From a general abstract system theoretical perspective, a quantum-like system description in the spirit of a generalized Quantum Theory may appear to be simpler and more natural than a classically inspired description. We investigate the reasons why we nevertheless conceive ourselves embedded into a classically structured world. Categorial, physical and pragmatic reasons are proposed as explanations.
From a general abstract system theoretical perspective, a quantum-like system description in the spirit of a generalized Quantum Theory may appear to be simpler and more natural than a classically inspired description. We investigate the reasons why we nevertheless conceive ourselves embedded into a classically structured world. Categorial, physical and pragmatic reasons are proposed as explanations.
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Abstract Quantum theory provides a superb description of physical reality on a small scale, yet it contains many mysteries. Without doubt, it is hard to come to terms with the workings of this theory, and it is particularly difficult to make sense of the kind of ‘physical reality’—or lack of it—that it seems to imply for our world. Taken at its face value, the theory seems to lead to a philosophical standpoint that many (including myself) find deeply unsatisfying. At best, and taking its descriptions at their most literal, it provides us with a very strange view of the world indeed. At worst, and taking literally the proclamations of some of its most famous protagonists, it provides us with no view of the world at all.
Not only is Quantum Mechanics (QM) conceptually rich, it is also a theory that physics students have found abstract and technically formidable. Nevertheless, compared to other classical topics of physics, university students’ understanding of QM has received minimal attention in the physics education literature. The principal purpose of this study was to characterize the variation in the ways that undergraduate physics students depict the basic concepts of QM and to extrapolate the results to scaffold possible changes to instructional practices at the university that provided the context for the study. In so doing, an adaptation of a developmental phenomenographic perspective was chosen. Empirically, the study was approached through in-depth interviews with 35 physics students from two Ethiopian governmental universities after they had been exposed to the traditional QM course for one-third of a semester. Interview responses were analyzed using phenomenographic approach where a picture of students’ depictions was established for each quantum concept by expounding the given responses. For each basic quantum concept addressed, the structure of the description categories was separately constructed, and overall, it was found that naive, quasi-classical ontology and/or variants of classical ways of visualization are dominant in students’ responses. For example, it was found that students’ depictions of the photon concept could be described with three distinct categories of description, which are (a) classical intuitive description, (b) mixed model description and (c) quasi-quantum model description. Similarly, the findings revealed that it is possible to establish three qualitatively different categories of description to picture students’ depictions of matter waves, namely, (a) classical and trajectory-based description, (b) an intricate blend of classical and quantum description and (c) incipient quantum model description. Likewise, it was found that students’ depictions of uncertainty principle can be described as: (a) uncertainty as classical ignorance, (b) uncertainty as measurement disturbance and (c) uncertainty as a quasi-quantum principle. \nWith regard to learning QM, the categories of description made clear several issues: most students did not have enough knowledge to depict the basic concepts of QM properly; they were influenced by the perspective of classical physics and their perceptions in making explanations about QM; and they also applied mixed ideas, one based on their classical model and the other from newly introduced QM. These results are also supported by the findings of previous studies in similar domains. Findings from the study were used to guide the design of multiple representations-based instructions and interactive learning tutorials on the conceptual aspects of QM that has been shown to address specific difficulties identified in the study. Theoretical and practical implications of the study, as well as potential future considerations are drawn.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
In most approaches to fundamental physics, spacetime symmetries are postulated a priori and then explicitly implemented in the theory. This includes Lorentz covariance in quantum field theory and diffeomorphism invariance in quantum gravity, which are seen as fundamental principles to which the final theory has to be adjusted. In this paper, we suggest, within a much simpler setting, that this kind of reasoning can actually be reversed, by taking an operational approach inspired by quantum information theory. We consider observers in distinct laboratories, with local physics described by the laws of abstract quantum theory, and without presupposing a particular spacetime structure. We ask what information-theoretic effort the observers have to spend to synchronize their descriptions of local physics. If there are 'enough' observables that can be measured universally on several different quantum systems, we show that the observers' descriptions are related by an element of the orthochronous Lorentz group , together with a global scaling factor. Not only does this operational approach predict the Lorentz transformations, but it also accurately describes the behavior of relativistic Stern–Gerlach devices in the WKB approximation, and it correctly predicts that quantum systems carry Lorentz group representations of different spin. This result thus hints at a novel information-theoretic perspective on spacetime.