I will show how an objective definition of the concept of information and the consideration of recent results about information-processing in the human brain help clarify some fundamental and often counter-intuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. In particular, I will discuss entanglement, teleportation, non-interaction measurements and decoherence in the light of the fact that pragmatic information, the one our brain handles, can only be defined in the classical macroscopic domain; it does not operate in the quantum domain. This justifies viewing quantum mechanics as a discipline dealing with mathematical models and procedures aimed exclusively at predicting possible macroscopic changes and their likelihood that a given quantum system may cause when it interacts with its environment, including man-made devices such as measurement instruments. I will discuss the informational and neurobiological reasons of why counter-intuitive aspects arise whenever we attempt to construct mental images of the "inner workings" of a quantum system by forcing the concepts of classical information and time into the quantum domain; in this context I will examine the role of pragmatic information as a discriminator in the quantum-to-classical transition.
I will show how an objective definition of the concept of information and the consideration of recent results about information-processing in the human brain help clarify some fundamental and often counter-intuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. In particular, I will discuss entanglement, teleportation, non-interaction measurements and decoherence in the light of the fact that pragmatic information, the one our brain handles, can only be defined in the classical macroscopic domain; it does not operate in the quantum domain. This justifies viewing quantum mechanics as a discipline dealing with mathematical models and procedures aimed exclusively at predicting possible macroscopic changes and their likelihood that a given quantum system may cause when it interacts with its environment, including man-made devices such as measurement instruments. I will discuss the informational and neurobiological reasons of why counter-intuitive aspects arise whenever we attempt to construct mental images of the "inner workings" of a quantum system by forcing the concepts of classical information and time into the quantum domain; in this context I will examine the role of pragmatic information as a discriminator in the quantum-to-classical transition.
There are two common “bad habits” in the description, analysis, interpretation and teaching of fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics. One is the all too casual use of the term “information”, without making it explicitly clear which of the various types, Shannon, algorithmic or pragmatic, are meant. The other concerns the use of the term “knowledge”, without alluding to specific aspects of human brain function, for instance, when the observer selects the “system under study”, formulates simplified models, asks theoretical questions, plans an experiment, decides what to measure, prepares the system, chooses initial conditions, anticipates to obtain certain results and confirms a final state. I will show how an objective definition of information and recent results about information-processing in the brain help overcome the most common counter-intuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. In particular, I will discuss entanglement, teleportation, non-interaction measurements and decoherence in the light of the fact that the concept of pragmatic information, the one our brain handles, can only be defined in the macroscopic domain. Counter-intuitive aspects arise when we construct mental images of quantum systems in which the concept of pragmatic information is illegitimately forced into the quantum domain.
An objective definition of pragmatic information and the consideration of recent results about information processing in the human brain can help overcome some traditional difficulties with the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Rather than attempting to define information ab initio, I introduce the concept of interaction between material bodies as a primary concept. Two distinct categories can be identified: 1) Interactions which can always be reduced to a superposition of physical interactions (forces) between elementary constituents; 2) Interactions between complex bodies which cannot be reduced to a superposition of interactions between parts, and in which patterns and forms (in space and/or time) play the determining role. Pragmatic information is then defined as the correspondence between a given pattern and the ensuing pattern-specific change. I will show that pragmatic information is a biological concept that plays no active role in the purely physical domain; it only does so when a living organism intervenes. The consequences for the foundations of both classical and quantum physics are important and will be discussed in detail. Since by its very definition pragmatic information (the one our brain uses to represent, think about and react to the outside world)cannot operate in the quantum domain, it is advisable to refrain from using it in our mental representation of what is happening 'inside' a quantum system. Although the theoretical framework developed for quantum mechanics handles mathematical entities specifically attributed to a quantum system, the only truly pragmatic information it can provide relates to macroscopic effects on the environment (natural, or artificial as in a measurement instrument) with which the system interacts.
After some historical remarks concerning Schroedinger's discovery of wave mechanics, we present a unified formalism for the mathematical description of classical and quantum-mechanical systems, utilizing elements of the theory of operator algebras. We then review some basic aspects of quantum mechanics and, in particular, of its interpretation. We attempt to clarify what Quantum Mechanics tells us about Nature when appropriate experiments are made. We discuss the importance of the mechanisms of "dephasing" and "decoherence" in associating "facts" with possible events and rendering complementary possible events mutually exclusive.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
In recent decades, progress in the field of neurosciences has triggered an interest in understanding mind-brain relationships. Quantum Mechanics (QM) has been present in the debate from its beginnings through the well-known measurement paradox. The standard interpretation of QM considers two basic, fundamentally irreducible, processes: the deterministic evolution of the wave-function according to the Schrodinger equation, once the initial conditions have been settled; and the indeterministic wave-function collapse into one of the possible outcomes, after performing a specific measurement. So, QM would point to the limits of a purely deterministic view of nature and, in particular, of brains. Nevertheless, QM’s relevance for the brain’s physics is still to be proven. Detractors of the QM influence are confident of the role of decoherent processes at different physical scales in order to ensure a classical deterministic behavior of the brain. However, little attention is paid to the epistemic implications of invoking decoherence for the mind-brain problem. In this paper, (i) we present lasting QM models stating a specific view of human consciousness and make explicit their position regarding the relationship between the physical activity of neurons and/or networks of neurons and the phenomenal conscious experience; (ii) we review the main criticisms of the relevance of QM in the brain and, most importantly, we bring out the philosophical implications behind the usual recourse to decoherence in the transition from the quantum to the classical world, explaining why the mind-brain problem and the measurement paradox should not be disentangled.
Science is learning more about the brain activity necessary for consciousness, but has not identified any mechanisms for how it could actually arise through neural processes. Here I present ways to build consciousness into the mathematics of quantum mechanics for use in the growing area of quantum neurology. Quantum waves are not physical in the sense of forces acting on particles through cause and effect, and they are expressed using mathematical placeholders that do not have agreed-upon real-world representations. These can be used to represent consciousness. Quantum mechanics has shown how the traditional aspects of the physical world emerge from non-physical quantum information through a combination of mathematical, not causal, determinism, and stochastic interactions. The modeling methods here could help account for how the mental world could also emerge from information fields. Neural interactions for mental experiences are complex, so it is reasonable to expect that consciousness is an emergent property of neural networks. But emergent properties are not magic – they work through procedural mechanisms – in this case for how neural processes generate experiences. No steps for how consciousness could be manufactured in this way are apparent, and philosophers have strong arguments for such not being possible. An alternative is to model consciousness as part of quantum waves, so it is accessed, not created, by the brain. This is a form of neutral monism – the idea that the physical and mental worlds both come from a single underlying source – in this case quantum waves. The classical physical picture of particles and forces acting under cause and effect has developed into a belief system, not just a theory, and this has created difficulties in taking quantum mechanics itself at face value. The result has been the creation of numerous “interpretations” of quantum mechanics that seek to frame it within these philosophical presuppositions. The conceptual framework of Cartesian dualism provides a platform for analysis of the related philosophical issues of consciousness and of quantum mechanics itself.