We critically evaluate the treatment of the notion of measurement in the Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics. We find such a treatment unsatisfactory because it relies, often implicitly, on elements external to those provided by the formalism. In particular, we note that, in order for the formalism to be informative when dealing with measurement scenarios, one needs to assume that the appropriate choice of framework is such that apparatuses are always in states of well defined pointer positions after measurements. The problem is that there is nothing in the formalism to justify this assumption. We conclude that the Consistent Histories approach, contrary to what is claimed by its proponents, fails to provide a truly satisfactory resolution for the measurement problem in quantum theory.
We critically evaluate the treatment of the notion of measurement in the Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics. We find such a treatment unsatisfactory because it relies, often implicitly, on elements external to those provided by the formalism. In particular, we note that, in order for the formalism to be informative when dealing with measurement scenarios, one needs to assume that the appropriate choice of framework is such that apparatuses are always in states of well defined pointer positions after measurements. The problem is that there is nothing in the formalism to justify this assumption. We conclude that the Consistent Histories approach, contrary to what is claimed by its proponents, fails to provide a truly satisfactory resolution for the measurement problem in quantum theory.
We critically evaluate the treatment of the notion of measurement in the Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics. We find such treatment unsatisfactory because it relies, often implicitly, on elements external to the provided formalism. In particular, when dealing with measurement scenarios, the formalism, in order to be informative, needs to assume that after measurements measuring apparatuses are always in states of well defined pointer positions. The problem is that there is nothing in the formalism to justify this assumption. We conclude that the Consistent Histories approach, contrary to what is claimed by its proponents, fails to provide a truly satisfactory resolution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.
In response to recent criticisms by Okon and Sudarsky, various aspects of the consistent histories (CH) resolution of the quantum measurement problem(s) are discussed using a simple Stern-Gerlach device, and compared with the alternative approaches to the measurement problem provided by spontaneous localization (GRW), Bohmian mechanics, many worlds, and standard (textbook) quantum mechanics. Among these CH is unique in solving the second measurement problem: inferring from the measurement outcome a property of the measured system at a time before the measurement took place, as is done routinely by experimental physicists. The main respect in which CH differs from other quantum interpretations is in allowing multiple stochastic descriptions of a given measurement situation, from which one (or more) can be selected on the basis of its utility. This requires abandoning a principle (termed unicity), central to classical physics, that at any instant of time there is only a single correct description of the world.
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is a reformulation of the standard Copenhagen interpretation that aims at incorporating quantum probabilities as part of the axiomatic foundations of the theory. It is not only supposed to equip quantum mechanics with clear criteria of its own experimental verification but, first and foremost, to alleviate one of the stumbling blocks of the theory ‐ the measurement problem. Since the consistent histories interpretation operates with a series of quantum events integrated into one quantum history, the measurement problem is naturally absorbed as one of the events that build up a history. The interpretation rests upon the two following assumptions, proposed already by J. von Neumann: (1) both the microscopic and macroscopic regimes are subject to the same set of quantum laws and (2) a projector operator that is assigned to each event within a history permits to transcribe the history into