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arXiv:1008.4593 · Nature Photonics

Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination

Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers, Christoffer Wittmann, Dominique Elser, Johannes Skaar, Vadim Makarov

Published Aug 29, 2010• 1,141 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1038/nphoton.2010.214

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It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010)]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors under bright illumination can lead to the same outcome. We demonstrate that the detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 can be blinded by heating the avalanche photo diodes (APDs) using bright illumination, so-called thermal blinding. Further, the detectors can be triggered using short bright pulses once they are blind. For systems with pauses between packet transmission such as the plug-and-play systems, thermal inertia enables Eve to apply the bright blinding illumination before eavesdropping, making her more difficult to catch.