It is usually stated that quantum mechanics presents problems with the identity of particles, the most radical position -supported by E. Schrodinger- asserting that elementary particles are not individuals. But the subject goes deeper, and it is even possible to obtain states with an undefined particle number. In this work we present a set theoretical framework for the description of undefined particle number states in quantum mechanics which provides a precise logical meaning for this notion. This construction goes in the line of solving a problem posed by Y. Manin, namely, to incorporate quantum mechanical notions at the foundations of mathematics. We also show that our system is capable of representing quantum superpositions.
It is usually stated that quantum mechanics presents problems with the identity of particles, the most radical position -supported by E. Schrodinger- asserting that elementary particles are not individuals. But the subject goes deeper, and it is even possible to obtain states with an undefined particle number. In this work we present a set theoretical framework for the description of undefined particle number states in quantum mechanics which provides a precise logical meaning for this notion. This construction goes in the line of solving a problem posed by Y. Manin, namely, to incorporate quantum mechanical notions at the foundations of mathematics. We also show that our system is capable of representing quantum superpositions.
The notion of an individual and the related issues on individuation are topics that appear in the philosophical discussion ever since the antiquity. The idea of an individual thing is intuitively clear: an individual is something of a specific kind that is a unity, having its own identity, and being so that it is possible at least in principle to discern it from any other individual, even of similar species. But when we try to leave the intuitive realm and push this idea to a logical analysis, we find a cluster of problems that are difficult to overcome within standard logico-mathematical contexts. In this work, we shall be concerned with some aspects of this intuitive concept of an individual and on some related facts about individuation taken from recent discussions that arose ever since the inception of quantum theory, pushing the discussion to a “logical” view, which in our opinion is still lacking in the usual debates on such issues. In the final part of the paper, we propose a metaphysics where the notion of identity is substituted, for some objects, by a weaker notion of indiscernibility, and we try to justify such a move. In most of the uses of the expression “quantum theory”, we shall not make explicit the distinction between the non-relativistic and the relativistic approaches, although they of course are quite different, for we think that the problems as we shall present them appear in both versions. But, as the text goes, the context will distinguish between them and these questions will become clear to the reader.
I consider in this book a formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Usually QM is formulated based on the notion of time and space, both of which are thought a priori given quantities or notions. However, when we try to define the notion of velocity or momentum, we encounter a difficulty as we will see in chapter 1. The problem is that if the notion of time is given a priori, the velocity is definitely determined when given a position, which contradicts the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg. We then set the basis of QM on the notion of position and momentum operators as in chapter 2. Time of a local system then is defined approximately as a ratio ∣x∣/∣v∣ between the space coordinate x and the velocity v. In this formulation of QM, we can keep the uncertainty principle, and time is a quantity that does not have precise values unlike the usually supposed notion of time has. The feature of local time is that it is a time proper to each local system, which is defined as a finite set of quantum mechanical particles. We now have an infinite number of local times that are unique and proper to each local system. Based on the notion of local time, the motion inside a local system is described by the usual Schrödinger equation. We investigate such motion in a given local system in part II. This is a usual quantum mechanics. After some excursion of the investigation of local motion, we consider in part III the relative relation or motion between plural local systems. In the final part IV, we will prove that there is at least one Universe wave function ϕ in which all local systems have local motions and thus local times. This concludes our formulation of Quantum Mechanics.
I consider in this book a formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Usually QM is formulated based on the notion of time and space, both of which are thought a priori given quantities or notions. However, when we try to define the notion of velocity or momentum, we encounter a difficulty as we will see in chapter 1. The problem is that if the notion of time is given a priori, the velocity is definitely determined when given a position, which contradicts the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg. We then set the basis of QM on the notion of position and momentum operators as in chapter 2. Time of a local system then is defined approximately as a ratio ∣x∣/∣v∣ between the space coordinate x and the velocity v. In this formulation of QM, we can keep the uncertainty principle, and time is a quantity that does not have precise values unlike the usually supposed notion of time has. The feature of local time is that it is a time proper to each local system, which is defined as a finite set of quantum mechanical particles. We now have an infinite number of local times that are unique and proper to each local system. Based on the notion of local time, the motion inside a local system is described by the usual Schrodinger equation. We investigate such motion in a given local system in part II. This is a usual quantum mechanics. After some excursion of the investigation of local motion, we consider in part III the relative relation or motion between plural local systems. In the final part IV, we will prove that there is at least one Universe wave function ϕ in which all local systems have local motions and thus local times. This concludes our formulation of Quantum Mechanics.
Some aspects of the interpretation of microscopic physics in terms of quantum theory are discussed. It is first emphasized that quantum theory is formulated in a Cartesian coordinate system; in other coordinates the result obtained with the help of the Hamiltonian formalism and commutation relations between ''canonically conjugated'' coordinate and momentum operators leads to a wrong version of quantum mechanics. In this connection the Feynman integral formalism is also discussed. In this formalism the measure is not well defined, and there is no idea how to distinguish between the true version of quantum mechanics and an incorrect one. In this respect, the Feynman approach consists of a mnemonic rule to generate perturbation series from an undefined zero-order term. The origin of time in the quantum framework is then analyzed in detail and illustrated by the example of atomic collisions. It is shown that the time-dependent Schr ¨ odinger equation for the closed three-body (two nuclei + electron) system has no physical meaning because in the high-impact energy limit it transforms into an equation with two independent time-like variables; time naturally appears in the stationary Schr ¨ odinger equation as a result of extraction of a classical subsystem (two nuclei) from a closed three-body system. Finally, following the well-known Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky experiment and Bell's inequality, we reiterate that the wave function must be interpreted as an actual field of information, in a form as elementary as the usual material particles and electromagnetic fields. In fact, experimental measurements transfer this quantum information field into the classical world, which is directly discernable. In my conclusion, the relation between physical reality and its mathematical formulation is discussed. 2012 Physics Essays Publication. (DOI: 10.4006/0836-1398-25.1.27) R ´
While classical accounts of identity (‘classical’ here pertaining to both logics and physics) are generally well understood, the advent of quantum theory, specifically quantum statistics, has cast shadow over these conceptions. Dealing with the consequently surfacing problems is a philosophically rich and interesting enterprise. I begin this thesis by providing an exegesis of the roles played by, and features of, identity in logics, classical physics, and quantum physics. Therein I consider how under a quantal description of reality, classical notions of identity and individuality break down. In the second chapter, I address how this problem has launched an arc of thought in analytic metaphysics and formal philosophy motivating the development of non-standard formal frameworks with which philosophical sense can be made of quantal objects. Among these, I explore and critically evaluate quaset theory, quasi-set theory, and non-reflexive Schr¨odinger logics, identifying some significant problems with quaset theory that arise in defining cardinality and later, pointing out a problem with Schr¨odinger logics in their modelling of the continuity between quantal and classical treatments of the world. The queer character of identity in the quantal regime motivates a turn to vagueness which I introduce in the third chapter, providing a brief outline of vagueness and the sorites paradox. Further, I reflect on the fundamental nature of vagueness, outlining and evaluating the semantic and ontic conceptions thereof. In the final chapter, I proceed to explicate and assess notions that identity and quantal objects can be vague. I shall discuss accounts according to which the vagueness of identity and quantum objects is posited as a feature of nature emerging in quantum systems — the ontic vagueness of identity — finding that these ideas are flawed and/or rely on misinterpretations of vagueness. Finally, I present an argument which suggests how the vagueness of identity can arise as an artifact of the differing treatments of identity in the quantal and classical regimes in which the vagueness involved can be semantic rather than ontic.