $\rightarrow$ classical, but so far it has not been available for direct experimental study in a mechanical system. We show how any interaction, even a purely quantum one, of sufficient strength can constitute a physical "measurement" - essentially the emergence of an effectively classical object - active observation thus being a sufficient but not necessary criterion. So it seems we have in this case of the "quantum machine" a unique possibility to study, and possibly solve, the long-standing "measurement problem" of quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.12988/astp.2015.5113

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Recently a study of the first superposed mechanical quantum object ("machine") visible to the naked eye was published. However, as we show, it turns out that if the object would actually be observed, i.e. would interact with an optical photon, the quantum behavior should vanish. This, the actual observation, has long been suspected in many interpretations of quantum mechanics to be what makes the transition quantum →\rightarrow→ classical, but so far it has not been available for direct experimental study in a mechanical system. We show how any interaction, even a purely quantum one, of sufficient strength can constitute a physical "measurement" - essentially the emergence of an effectively classical object - active observation thus being a sufficient but not necessary criterion. So it seems we have in this case of the "quantum machine" a unique possibility to study, and possibly solve, the long-standing "measurement problem" of quantum mechanics.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is acknowledged as the fundamental theory on which the whole fabric of physics is supposed to rely. And yet, the features of quantum measurements, processes that provide information about microscopic objects, seem to contradict the principles of quantum mechanics. We make a qualitative presentation of this long standing problem and give an idea of recent progress in the elucidation of the paradox. Although governed solely by the quantum equations of motion, the dynamical process involving the tested system and the measuring apparatus veils the quantum oddities that oppose our standard logic and gives rise to the expected properties of measurements. In spite of the irreducibly probabilistic nature of the underlying quantum physics, classical concepts emerge, such as standard probabilities, ordinary correlations, disappearance of quantum fluctuations, and the possibility of making statements about individual systems.
The problem of measurement taken at face value shows clearly that there is an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism.The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution to it.A widely debated question is to decide between two different interpretations.The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate.For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed and so, to explain the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears.In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do.In this paper, we examine arguments for and against both interpretations and defend a position according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer in close parallel to the Everett interpretation.
Measurements play a specific role in quantum mechanics; only measurements allow us to catch a glimpse of the eluding physical reality. However, there is something deeply unsatisfactory with this specificity—a measurement is itself a physical process! Several varying modes of coping with this dilemma have been proposed and this article tries to describe how a now-century-long discussion has led to new insights about the transition from the quantum to the classical world. Starting from the pioneer’s view of the quantum measurement problem, it follows the development of formalisms, the interest from philosophers for its new aspects on reality and how different interpretations of quantum mechanics have tried to support our classically working brains in understanding quantum phenomena. Decoherence is a main topic and its role in measurement processes exemplified. The question of whether the quantum measurement problem is now solved is left open for the readers’ own judgment.
David Wallace's The Emergent Multiverse is the most recent complete presentation of a version of Everett's theory of quantum mechanics that has attracted much scientific activity in the past decade. I present a brief sketch ofWallace's solution to the measurement problem, arguing that the many-worlds interpretation is not as far-fetched as it is often conceived to be. Taking the wavefunction as the fundamental ontology, it claims to solve the measurement problem by recognizing certain (quasi-classical) patterns of the wavefunction in 3N-dimensional configuration space that functionally behave like the (classical) configuration-space pattern of a N-particle system described by classical mechanics. In this sense, structures within the universal wavefunction are identified with classical `worlds' at the coarse-grained level. I highlight two elements of this work: the role of emergence and the functionalist framework that Wallace imports through what he calls `Dennett's criterion'. This criterion appeals to the virtue of usefulness (in the form of predictability and explanatory power) as a criterion for the reality of `patterns'. It is shown that, due to decoherence, quasi-classical worlds emerge weakly, similar to that of the emergence of thermodynamic temperature from statistical physics, in the sense that they are autonomous and unexpected with respect to the lower-level domain (as opposed to strong emergence of some insuper et supra high-level ontology). However, the use of Dennett's criterion obscures this result, laying bare some philosophical issues, which we address over three axes of distinctions: (i) the objective/subjective-axis, (ii) the quantitative/qualitative-axis within the framework of intertheoretic reduction and (iii) the ontological/epistemological-axis. First, Daniel Dennett's `real patterns' are compared to Wallace approach to patterns. Then, I point out (i) an analogy with Bas van Fraassen's idea of causal patterns that become salient due to pragmatic explanation, namely that in the context of a pragmatic goal the quasi-classical pattern is made salient over other objectively existing, non-classical, patterns. I conclude that in the absence of human goals there is no reason to regard the quasi-classical pattern as `more real' than other patterns. In analogy to Dennett's `intentional stance', Wallace is committed to a `classical stance', equivalent to breaking Hilbert space democracy of bases. Although Wallace's version is a weaker one, his (ii) relations between theories bare resemblance to the reductionist program, and I argue that, next to quantitative deduction, additional conceptual `bridge principles' à la Ernest Nagel are needed. The appeal to usefulness as a criterion for reality (iii), I claim, is not necessary to solve the measurement problem itself, but has the further (unwarranted) goal of establishing `real' worlds. I spell out a solution to the measurement problem, the many-minds theory, which solves the problem along the same lines as The Emergent Multiverse, with the exception that the - although the quantum world itself is real - the classical worlds with definite properties are beliefs in the superposed brains of observers.
Three problems stand in the way of deriving classical theories from quantum mechanics: those of realist interpretation, of classical properties and of quantum measurement. Recently, we have identified some tacit assumptions that lie at the roots of these problems. Thus, a realist interpretation is hindered by the assumption that the only properties of quantum systems are values of observables. If one simply postulates the properties to be objective that are uniquely defined by preparation then all difficulties disappear. As for classical properties, the wrong assumption is that there are arbitrarily sharp classical trajectories. It turns out that fuzzy classical trajectories can be obtained from quantum mechanics by taking the limit of high entropy. Finally, standard quantum mechanics implies that any registration on a quantum system is disturbed by all quantum systems of the same kind existing somewhere in the universe. If one works out systematically how quantum mechanics must be corrected so that there is no such disturbance, one finds a new interpretation of von Neumann's "first kind of dynamics", and so a new way to a solution of the quantum measurement problem. The present paper gives a very short review of this work.