Quantum computers can break the RSA, El Gamal, and elliptic curve public-key cryptosystems, as they can efficiently factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. The power of such quantum attacks lies in \emph{quantum Fourier sampling}, an algorithmic paradigm based on generating and measuring coset states. %This motivates the investigation of the power or limitations of quantum Fourier sampling, especially in attacking candidates for ``post-quantum'' cryptosystems -- classical cryptosystems that can be implemented with today's computers but will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks. In this article we extend previous negative results of quantum Fourier sampling for Graph Isomorphism, which corresponds to hidden subgroups of order two (over S_n, to several cases corresponding to larger hidden subgroups. For one case, we strengthen some results of Kempe, Pyber, and Shalev on the Hidden Subgroup Problem over the symmetric group. In another case, we show the failure of quantum Fourier sampling on the Hidden Subgroup Problem over the general linear group GL_2(\FF_q). The most important case corresponds to Code Equivalence, the problem of determining whether two given linear codes are equivalent to each other up to a permutation of the coordinates. Our results suggest that for many codes of interest---including generalized Reed Solomon codes, alternant codes, and Reed-Muller codes---solving these instances of Code Equivalence via Fourier sampling appears to be out of reach of current families of quantum algorithms.
Quantum computers can break the RSA and El Gamal public-key cryptosystems, since they can factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. If we believe that quantum computers will someday become a reality, we would like to have \emph{post-quantum} cryptosystems which can be implemented today with classical computers, but which will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks. In this article we show that the McEliece cryptosystem over \emph{well-permuted, well-scrambled} linear codes resists precisely the attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems are vulnerable---namely, those based on generating and measuring coset states. This eliminates the approach of strong Fourier sampling on which almost all known exponential speedups by quantum algorithms are based. Specifically, we show that the natural case of the Hidden Subgroup Problem to which the McEliece cryptosystem reduces cannot be solved by strong Fourier sampling, or by any measurement of a coset state. We start with recent negative results on quantum algorithms for Graph Isomorphism, which are based on particular subgroups of size two, and extend them to subgroups of arbitrary structure, including the automorphism groups of linear codes. This allows us to obtain the first rigorous results on the security of the McEliece cryptosystem in the face of quantum adversaries, strengthening its candidacy for post-quantum cryptography.
The Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) provides the fundamental framework for most quantum algorithms. Until very recently, all known problems where quantum computation provides a super-polynomial speedup over classical algorithms have been variants of the HSP for particular abelian groups. Examples include factoring integers and computing the discrete log, for which Shor found efficient quantum algorithms. The algorithm for these problems may be viewed as consisting of the main HSP solution plus an ad hoc method of dealing with the particular variant. In this dissertation, we give a systematic way of dealing with all these variants. The key component of our solution is a new theorem about the robustness of Fourier sampling. The purpose of this theorem is to better understand the structure underlying existing algorithms as well as to provide an algorithmic tool for the construction of future quantum algorithms. In addition, we also derive a new algorithm for computing the quantum Fourier transform which is asymptotically faster than any previously known algorithm. By contrast, the nonabelian HSP is wide open. It includes as a special case the longstanding open question of graph isomorphism, where the group is the symmetric group, S n . It is natural to carry over the abelian HSP algorithm to the nonabelian case. We show that in the case that the hidden subgroup is normal, this algorithm succeeds in reconstructing the subgroup in polynomial time. On the other hand, we give evidence that this algorithm is inadequate to even distinguish a trivial subgroup from an involution in t...
Many quantum algorithms, including Shor's celebrated factoring and discrete log algorithms, proceed by reduction to a hidden subgroup problem, in which a unknown subgroup H of a group G must be determined from a quantum state ψ over G that is uniformly supported on a left coset of H. These hidden subgroup problems are typically solved by Fourier sampling: the quantum Fourier transform of ψ is computed and measured. When the underlying group is nonabelian, two important variants of the Fourier sampling paradigm have been identified: the weak standard method, where only representation names are measured, and the strong standard method, where full measurement (i.e., the row and column of the representation as well as its name) occurs. It has remained open whether the strong method is indeed stronger, that is, whether there are hidden subgroups that can be reconstructed via the strong method but not by the weak, or any other known, method.In this article, we settle this question in the affirmative. We show that hidden subgroups of semidirect products of the form ℤq × ℤp, where q | (p - 1) and q = p/polylog(p), can be efficiently determined by the strong standard method. Furthermore, the weak standard method and the "forgetful" abelian method are insufficient for these groups so that, in fact, it appears that use of the corresponding nonabelian representation theory is crucial. We extend this to an informationtheoretic solution for the hidden subgroup problem over the groups ℤq × ℤp where q | (p - 1) and, in particular, the affine groups Ap. Finally, we prove a simple closure property for the class of groups over which the hidden subgroup problem can be solved efficiently.
Many quantum algorithms, including Shor's celebrated factoring and discrete log algorithms, proceed by reduction to a hidden subgroup problem, in which an unknown subgroup H of a group G must be determined from a quantum state
ψ over G that is uniformly supported on a left coset of H. These hidden subgroup problems are typically solved by Fourier sampling: the quantum Fourier transform of
ψ is computed and measured. When the underlying group is nonabelian, two important variants of the Fourier sampling paradigm have been identified: the weak standard method, where only representation names are measured, and the strong standard method, where full measurement (i.e., the row and column of the representation, in a suitably chosen basis, as well as its name) occurs. It has remained open whether the strong standard method is indeed stronger, that is, whether there are hidden subgroups that can be reconstructed via the strong method but not by the weak, or any other known, method. In this article, we settle this question in the affirmative. We show that hidden subgroups H of the q-hedral groups, i.e., semidirect products
Zq⋉Zp, where
q∣(p−1), and in particular the affine groups
Ap, can be information-theoretically reconstructed using the strong standard method. Moreover, if
∣H∣=p/polylog(p), these subgroups can be fully reconstructed with a polynomial amount of quantum and classical computation. We compare our algorithms to two weaker methods that have been discussed in the literature—the “forgetful” abelian method, and measurement in a random basis—and show that both of these are weaker than the strong standard method. Thus, at least for some families of groups, it is crucial to use the full power of representation theory and nonabelian Fourier analysis, namely, to measure the high-dimensional representations in an adapted basis that respects the group's subgroup structure. We apply our algorithm for the hidden subgroup problem to new families of cryptographically motivated hidden shift problems, generalizing the work of van Dam, Hallgren, and Ip on shifts of multiplicative characters. Finally, we close by proving a simple closure property for the class of groups over which the hidden subgroup problem can be solved efficiently.
McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems are robust and versatile cryptosystems. These cryptosystems work with many linear error-correcting codes. They are popular these days because they can be quantum-secure. In this paper, we study the Niederreiter cryptosystem using non-binary quasi-cyclic codes. We prove, if these quasi-cyclic codes satisfy certain conditions, the corresponding Niederreiter cryptosystem is resistant to the hidden subgroup problem using weak quantum Fourier sampling. Though our work uses the weak Fourier sampling, we argue that its conclusions should remain valid for the strong Fourier sampling as well.