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arXiv:1301.2695 · Physical Review Letters

Ontological Models Predictively Inequivalent to Quantum Theory

G. C. Ghirardi, Raffaele Romano

Published Apr 24, 2013• 16 citations
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Abstract

Recently, it has been argued that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power under a strong assumption of free choice of the experimental settings and validity of quantum mechanics. Here, under a different free choice assumption, we describe a model which violates this statement for almost all states of a bipartite two-level system, in a possibly experimentally testable way. From consistency with quantum mechanics and the nonsignaling principle, we derive a bound on the local averages for the family of deterministic ontological theories that our model belongs to.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.110.170404

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Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. 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Recently, it has been argued that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power under a strong assumption of free choice of the experimental settings and validity of quantum mechanics. Here, under a different free choice assumption, we describe a model which violates this statement for almost all states of a bipartite two-level system, in a possibly experimentally testable way. From consistency with quantum mechanics and the nonsignaling principle, we derive a bound on the local averages for the family of deterministic ontological theories that our model belongs to.
Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is complete, and that quantum states vectors are necessarily in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of reality, under the assumptions that quantum theory is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we argue that the adopted form of the free choice assumption is stronger than needed. In our perspective, there are hidden assumptions underlying these results, which limit their range of validity. We support our argument by a model for the bipartite two-level system, reproducing quantum mechanics, in which the free will assumption is respected, and different quantum states can be connected to the same state of reality.
It was argued [1] that there can be no extension of quantum mechanics with improved predictive power on a measurement freely chosen, independently of any event that is not in its future light cone. The assumption of measurement choice was criticized [2] to be too strong to be physically necessary and extensions of quantum mechanics were shown [3] to be possible under a more relaxed measurement assumption. Here I point out an error in the criticism and observe that the actual mistake of the no-go theorem lies in an unwarranted assumption implicitly made in the proof of [1]. Hence, quantum mechanics is guaranteed to have the maximal predictive power only in situations of complete certainty and complete uncertainty about measurement outcomes. I then show that the measurement assumption can be further relaxed without affecting the conclusion on the predictive power of quantum mechanics versus alternative theories. I further study the optimal predicative improvement over quantum mechanics of local spin measurements on a pair of entangled qubits by any alternative theory and conjecture a strict upper bound.
Relying on some auxiliary assumptions, usually considered mild, Bell’s theorem proves that no local theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. In this work, we introduce a fully local, superdeterministic model that by explicitly violating ‘settings independence’—one of these auxiliary assumptions, requiring statistical independence between measurement settings and systems to be measured—is able to reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. Moreover, we show that contrary to widespread expectations, our model can break settings independence without an initial state that is too complex to handle, without visibly losing all explanatory power, and without outright nullifying all of experimental science. Still, we argue that our model is unnecessarily complicated and does not offer true advantages over its non-local competitors. We conclude that while our model does not appear to be a viable contender to its non-local counterparts, it provides the ideal framework to advance the debate over violations of statistical independence via the superdeterministic route.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
In this paper, we show that Quantum Mechanics does not admit ontological models, in the sense that the quantum state of a system cannot correspond to a set of physical states representing the independent reality of the system. We show, via two thought experiments based on the Wigner's friend scenario, that if the ontic state of physical systems in the lab is the same for Wigner and for his friend, one of the following will be violated: PBR theorem, Quantum-theoretic predictions, and the "No-superdeterminism" assumption.
The non-extensibility of quantum theory into a theory with improved predictive power is based on a strong assumption of independent free choice, in which the physicists pick a measurement axis independently of anything that couldn't have been caused by their decision. Independent free choice is also at the core of the Nash equilibrium and classical game theory. A more recent line of game-theoretical research based on weakening free choice leads to non-trivial solution concepts with desirable properties such as at-most uniqueness, Pareto optimality, and contextuality. We show how introducing contingent free choice in the foundations of quantum theory yields a class of deterministic and contextual theories with an improved predictive power, and contrast them with the pilot-wave theory. Specifically, we suggest that quantum experiments, such as the EPR experiment, involving measurements located in spacetime, can be recast as dynamic games with imperfect information involving human agents and the universe. The underlying idea is that a physicist picking a measurement axis and the universe picking a measurement outcome are two faces of the same physical contingency phenomenon. The classical, Nashian resolution of these games based on independent free choice is analogous to local hidden variable theories, constrained by the Bell inequalities. On the other hand, in a setup in which agents are rational and omniscient in all possible worlds, under contingent free choice, the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium provides a contextual resolution, based on the iterated elimination of inconsistent worlds, towards an at-most unique possible world, in which the outcomes of measurements that actually are carried out, and only them, are deterministically defined.