The main claim of the paper is that one can be 'realist' (in some sense) about quantum mechanics without requiring any form of realism about the wave function. We begin by discussing various forms of realism about the wave function, namely Albert's configuration-space realism, Duerr Zanghi and Goldstein's nomological realism about the wave function, Esfeld's dispositional reading of the wave function and Pusey Barrett and Rudolph's realism about the quantum state. By discussing the articulation of these four positions, and their interrelation, we conclude that instrumentalism about the wave function is by itself not sufficient to choose one over the other interpretations of quantum mechanics, thereby confirming in a different way the indetermination of the metaphysical interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The main claim of the paper is that one can be 'realist' (in some sense) about quantum mechanics without requiring any form of realism about the wave function. We begin by discussing various forms of realism about the wave function, namely Albert's configuration-space realism, Duerr Zanghi and Goldstein's nomological realism about the wave function, Esfeld's dispositional reading of the wave function and Pusey Barrett and Rudolph's realism about the quantum state. By discussing the articulation of these four positions, and their interrelation, we conclude that instrumentalism about the wave function is by itself not sufficient to choose one over the other interpretations of quantum mechanics, thereby confirming in a different way the indetermination of the metaphysical interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Introduction It is not exaggeration to claim that one of the major divides in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics derives from the way physicists and philosophers understand the status of the wave function. On the instrumentalist side of the camp, the wave function is regarded as a mere instrument to calculate probabilities that have been established by previous measurement outcomes. On the other “realistic” camp, the wave function is regarded as a new physical entity or a physical field of some sort. While both sides agree about the existence of quantum “particles” (the so-called theoretical entities), and therefore reject the radical agnosticism about them preached by van Fraassen (1980), the various “realistic” (and consequently, instrumentalist) philosophies of quantum mechanics are typically formulated in different, logically independent ways, so their implications need to be further investigated. For instance, on the one hand it seems plausible to claim that a realistic stance about the wave function is not the only way to defend “realism” about quantum theory. One can support a “flash” or a “density-of-stuff ” ontology (two variants of GRW), or an ontology of particles with well-defined positions (as in Bohmian mechanics), as primitive ontologies for observer-independent formulations of quantum mechanics (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghí, 2008). “Primitive ontologies”, as here are understood, are not only a fundamental ground for other ontological posits, but also entail a commitment to something concretely existing in spacetime (see also Allori, 2013). On the other hand, however, it is still debated whether such primitive ontologies can be autonomous from some form of realism about the wave function (Albert, 1996). In order to discuss this problem, we begin with a preliminary clarification of the meaning of “realism” and “instrumentalism” in physics, which are often subject to ideological and abstract discussions that often have little to do with the practice of physics (Section 9.2).
In this paper I review three different positions on the wave function, namely: nomological realism, dispositionalism, and configuration space realism by regarding as essential their capacity to account for the world of our experience. I conclude that the first two positions are committed to regard the wave function as an abstract entity. The third position will be shown to be a merely speculative attempt to derive a primitive ontology from a reified mathematical space. Without entering any discussion about nominalism, I conclude that an elimination of abstract entities from one’s ontology commits one to instrumentalism about the wave function, a position that therefore is not as unmotivated as it has seemed to be to many philosophers.
Abstract: Different realistic attitudes towards wavefunctions and quantum states are as old as quantum theory itself. Recently Pusey, Barret and Rudolph (PBR) on the one hand, and Auletta and Tarozzi (AT) on the other, have proposed new interesting arguments in favor of a broad realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics that can be considered the modern heir to some views held by the fathers of quantum theory. In this paper we give a new and detailed presentation of such arguments, propose a new taxonomy of different realistic positions in the foundations of quantum mechanics and assess the scope, within this new taxonomy, of these realistic arguments.
Different realistic attitudes towards wavefunctions and quantum states are as old as quantum theory itself. Recently Pusey, Barret and Rudolph (PBR) on the one hand, and Auletta and Tarozzi (AT) on the other, have proposed new interesting arguments in favor of a broad realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics that can be considered the modern heir to some views held by the fathers of quantum theory. In this paper we give a new and detailed presentation of such arguments, propose a new taxonomy of different realistic positions in the foundations of quantum mechanics and assess the scope, within this new taxonomy, of these realistic arguments.
Abstract This chapter considers and responds to criticism that wave function realism is only plausible as an approach to the interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and not relativistic quantum theories and quantum field theories. This critique gains traction as wave function realism has until now been formulated and defended solely within the context of idealized, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The chapter considers five such arguments and responds to each. An important lesson is that wave function realists should only adopt the wave-function-in-configuration-space picture as part of an interpretation of an idealized nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. More generally, the space the wave function inhabits will vary as the quantum theory the wave function realist is developing an interpretation of varies. The chapter develops a sketch of what wave function realism looks like in one relativistic context. It then discusses the issue of the interpretation of quantum theories in the limit of physical theorizing.
A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics.