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arXiv:1008.2524 · Acta Physica Slovaca Reviews and Tutorials

Survey of an approach to quantum measurement, classical properties and realist interpretation problems

Petr Hájíček, Jiří Tolar

Published Dec 1, 2010• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Survey of an approach to quantum measurement, classical properties and realist interpretation problems
DOI
10.2478/v10155-010-0006-y

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Three problems stand in the way of deriving classical theories from quantum mechanics: those of realist interpretation, of classical properties and of quantum measurement. Recently, we have identified some tacit assumptions that lie at the roots of these problems. Thus, a realist interpretation is hindered by the assumption that the only properties of quantum systems are values of observables. If one simply postulates the properties to be objective that are uniquely defined by preparation then all difficulties disappear. As for classical properties, the wrong assumption is that there are arbitrarily sharp classical trajectories. It turns out that fuzzy classical trajectories can be obtained from quantum mechanics by taking the limit of high entropy. Finally, standard quantum mechanics implies that any registration on a quantum system is disturbed by all quantum systems of the same kind existing somewhere in the universe. If one works out systematically how quantum mechanics must be corrected so that there is no such disturbance, one finds a new interpretation of von Neumann's "first kind of dynamics", and so a new way to a solution of the quantum measurement problem. The present paper gives a very short review of this work.
During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalist interpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurements results. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpoint have been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapse account, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum state represents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced some conceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-ideal case, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements. Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and this might be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterion of reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on the properties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such a criterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalistinterpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurementsresults. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpointhave been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapseaccount, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum staterepresents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced someconceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonianinterpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of themeasurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-idealcase, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements.Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and thismight be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterionof reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on theproperties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such acriterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.
We discuss V.P. Belavkin’s approach to the measurement problem encapsulated in his theory of eventum mechanics (as presented in his 2007 survey). In particular, we show its relation to ideas based on superselection and interaction with the environment developed by N.P. Landsman (1995, and more recent papers). Landsman writes “those believing that the classical world exists intrinsically and absolutely [such persons later termed by him B-realists] are advised against reading this [his, 1995] paper”. He adopts a milder position, calling it that of an A-realist: we live in a classical world but to give it special status is like insisting that the Earth is the centre of the universe. The B-realists are accused of living under some kind of hallucination. Landsman presents arguments pointing in a particular direction to a resolution of the measurement problem which at least would satisfy the A-realists. We point out in this paper that the theory earlier developed by Belavkin (surveyed in his 2007 paper) seems to complete Landsman’s program or at least exhibits a “realisation” satisfying his desiderata. At the same time it seems that this completion of the program ends up giving both A- and B-realists equal licence to accuse the others of living under hallucinations. Preface This is a rough and still incomplete draft. It will come across to the reader as a private conversation between the author and his friends Slava Belavkin and Klaas Landsman. In particular, a proper introduction is urgently needed.