Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems.
Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems.
Information-flow security aims to prevent the leakage of confidential information through program execution. This problem becomes fundamentally subtler for quantum programs, because their states may involve superposition and entanglement, and their executions may involve intricate interactions between classical and quantum variables. This paper develops semantic foundations and verification methods for secure information flow in quantum programs. We formulate two notions of information-flow security. The first is a noninterference-based definition that naturally generalizes its classical counterpart. The second is a simulation-based definition that explicitly models an attacker, providing a clear operational interpretation of security. We prove that these two notions are equivalent. To verify the information-flow security of quantum programs, we develop a proof framework based on quantum Hoare logic. A key challenge is that the standard self-composition technique, which expresses information-flow security in Hoare logic by composing a program with a renamed copy of itself, fails in the quantum setting due to an obstruction analogous to the no-cloning theorem. To overcome this challenge, we introduce self-conjugation, a novel technique that leverages the deferred measurement principle and properties of unitary operations. We demonstrate our framework on examples drawn from the quantum one-time pad, quantum error correction, and anonymous entanglement generation.
This thesis presents a formal model for quantum protocols, that is, cryptographic protocols based on quantum mechanics. It also develops a definition of security (which includes notions such as privacy and correctness) for quantum protocols.
First, existing classical (non-quantum) definitions of security are studied. There are essentially two approaches: one based on Turing Machines and simulation, the other using information theory. Both approaches are explored in detail and compared, then a particular variation of the first approach is chosen. Security is defined by introducing an interface (also called a simulator) which is capable of translating an attack on protocol 1 into an attack on protocol 2. The profile of a protocol is a stochastic variable, defined as the output of the participants and the view of the adversary who performs the attack. If an interface exists such that the profile of protocol 1 is indistinguishable from the profile of protocol 2 with the help of this interface, then protocol 1 is at least as secure as protocol 2. An absolute notion of security is obtained by comparing the protocol implementation with its 'ideal' equivalent.
In this approach, and in classical cryptography in general, indistinguishability of probability distributions is a crucial tool. The meaning of this notion is explored in the context of density matrices, the mathematical formalism which is used to describe the state of a quantum system. Various measures of distinguishability of quantum states relevant from a cryptographic point of view are investigated: probability of error, trace norm (related to the Kolmogorov distance), overlap (related to the Bhattacharyya coefficient) and Shannon distinguishability (defined through the mutual information). It is shown that if we require that the distinguishability between two families of quantum states vanish exponentially fast, these four distinguishability measures are equivalent.
Along the way upper and lower bounds for the Shannon distinguishability are obtained. This is a very useful result, because explicit computation of the Shannon distinguishability between two quantum states is often difficult (it requires solving a transcendental equation), whereas the other distinguishability measures, in particular the trace norm, are usually much easier to compute.
In the last chapter the two previous topics are combined. A formal model for quantum protocols is formulated. It uses Quantum Turing Machines to represent the participants, who communicate through a quantum channel. The different nature of quantum information as opposed to classical information is explored in detail, including the implications this has for the definition. As in the classical case, we introduce an interface to compare the security of two protocols for the same task. Subsequently some consequences of the proposed definition are investigated. In particular, strong evidence is given that one classical technique often used in proofs of security for classical protocols, called rewinding, is impossible in the quantum setting.
