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arXiv:1012.1776

Examples of the Generalized Quantum Permanent Compromise Attack to the Blum-Micali Construction

Elloá B. Guedes, Francisco de Assis, Bernardo Lula

Published Dec 8, 2010• 1 citation
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Abstract

This paper presents examples of the quantum permanent compromise attack to the Blum-Micali construction. Such attacks illustrate how a previous attack to the Blum-Micali generator can be extended to the whole Blum-Micali construction, including the Blum-Blum-Shub and Kaliski generators.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1012.1776

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Communication systems are subject to adversarial attacks since malevolent adversaries might harm and disrupt legitimate transmissions intentionally. Of particular interest in this paper are so-called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which the jammer completely prevents any transmission. Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels, providing a suitable model to capture the jamming attacks of interest, are studied. Algorithmic detection frameworks are developed based on Turing machines and also Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) machines, where the latter can process and store arbitrary real numbers. It is shown that Turing machines are not capable of detecting DoS attacks. However, BSS machines are capable thereof implying that real number signal processing enables the algorithmic detection of DoS attacks.