Wave functions live on configuration space. Schrodinger called this entanglement. The linearity of the Schrodinger equation prevents the wave function from representing reality. If the equation were non-linear (e.g., reduction models) the wave function living on configuration space still by itself could not represent reality in physical space. In this paper, we continue the line of reasoning discussed in our previous paper, "The Fundamental Importance of Discourse in Theoretical Physics", [arXiv:1001.4111], to explore the "measurement problem" in quantum mechanics. In particular we present a new interpretation of quantum decoherence, and a novel critique of the double slit experiment. In addition, we review the use of "determinism" in the discourse of quantum mechanics, resolving the confusion created by theories which attempt to restore determinism to quantum mechanics while confusing determinism with ontological necessity. Finally, we review Bell's Theorem in order to demonstrate that nonlocality is an inherent ontological quality of the configuration space of the universe regardless of deterministic or non-deterministic character of quantum mechanics.
Wave functions live on configuration space. Schrodinger called this entanglement. The linearity of the Schrodinger equation prevents the wave function from representing reality. If the equation were non-linear (e.g., reduction models) the wave function living on configuration space still by itself could not represent reality in physical space. In this paper, we continue the line of reasoning discussed in our previous paper, "The Fundamental Importance of Discourse in Theoretical Physics", [arXiv:1001.4111], to explore the "measurement problem" in quantum mechanics. In particular we present a new interpretation of quantum decoherence, and a novel critique of the double slit experiment. In addition, we review the use of "determinism" in the discourse of quantum mechanics, resolving the confusion created by theories which attempt to restore determinism to quantum mechanics while confusing determinism with ontological necessity. Finally, we review Bell's Theorem in order to demonstrate that nonlocality is an inherent ontological quality of the configuration space of the universe regardless of deterministic or non-deterministic character of quantum mechanics.
Abstract In considering models of reality we must consider the fundamental nature of quantum mechanics, which has had great success in describing the spectrum of light from distant stars and galaxies, formulating the properties of the strong, electro-weak or electromagnetic and weak decay forces, and explaining atomic order formulated as the atomic periodic table and atomic spectra. A vast array of technologies has resulted from quantum theory, from semiconductors to NMR machines, nuclear reactors and possibly encryption secured, fast quantum computers. Quantum theory, however, has yet to fully engage with the gravitational force. With the advent of quantum theory, several major issues stand out, leaving us with major philosophical questions on the nature of physics and reality, and our ability to comprehend them. The issues involve the interpretation of quantum measurement, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle on the completeness of quantum theory and nonlocality. The frontiers of science continue to open new concepts based on a multidimensional reality which we use to address these issues, including solving the Schrödinger and Dirac equations in complex Minkowski eight space. We also formulate Bell’s theorem and the Young’s double slit experiment in Rauscher’s complex eight-space. We formulate an interpretation of the quantum that yields locality in a hyper-dimensional complex space and that maintains the completeness of quantum theory and nonlocality in usual four space, with local connectivity and the Lorentz invariant conditions, where subluminal and luminal signaling are maintained. Are we really forced to choose between two alternate views of reality? One view that external reality exists independent of the observer, and the other that the observer somehow is a participator or an integral part of all of nature. Must we choose between these or is there another way out? We find our way out and we satisfy both Bohr (Copenhagen) and Einstein (determinism) in bringing about a practical outcome of the debate. By developing and applying complex eight space, we can accommodate locality or local realism in terms of contiguous event connections in complex eight space. In four space, nonlocality dominates and also can be considered locality in eight space. The determination of the state of a system naturally collapses to its final state where quantum mechanics is functioning completely in four and in eight dimensional spaces.
Standard interpretations of quantum mechanics often maintain that physical reality is incomplete until it is observed, or else that the collapse of the wave function constitutes a fundamental ontological event associated with the act of measurement. Such readings conflate observation with physical interaction and reify the theory’s formalism into a metaphysics of indeterminacy. This paper proposes a reinterpretation of the collapse of the wave function as an effective, post-realization phenomenon: a descriptive projection that occurs within a globally relational state that is ontologically determined. By integrating decoherence theory, an analysis of the double-slit experiment, and a reinforced block-universe model, it is argued that quantum entities do not alternate between wave-like and corpuscular natures. Rather, different experimental regimes restrict the degrees of freedom accessible to local description, yielding distinct empirical manifestations. This approach preserves determinism, avoids an observer-dependent ontology, and provides a non-mystical explanation of quantum entanglement grounded in the ontological primacy of global relational structure over local spatiotemporal description.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
The present paper interprets quantum mechanics within the ontological framework of the Theory of Consciousness. The Theory posits consciousness as the sole ontological reality, formally described as a topological space, and derives all physical phenomena as manifestations of the local knowledge of the observer. Within this framework the five principal phenomena of quantum mechanics —superposition, wave-function collapse, the uncertainty principle, quantization, and entanglement — are shown to arise necessarily from the axiomatic ontological chain of consciousness without introducing new postulates. Quantum indeterminacy is reinterpreted not as a fundamental property of matter but as a structural limitation of the observer’s local knowledge. The Planck constant is identified with the minimum resolvable change of the knowledge structure of the quantum observer. The conceptual paradoxes of quantum mechanics—the measurement problem, non-locality, and the probabilistic nature of results — dissolve once consciousness is restored as the ontological foundation.
Quantum nonlocality is shown to be an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation, in which each observed quantity has exactly one value at any instant. In reality, all physical systems obey quantum mechanics, which obeys no such rule. Locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI). Using the MWI, I show that the quantum side of Bell's inequality, generally believed nonlocal, is really due to a series of three measurements (not two as in the standard, oversimplified analysis), all three of which have only local effects. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI. The mistaken interpretation of nonlocality experiments depends crucially on a question-begging version of the Born interpretation, which makes sense only in "collapse" versions of quantum theory, about the meaning of the modulus of the wave function, so I use the interpretation based on the MWI, namely that the wave function is a world density amplitude, not a probability amplitude. This view allows the Born interpretation to be derived directly from the Schrödinger equation, by applying the Schrödinger equation to both the observed and the observer.