It is argued that the traditional "realist" methodology of physics, according to which human concepts, laws and theories can grasp the essence of reality, is incompatible with the most fruitful interpretation of quantum formalism. The proof rests on the violation by quantum mechanics of the foundational principles of that methodology. An alternative methodology, in which the construction of sciences finishes at the level of human experience, as standard quantum theory strongly suggests, is then conjectured.
It is argued that the traditional "realist" methodology of physics, according to which human concepts, laws and theories can grasp the essence of reality, is incompatible with the most fruitful interpretation of quantum formalism. The proof rests on the violation by quantum mechanics of the foundational principles of that methodology. An alternative methodology, in which the construction of sciences finishes at the level of human experience, as standard quantum theory strongly suggests, is then conjectured.
Abstract Over a dozen constructions have been proposed to untangle the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). The authors have spent a lot of energy in establishing formal solutions but, to the best of my knowledge, have not carefully examined the methodological problems that arise before beginning a theoretical construct in QM. This paper argues on the following methodological obstacles: 1. The definitional and computational formulas. 2. The different theories of probability. We have also tried to solve problems 1 and 2, but the complete illustration of this attempt exceeds an article’s length, so this paper is limited to presenting 1 and 2, and discussing the intellectual and formal assumptions that should be necessary to unify the theories of probability.
One hundred years after the creation of quantum theory, there is no consensus on the kind of reality that is described by the theory. Here, I attribute the lack of progress to the prevailing interpretative methodology, which invariably takes the quantum formalism as the starting point for philosophical reflection and analysis. I argue that this methodology is particularly inappropriate, for it invariably marginalizes much of the theory's content, both that implicit in modelling heuristics and experimental practices, and that encapsulated in the mathematical structures of its formalism. In addition, the prevailing methodology offers little protection against undue influence by metaphysically-laden language which invariably accompanies the formalism.
Here, I summarize an alternative methodology whose goal is to ensure that an interpretational project take into account all forms of theoretic content. The methodology harnesses the recent results of the quantum reconstruction program. These results distil the mathematical content of the quantum formalism into physical principles and assumptions, which are more readily philosophically digestible than the formalism itself, and bracket much of its metaphysically-laden language.
As a case study of reconstruction-based interpretation, I describe the reconstruction of the identical particle formalism, and its step-by-step interpretation, highlighting the key questions that drive the interpretation forwards and the techniques and stances that are employed in each step. The interpretation yields a novel metaphysical profile for systems of identical particles as potential parts of a whole, which can be traced step-by-step to elementary experimental data and the reconstruction's physical postulates and assumptions. I also describe some of the pitfalls that one faces in any attempt to directly interpret the identical particle formalism.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
Despite the unparalleled accuracy of quantum-theoretical predictions across an enormous range of phenomena, the theory's foundations are still in doubt. The theory deviates radically from classical physics, predicts counterintuitive phenomena, and seems inconsistent. The biggest stumbling block is measurement, where the Schrodinger equation's unitary evolution seems inconsistent with collapse. These doubts have inspired a variety of proposed interpretations and alterations of the theory. Most interpretations posit the theory represents only observed appearances rather than reality. The realistic interpretations, on the other hand, posit entities such as other universes, hidden variables, artificial collapse mechanisms, or human minds, that are not found in the standard mathematical formulation. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the possibility that the standard theory is both realistic and correct as it stands. This paper examines several controversial issues, namely quantization, field particle duality, quantum randomness, superposition, entanglement, non-locality, and measurement, to argue that standard quantum physics, realistically interpreted, is consistent with all of them.
This work is a conceptual research monograph comprising forty interconnected chapters that investigate the nature of reality, collapse, intention, and the epistemic limits of human knowledge. Drawing from physics, philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphysics, the book proposes a unified framework titled Javed’s Quantum Thought. The central thesis distinguishes reality as a complete and fixed causal structure (“map”) from human intention as a position or orientation (“location”) within that structure. Within this framework, collapse is not treated as the creation of outcomes or a modification of reality, but as the stabilization of experiential location when movement within the map ceases. The book critically examines common assumptions in both classical and quantum interpretations—particularly the tendency to mistake observation for causation, reaction for action, and measurement for objective truth. To address scientific objections, the work includes multiple empirical and computational analyses demonstrating that all experimental results are approximations constrained by instrumental precision, environmental variability, and methodological limits. This principle is formalized as: Reality × Experiment = Incomplete Truth Through discussions of physical measurement (length, temperature, mass, gravity, sound), historical constants (such as the speed of light), and computational error (floating-point limitations), the book establishes that empirical science refines access to reality without ever fully capturing it. Rather than opposing science, this work clarifies its domain and boundaries, positioning experimentation as a method of approximation rather than absolute representation. The monograph is intended for readers interested in philosophy of science, foundations of physics, quantum interpretation, and the relationship between human cognition and objective reality. This work does not claim experimental proof of metaphysical assertions; instead, it offers a coherent conceptual framework for understanding collapse, intention, and knowledge without violating scientific methodology.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?