Security and privacy have become such important commodities in
the information and globalization era that it would be
extremely beneficial to comprehensively explore possibilities
for providing (near) perfect performance in these fields. A
method based on quantum phenomena and the laws and limitations
of quantum information processing and communication was
recently developped with the aim of providing so-called
unconditional security in sensitive cryptographic tasks. During
the last 20 years, quantum cryptography has made remarkable
(even previously unimaginable) progress. The goal of this paper
is to present a brief introduction to the principles, methods
and achievements of quantum cryptography and to discuss its
recent advances and the challenges it poses, especially in the
area of quantum network security
We call quantum security the area of IT security dealing with scenarios where one or more parties have access to quantum hardware. This encompasses both the fields of post-quantum cryptography (that is, traditional cryptography engineered to be resistant against quantum adversaries), and quantum cryptography (that is, security protocols designed to be natively run on a quantum infrastructure, such as quantum key distribution). Moreover, there exist also hybrid models, where traditional cryptographic schemes are somehow `mixed' with quantum operations in certain scenarios. Even if a fully-fledged, scalable quantum computer has yet to be built, recent results and the pace of research in its realization call for attention, lest we suddenly find ourselves one day with an obsolete security infrastructure. For this reason, in the last two decades research in quantum security has experienced an exponential growth in interest and investments. In this work, we propose the first systematic classification of quantum security scenarios, and for each of them we recall the main tools and results, as well as presenting new ones. We achieve this goal by identifying four distinct quantum security classes, or domains, each of them encompassing the security notions and constructions related to a particular scenario. We start with the class QS0, which is `classical cryptography' (meaning that no quantum scenario is considered), where we present some classical constructions and results as a preliminary step. Regarding post-quantum cryptography, we introduce the class QS1, where we discuss in detail the problems arising when designing a classical cryptographic object meant to be resistant against adversaries with local quantum computing power, and we provide a classification of the possible quantum security reductions in this scenario when considering provable security. Moreover, we present results about the quantum security and insecurity of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (a useful tool used to turn interactive identification schemes into digital signatures), and ORAMs (protocols used to outsource a database in a private way). In respect to hybrid classical-quantum models, in the security class QS2 we discuss in detail the possible scenarios where these scenarios arise, and what a correct formalization should be in terms of quantum oracle access. We also provide a novel framework for the quantum security (both in terms of indistinguishability and semantic security) of secret-key encryption schemes, and we give explicit secure constructions, as well as impossibility results. Finally, in the class QS3 we consider all those cryptographic constructions designed to run natively on quantum hardware. We give constructions for quantum encryption schemes (both in the secret- and public-key scenario), and we introduce transformations for obtaining such schemes by conceptually simpler schemes from the class QS2. Moreover, we introduce a quantum version of ORAM, called quantum ORAM (QORAM), aimed at outsourcing in a private way a database composed of quantum data. In proposing a suitable security model and an explicit construction for QORAMs, we also introduce a technique of independent interest which models a quantum adversary able to extract information from a quantum system without disturbing it `too much'. We believe that the framework we introduce in this work will be a valuable tool for the scientific community in addressing the challenges arising when formalizing sound constructions and notions of security in the quantum world.
Abstract In addition to the quantum channel, an auxiliary classical authentic communication channel is required for quantum key distribution. To provide unconditional security in quantum cryptography, which based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, information-theoretic authentication is required, and not authentication based on computational complexity. The paper provides a security proof of information-theoretic authentication in quantum cryptography using ɛ -ASU 2 hash functions. The internal structure of ɛ -ASU 2 hash functions is not used in the proof, so these hash functions can be implemented by a different composition of other hash functions, for example, including the composition ɛ -AXU 2 functions with a reused key and subsequent encryption of the tag with a one-time pad key, which is taken from the previous session of quantum key distribution. It is also shown that information-theoretic authentication preserves composable security of the keys. This authentication method can also be used for key agrrement in in networks with trusted nodes (Molotkov 2022 Laser Phys. Lett. 19 045201–9; Arbekov and Molotkov 2020 Laser Phys. Lett. 17 055202–8) and with quantum key distribution.
Quantum communication is a rapidly growing area of research and development. While the successful construction of a large-scale quantum computer may be some years away, there are already commercial implementations of secure communication using quantum cryptography. The application of formal methods to classical communication and cryptographic systems has been very successful, and is now widely used in industry by organisations such as Intel, Microsoft and NASA. There is reason to believe that similar benefits can be expected for the verification of quantum systems. In this thesis, we focus on the use of process calculus, specifically Communicating Quantum Processes (CQP), for the analysis of quantum protocols. Congruence relations are an important aspect of process calculus, since they provide the foundation for equational reasoning. Previous work on congruence relations for quantum processes excluded the classical information arising from measurements, and was therefore unable to analyse many of the interesting known quantum communication protocols. Developing a congruence relation for general quantum processes is difficult because of the interaction between measurement, entanglement and parallel composition. We define a labelled transition relation for CQP in order to describe external interactions. Based on this semantics, we define a notion of observational equivalence for CQP processes, namely probabilistic branching bisimilarity. We find that this relation is not preserved by parallel composition, however we are able to gain a deeper understanding of the link between probabilistic branching and measurement. Based on this newfound understanding, we present a novel semantics for quantum processes, combining mixed quantum states with probabilistic branching. With respect to this new semantic model, we define full probabilistic branching bisimilarity and prove that it is a congruence. We use this congruence relation to discuss an axiomatic approach to the verification of quantum processes. The quantum teleportation protocol is used as a primary example throughout, and we prove that it is congruent to a quantum channel. We define a translation from CQP to the Quantum Model Checker (QMC) in order to provide automated verification techniques using CQP specifications. We prove that this translation preserves the semantics of CQP processes, thereby enabling a multifaceted approach to formal verification by enhancing the manual techniques of process calculus with the benefits of model checking.