We present a detailed description of a widely applicable mathematical model for quantum key distribution (QKD) systems implementing the measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol. The model is tested by comparing its predictions with data taken using a proof-of-principle, time-bin qubit-based QKD system in a secure laboratory environment (i.e. in a setting in which eavesdropping can be excluded). The good agreement between the predictions and the experimental data allows the model to be used to optimize mean photon numbers per attenuated laser pulse, which are used to encode quantum bits. This in turn allows optimization of secret key rates of existing MDI-QKD systems, identification of rate-limiting components, and projection of future performance. In addition, we also performed measurements over deployed fiber, showing that our system's performance is not affected by environment-induced perturbations.
We present a detailed description of a widely applicable mathematical model for quantum key distribution (QKD) systems implementing the measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol. The model is tested by comparing its predictions with data taken using a proof-of-principle, time-bin qubit-based QKD system in a secure laboratory environment (i.e. in a setting in which eavesdropping can be excluded). The good agreement between the predictions and the experimental data allows the model to be used to optimize mean photon numbers per attenuated laser pulse, which are used to encode quantum bits. This in turn allows optimization of secret key rates of existing MDI-QKD systems, identification of rate-limiting components, and projection of future performance. In addition, we also performed measurements over deployed fiber, showing that our system's performance is not affected by environment-induced perturbations.
We present a detailed description of a widely applicable mathematical model for quantum key distribution (QKD) systems implementing the measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol. The model is tested by comparing its predictions with data taken using a proof-of-principle, time-bin qubit-based QKD system in a secure laboratory environment (i.e. in a setting in which eavesdropping can be excluded). The good agreement between the predictions and the experimental data allows the model to be used to optimize mean photon numbers per attenuated laser pulse, which are used to encode quantum bits. This in turn allows optimization of secret key rates of existing MDI-QKD systems, identification of rate-limiting components, and projection of future performance. In addition, we also performed measurements over deployed fiber, showing that our system's performance is not affected by environment-induced perturbations.
We assess the overall performance of our quantum key distribution (QKD) system implementing the measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol using components with varying capabilities such as different single-photon detectors and qubit preparation hardware. We experimentally show that superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors allow QKD over a channel featuring 60 dB loss, and QKD with more than 600 bits of secret key per second (not considering finite key effects) over a 16 dB loss channel. This corresponds to 300 and 80 km of standard telecommunication fiber, respectively. We also demonstrate that the integration of our QKD system into FPGA-based hardware (instead of state-of-the-art arbitrary waveform generators) does not impact on its performance. Our investigation allows us to acquire an improved understanding of the trade-offs between complexity, cost and system performance, which is required for future customization of MDI-QKD. Given that our system can be operated outside the laboratory over deployed fiber, we conclude that MDI-QKD is a promising approach to information-theoretic secure key distribution.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two legitimate parties to share a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. The unconditional security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Original security proofs of QKD are based on a few assumptions, e.g., perfect single photon sources and perfect single-photon detectors. However, practical implementations of QKD systems do not fully comply with such assumptions due to technical limitations. The gap between theory and implementations leads to security loopholes in most QKD systems, and several attacks have been launched on sophisticated QKD systems. Particularly, the detectors have been found to be the most vulnerable part of QKD. Much effort has been put to build side-channel-free QKD systems. Solutions such as security patches and device-independent QKD have been proposed. However, the former are normally ad-hoc, and cannot close unidentified loopholes. The latter, while having the advantages of removing all assumptions on devices, is impractical to implement today. Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) turns out to be a promising solution to the security problem of QKD. In MDI-QKD, all security loopholes, including those yet-to-be discovered, have been removed from the detectors, the most critical part in QKD. In this thesis, we investigate issues related to the practical implementation and security of MDI-QKD. We first present a demonstration of polarization-encoding MDI-QKD. Taking finite key effect into account, we achieve a secret key rate of 0.005 bit per second (bps) over 10 km spooled telecom fiber, and a 1600-bit key is distributed. This work, together with other demonstrations, shows the practicality of MDI-QKD. Next we investigate a critical assumption of MDI-QKD: perfect state preparation. We apply the loss-tolerant QKD protocol and adapt it to MDI-QKD to quantify information leakage due to imperfect state preparation. We then present an experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD over 10 km and 40 km of spooled fiber, which for the first time considers the impact of inaccurate polarization state preparation on the secret key rate. This would not have been possible under previous security proofs, given the same amount of state preparation flaws.
Abstract Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a technique for quantum-secured communication that eliminates all detector side-channels, although is currently limited by implementation complexity and low secure key rates. Here, we introduce a simple and compact MDI-QKD system design at gigahertz clock rates with enhanced resilience to laser fluctuations—thus enabling free-running semiconductor laser sources to be employed without spectral or phase feedback. This is achieved using direct laser modulation, carefully exploiting gain-switching and injection-locking laser dynamics to encode phase-modulated time-bin bits. Our design enables secure key rates that improve upon the state of the art by an order of magnitude, up to 8 bps at 54 dB channel loss and 2 kbps in the finite-size regime for 30 dB channel loss. This greatly simplified MDI-QKD system design and proof-of-principle demonstration shows that MDI-QKD is a practical, high-performance solution for future quantum communication networks.
The security of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is fundamentally constrained by vulnerabilities of single-photon detectors. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) was proposed to remove this limitation by allowing all measurements to be performed by a completely untrusted party, under the assumption that the measurement node can be treated as adversarial but does not compromise the security guarantees of the protocol.
Here we show that this assumption is insufficient under realistic adversarial control of the measurement device. We present an attack in which an adversary exploits active control of the measurement node (Charlie) to obtain significant information about the secret key. The attack enables recovery of up to 70\% of the sifted key while introducing only 5.6\% quantum bit error rate. Unlike previously reported attacks targeting specific implementations of MDI-QKD, our results demonstrate a limitation of the standard security model underlying the protocol.
These findings indicate that additional constraints on the measurement-device independence assumption, or refined security analyses incorporating stronger adversarial capabilities, are required to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in realistic scenarios.
The main type of obstacles of practical applications of quantum key distribution (QKD) network are various attacks on detection. Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDIQKD) protocol is immune to all these attacks, and thus, a strong candidate for network security. Recently, several proof-of-principle demonstrations of MDIQKD have been performed. Although novel, those experiments are implemented in the laboratory with secure key rates less than 0.1 b/s. Besides, they need manual calibration frequently to maintain the system performance. These aspects render these demonstrations far from practicability. Thus, justification is extremely crucial for practical deployment into the field environment. Here, by developing an automatic feedback MDIQKD system operated at a high clock rate, we perform a field test via deployed fiber network of 30 km total length achieving a 16.9 b/s secure key rate. The result lays the foundation for a global quantum network, which can shield from all the detection-side attacks.