It is pointed out that a slight variation on the Wheeler Delayed Choice Experiment presents the same challenge to orthodox quantum mechanics as Maudlin-type contingent absorber experiments present to the Transactional Interpretation (TI). Therefore, the latter cannot be used as a basis for refutation of TI.
In 1994, Maudlin proposed proposed an objection to the transactional interpretation (TI), involving an absorber that changes location depending on the trajectory of the particle. Maudlin considered this objection fatal. However, the TI did not die; rather, a number of responses were developed, some attempting to accommodate Maudlin's example within the existing TI, and others modifying the TI. I argue that none of these responses is fully adequate. The reason, I submit, is that there are two aspects to Maudlin's objection; the more readily soluble aspect has received all the attention, but the more problematic aspect has gone unnoticed. I consider the prospects for developing a succesful version of the TI in light of this second aspect of the objection.
The delayed choice experiments of the type introduced by Wheeler and extended by Englert, Scully, Süssmann and Walther [ESSW], and others, have formed a rich area for investigating the puzzling behaviour of particles undergoing quantum interference. The surprise provided by the original delayed choice experiment, led Wheeler to the conclu-sion that “no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon”, a radical explanation which implied that “the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present”. However Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley have shown that the Bohm interpretation gives a straightforward account of the behaviour of the particle without re-sorting to such a radical explanation. The subsequent modifications of this experiment led both Aharonov and Vaidman and [ESSW] to conclude that the resulting Bohm-type trajectories in these new sit-uations produce unacceptable properties. For example, if a cavity is
The Transactional Interpretation has been subject at various times to a challenge based on a type of thought experiment first proposed by Maudlin. It has been argued by several authors that such experiments do not in fact constitute a significant problem for the transactional picture. The purpose of this work is to point out that, when the relativistic level of the interpretation is considered, Maudlin-type challenges cannot even be mounted, since the putative 'slow-moving offer wave,' taken as subject to contingent confirmation, does not exist. This is a consequence of the Davies relativistic quantum-mechanical version of the direct-action theory together with the asymmetry between fermionic field sources and bosonic fields. The Maudlin challenge therefore evaporates completely when the relativistic level of the theory is taken into account.