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arXiv:1101.4507

Lee Smolin Five Great Problems and Their Solution without Ontological Hypotheses

Gunn Quznetsov

Published Jan 24, 2011• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Solutions of Lee Smolin Five Great Problems from his book {\it The Trouble with Physics: the Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next} are described. This solutions is obtained only from the properties of probability without any ontological hypotheses.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1101.4507

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A number of books have appeared purporting to explain quantum mechanics to the general public. These books have put considerable emphasis on so-called quantum 'paradoxes', using them to portray the quantum theory as mysterious or 'spooky'. The author discusses these 'paradoxes' from a different viewpoint with the aim of demystifying the theory. Emphasis is shifted from an epistemological viewpoint (as exemplified by the 'probability interpretation') to an ontological one (the description of matter by physical fields). Difficulties in reconciling the probability interpretation with relativity are noted, and the importance of phase coherence, which is inadequately treated in the probability interpretation, is emphasised. In the light of such as approach, the 'paradoxes' are resolved.
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