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arXiv:1312.3514 · Physical Review A

Loss-tolerant quantum cryptography with imperfect sources

Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Go Kato, Hoi‐Kwong Lo, Koji Azuma

Published Nov 12, 2014• 211 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers unconditional security based on the laws of physics. Unfortunately, all previous QKD experiments assume perfect state preparation in their security analysis. Therefore, the generated key is not proven to be secure in the presence of unavoidable modulation errors. The key reason that modulation errors are not considered in previous QKD experiments lies in a crucial weakness of the standard Gottesman-Lo-L\"utkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) model, namely, it is not loss tolerant and Eve may in principle enhance imperfections through losses. Here, we propose a QKD protocol that is loss tolerant to state preparation flaws. Importantly, we show conclusively that the state preparation process in QKD can be much less precise than initially thought. Our method can also be applied to other quantum cryptographic protocols.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.90.052314

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In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers unconditional security based on the laws of physics. Unfortunately, all previous QKD experiments assume perfect state preparation in their security analysis. Therefore, the generated key is not proven to be secure in the presence of unavoidable modulation errors. The key reason that modulation errors are not considered in previous QKD experiments lies in a crucial weakness of the standard Gottesman-Lo-L"utkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) model, namely, it is not loss tolerant and Eve may in principle enhance imperfections through losses. Here, we propose a QKD protocol that is loss tolerant to state preparation flaws. Importantly, we show conclusively that the state preparation process in QKD can be much less precise than initially thought. Our method can also be applied to other quantum cryptographic protocols.
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is a standard technique in current quantum cryptographic implementations. Unfortunately, existing experiments have two important drawbacks: the state preparation is assumed to be perfect without errors and the employed security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. These two drawbacks mean that existing experiments are not guaranteed to be proven to be secure in practice. Here, we perform an experiment that shows secure QKD with imperfect state preparations over long distances and achieves rigorous finite-key security bounds for decoy-state QKD against coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. We quantify the source flaws experimentally and demonstrate a QKD implementation that is tolerant to channel loss despite the source flaws. Our implementation considers more real-world problems than most previous experiments, and our theory can be applied to general discrete-variable QKD systems. These features constitute a step towards secure QKD with imperfect devices.
Abstract In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secure communications between two parties based on physical laws. However, most of the security proofs of QKD today make unrealistic assumptions and neglect many relevant device imperfections. As a result, they cannot guarantee the security of the practical implementations. Recently, the loss-tolerant protocol (K. Tamaki et al., Phys. Rev. A, 90, 052314, 2014) was proposed to make QKD robust against state preparation flaws. This protocol relies on the emission of qubit systems, which, unfortunately, is difficult to achieve in practice. In this work, we remove such qubit assumption and generalise the loss-tolerant protocol to accommodate multiple optical modes in the emitted signals. These multiple optical modes could arise, e.g., from Trojan horse attacks and/or device imperfections. Our security proof determines some dominant device parameter regimes needed for achieving secure communication and, therefore, it can serve as a guideline to characterise QKD transmitters. Furthermore, we compare our approach with that of H.-K. Lo et al. (Quantum Inf. Comput., 7, 431–458, 2007) and identify which method provides the highest secret key generation rate as a function of the device imperfections. Our work constitutes an important step towards the best practical and secure implementation for QKD.
Abstract Current implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically rely on prepare-and-measure (P&M) schemes. Unfortunately, these implementations are not completely secure, unless security proofs fully incorporate all imperfections of real devices. So far, existing proofs have primarily focused on imperfections of either the light source or the measurement device. In this paper, we establish a security proof for the loss-tolerant P&M QKD protocol that incorporates imperfections in both the source and the detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate the security of this scheme when the emitted states deviate from the ideal ones and Bob’s measurement device does not meet the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment to characterise the detection efficiency mismatch of commercial single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation state of the input light, and determine the expected secret key rate in the presence of state preparation flaws when using such detectors. Our work provides a way towards guaranteeing the security of actual implementations of widely deployed P&M QKD.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is the most promising solution to the security issues in practical quantum key distribution systems. Although several experimental demonstrations of MDI-QKD have been reported, they all make one crucial but not yet verified assumption, that is, there are no flaws in state preparation. Such an assumption is unrealistic and security loopholes remain in the source. Here we present a MDI-QKD experiment with the modulation error taken into consideration. By applying the loss-tolerant security proof by Tamaki et al. [Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014)], we distribute secure keys over fiber links up to 40 km with imperfect sources, which would not have been possible under previous security proofs. By simultaneously closing loopholes at the detectors and a critical loophole---modulation error in the source, our work shows the feasibility of secure QKD with practical imperfect devices.
The source and detection modules serve as vital components of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Nonetheless, in practical applications, the efficiency of QKD systems is hindered by source flaws and detector imperfections. In this paper, based on the loss-tolerant method, we consider the impact of state preparation flaws and detection defects (afterpulse, dead-time) on BB84 QKD systems. Our simulation results show that with the the state preparation flaw, afterpulse probability and dead-time increase, although the key rate and the transmission distance reduces, the loss-tolerant BB84 QKD system is much more robust and show promising behaviors in practical implementations.
In recent years, the gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) has been significantly narrowed, particularly for QKD systems with arbitrarily flawed optical receivers. The status for QKD systems with imperfect light sources is however less satisfactory, in the sense that the resulting secure key rates are often overly dependent on the quality of state preparation. This is especially the case when the channel loss is high. Very recently, to overcome this limitation, Tamaki et al proposed a QKD protocol based on the so-called 'rejected data analysis', and showed that its security—in the limit of infinitely long keys—is almost independent of any encoding flaw in the qubit space, being this protocol compatible with the decoy state method. Here, as a step towards practical QKD, we show that a similar conclusion is reached in the finite-key regime, even when the intensity of the light source is unstable. More concretely, we derive security bounds for a wide class of realistic light sources and show that the bounds are also efficient in the presence of high channel loss. Our results strongly suggest the feasibility of long distance provably secure communication with imperfect light sources.