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arXiv:1211.0942 · New Journal of Physics

Can different quantum state vectors correspond to the same physical state? An experimental test

Daniel Nigg, Thomas Monz, Philipp Schindler, Esteban A. Martinez, Markus Hennrich, R. Blatt, Matthew F. Pusey, Terry Rudolph, Jonathan Barrett

Published Dec 23, 2015• 64 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A century after the development of quantum theory, the interpretation of a quantum state is still discussed. If a physicist claims to have produced a system with a particular quantum state vector, does this represent directly a physical property of the system, or is the state vector merely a summary of the physicist's information about the system? Assume that a state vector corresponds to a probability distribution over possible values of an unknown physical or 'ontic' state. Then, a recent no-go theorem shows that distinct state vectors with overlapping distributions lead to predictions different from quantum theory. We report an experimental test of these predictions using trapped ions. Within experimental error, the results confirm quantum theory. We analyse which kinds of models are ruled out.

DOI
10.1088/1367-2630/18/1/013007

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A century after the development of quantum theory, the interpretation of a quantum state is still discussed. If a physicist claims to have produced a system with a particular quantum state vector, does this represent directly a physical property of the system, or is the state vector merely a summary of the physicist's information about the system? Assume that a state vector corresponds to a probability distribution over possible values of an unknown physical or 'ontic' state. Then, a recent no-go theorem shows that distinct state vectors with overlapping distributions lead to predictions different from quantum theory. We report an experimental test of these predictions using trapped ions. Within experimental error, the results confirm quantum theory. We analyse which kinds of models are ruled out.
Quantum states are the key mathematical objects in quantum theory. It is therefore surprising that physicists have been unable to agree on what a quantum state represents. There are at least two opposing schools of thought, each almost as old as quantum theory itself. One is that a pure state is a physical property of system, much like position and momentum in classical mechanics. Another is that even a pure state has only a statistical significance, akin to a probability distribution in statistical mechanics. Here we show that, given only very mild assumptions, the statistical interpretation of the quantum state is inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. This result holds even in the presence of small amounts of experimental noise, and is therefore amenable to experimental test using present or near-future technology. If the predictions of quantum theory are confirmed, such a test would show that distinct quantum states must correspond to physically distinct states of reality.
In this paper we consider theories in which reality is described by some underlying variables, λ. Each value these variables can take represents an ontic state (a particular state of reality). The preparation of a quantum state corresponds to a distribution over the ontic states, λ. If we make three basic assumptions, we can show that the distributions over ontic states corresponding to distinct pure states are nonoverlapping. This means that we can deduce the quantum state from a knowledge of the ontic state. Hence, if these assumptions are correct, we can claim that the quantum state is a real thing (it is written into the underlying variables that describe reality). The key assumption we use in this proof is ontic indifference — that quantum transformations that do not affect a given pure quantum state can be implemented in such a way that they do not affect the ontic states in the support of that state. In fact this assumption is violated in the Spekkens toy model (which captures many aspects of quantum theory and in which different pure states of the model have overlapping distributions over ontic states). This paper proves that ontic indifference must be violated in any model reproducing quantum theory in which the quantum state is not a real thing. The argument presented in this paper is different from that given in a recent paper by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph. It uses a different key assumption and it pertains to a single copy of the system in question.
Causality and the relativity of simultaneity seem at odds with the apparently sudden, acausal state-vector changes ("collapses") characteristic of quantum phenomena. The problem of how physical phenomena can be causally determined, have the probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and be consistent with special relativity appears to be solved by the assumption, essentially the same as one first used by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz to address a different problem, that the "initial" and "final" state vectors of a phenomenon or observation, along with certain other state vectors, all represent the system's state at all times. Each member of such an aggregate of state vectors is postulated to represent a different aspect of a physical state rather than a state, so that most of the state vectors in effect constitute a set of nonlocal hidden variables. Various implications of this assumption are illustrated through several physical situations. Among the results is a somewhat surprising resolution of a paradox in a three-spin Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger experiment (a "three-particle EPR" experiment), which involves a logical consequence that differs from familiar ideas of quantum physics that has no practical experimental consequence, and the prediction of new experimental phenomena related to the Zou-Wang-Mandel superposed-idler system. The potential value of the concepts described as heuristics for new predictions and for developing physical intuition by clarifying the interrelation and coherence of physical principles that would otherwise seem contradictory is briefly discussed.
The quantum state ψ is a mathematical object used to determine the probabilities of different outcomes when measuring a physical system. Its fundamental nature has been the subject of discussions since the inception of quantum theory. Is it ontic, that is, does it correspond to a real property of the physical system? Or is it epistemic, that is, does it merely represent our knowledge about the system? Assuming a natural continuity assumption and a weak separability assumption, we show here that epistemic interpretations of the quantum state are in contradiction with quantum theory. Our argument is different from the recent proof of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph and it already yields a nontrivial constraint on ψ-epistemic models using a single copy of the system in question.
Perhaps the quantum state represents information about reality, and not reality directly. Wave function collapse is then possibly no more mysterious than a Bayesian update of a probability distribution given new data. We consider models for quantum systems with measurement outcomes determined by an underlying physical state of the system but where several quantum states are consistent with a single underlying state-i.e., probability distributions for distinct quantum states overlap. Significantly, we demonstrate by example that additional assumptions are always necessary to rule out such a model.
This year we celebrate 100 years of quantum mechanics (QM). Incorrect interpretations of QM and incorrect mental models of the invisible details of quantum phenomena lead to paradoxes. To explain these, we advocate the statistical contextual interpretation (SCI) of quantum mechanics. State vectors (wave functions) and various operators are purely mathematical entities that permit quantitative probabilistic predictions. “State vector” describes an ensemble of identically prepared physical systems, and a specific “operator” represents a class of equivalent measurements of a physical observable. A collapse of wavefunction is not a mysterious and instantaneous physical process; a collapsed quantum state describes a new ensemble of physical systems prepared in a particular way. A value of a physical observable, such as a spin projection, associated with a pure quantum ensemble is a characteristic of this ensemble created by its interaction with measuring instruments. Probabilities are objective properties of random experiments in which empirical frequencies stabilize. Following Einstein, SCI rejects the claim that QM provides a complete description of individual physical systems, but it remains agnostic about whether a more detailed subquantum description can be found or is necessary. In conformity with Bohr contextuality, SCI rejects Bell-local and Bell-causal hidden variable models. Nevertheless, by incorporating into a probabilistic model contextual hidden variable measuring instruments, long distance quantum correlations studied in Bell tests can be explained without evoking quantum nonlocality or retro-causality. SCI allows the explanation of several quantum phenomena without evoking quantum magic. SCI does not claim to provide a complete description of quantum phenomena; in fact, it is unknown whether quantum probabilities even provide a complete description of existing experimental data. Time series of experimental data may contain much more information than is obtained using empirical frequencies and histograms. Therefore, predictable completeness of QM must be tested and not taken for granted.