The discovery of quantum key distribution by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) bases on the fundamental quantum feature: incompatibility of measurements of quantum non-commuting observables. In 1991 Ekert showed that cryptographic key can be generated at a distance with help of entangled (correlated) quantum particles. Recently Barrett, Hardy and Kent showed that the non-locality used by Ekert is itself a good resource of cryptographic key even beyond quantum mechanics. Their result paved the way to new generation of quantum cryptographic protocols - secure even if the devices are built by the very eavesdropper. However, there is a question, which is fundamental from both practical and philosophical point of view: does Nature offer security on operational level based on the original concept behind quantum cryptography - that information gain about one observable must cause disturbance to another, incompatible one? Here we resolve this problem by using another striking feature of quantum world - contextuality. It is a strong version of incompatibility manifested in the famous Kochen-Specker paradox. The crucial concept is the use of a new class of families of bipartite probability distributions . We show that if two persons share systems which locally exhibit the Kochen-Specker paradox and, in addition, exhibit perfect correlations, then they can extract secure key, even if they do not trust the quantum devices. This is the first operational protocol that directly implements the fundamental feature of Nature: the information gain vs. disturbance trade-off. For sake of proof we exhibit a new Bell's inequality which is interesting in itself. The security is proved not by exploiting strong violation of the inequality by quantum mechanics (as one usually proceeds), but rather by arguing, that quantum mechanics cannot violate it too much.
The discovery of quantum key distribution by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) bases on the fundamental quantum feature: incompatibility of measurements of quantum non-commuting observables. In 1991 Ekert showed that cryptographic key can be generated at a distance with help of entangled (correlated) quantum particles. Recently Barrett, Hardy and Kent showed that the non-locality used by Ekert is itself a good resource of cryptographic key even beyond quantum mechanics. Their result paved the way to new generation of quantum cryptographic protocols - secure even if the devices are built by the very eavesdropper. However, there is a question, which is fundamental from both practical and philosophical point of view: does Nature offer security on operational level based on the original concept behind quantum cryptography - that information gain about one bservables must cause disturbance to another, incompatible one? Here we resolve this problem by using in place of non-locality another striking feature of quantum world - contextuality. It is a strong version of incompatibility manifested in the famous Kochen-Specker paradox. The crucial concept is the use of a new class of families of bipartite probability distributions which locally exhibit the Kochen-Specker paradox conditions and, in addition, exhibit perfect correlations. We show that if two persons share systems described by such a family then they can extract secure key. This is the first operational protocol that directly implements the fundamental feature of Nature: the information gain vs. disturbance trade-off. At the same time it provides natural device-independent cryptographic scheme within quantum mechanics suitable for current technology.
We show that (1) the violation of the Ekert 1991 inequality is a sufficient condition for certification of the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, and (2) the violation of the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) inequality is, also, a sufficient condition for certification of the KS theorem. Therefore the success in each quantum key distribution protocol reveals the nonclassical feature of quantum theory, in the sense that the KS realism is violated. Further, it turned out that the Ekert inequality and the BBM inequality are depictured by distillable entanglement witness inequalities. Here, we connect the success in these two key distribution processes into the no-hidden-variables theorem and into witness on distillable entanglement. We also discuss the explicit difference between the KS realism and Bell's local realism in the Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory.
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to attain in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed to classical users of a quantum protocol, who may not even trust the quantum devices used to implement the protocol? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (DIQKD) was first formulated. We answer the challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of an entanglement-based protocol building on Ekert's original proposal for quantum key distribution. The proof of security builds on techniques from the classical theory of pseudo-randomness to achieve a new quantitative understanding of the non-local nature of quantum correlations.
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving device-independent quantum key distribution was first formulated. We answer this challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of a slight variant of Ekert's original entanglement-based protocol against the most general (coherent) attacks. The resulting protocol is robust: While assuming only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary's laboratory, it achieves a linear key rate and tolerates a constant noise rate in the devices. In particular, the devices may have quantum memory and share arbitrary quantum correlations with the eavesdropper. The proof of security is based on a new quantitative understanding of the monogamous nature of quantum correlations in the context of a multiparty protocol.
Quantum mechanics dramatically revolutionized our understanding of nature, challenged traditional information theory, and led to significant technological advancements. Two of the most counterintuitive features of quantum mechanics are quantum nonlocality and quantum contextuality. These features rule out hidden-variable models that attempt to explain quantum phenomena based on classical intuition. Quantum non-locality, first revealed by Bell's theorem in 1964, rules out local hidden-variable (LHV) models, originating from the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Meanwhile, quantum contextuality, originally pinpointed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem in 1967, focuses on single-system correlations rather than between space-like separated systems, demonstrating quantum mechanics is incompatible with non-contextual hidden-variable (NCHV) models. Quantum correlations are crucial in several applications, both in computing and communication tasks. They also enable the strongest form of cryptographic security through the device-independent (DI) paradigm, where devices are treated as black-boxes, and could even be supplied by potentially malicious adversaries. The semi-device-independent (SDI) paradigm offers a more practical solution by balancing security and feasibility, allowing for some assumptions about devices. Since different DI and SDI applications require specific properties, this thesis focuses on designing optimal quantum correlations for these applications. DI randomness amplification (DIRA) is an important task in DI information processing, that converts a weak, biased seed into a fully random one. Quantum correlations on the boundary of the no-signaling set are necessary for this task. We introduce a class of almost-quantum Bell inequalities and develop a tilted version of the celebrated Hardy’s paradox showing corresponding quantum correlations enhance the robustness and efficiency in state-of-the-art DIRA protocols. Another direction pursued in the thesis is the study of self-testing, a DI approach to certify the state and measurements of quantum systems in a unique manner. We investigated three families of quantum correlations, the tilted Hardy tests, which we prove self-test any two-qubit pure entangled state, except the maximally-entangled one, the
α-CHSH inequalities, where we prove robust self-test of the singlet and corresponding measurements, and weighted-Braunstein-Caves chained inequalities, which we prove delineate a boundary for the quantum correlation set, extending beyond the well-known Tsirelson-Landau-Masanes boundary. A third main direction explored in the thesis is the efficient construction of novel state-dependent and state-independent contextuality proof. We provide an optimal and experiment-friendly toolbox for various contextuality-based applications, including demonstrating entanglement-assisted advantages in zero-error communication, separating binary-outcome no-signaling models from quantum theory, and achieving optimal randomness rate in the SDI paradigm. We also discuss and address issues arising from the noise and errors in real-world experimental tests of the KS theorem, and show that quantum mechanics also violates NCHV models under arbitrary relaxation of the so-called non-disturbance conditions. Finally, a counter-intuitive phenomenon, termed ``bound randomness'', is introduced, revealing a deep resource-theoretical relationship between non-locality and DI-certified randomness. Analogous to Werner's famous result that entanglement is not sufficient for non-locality, ``bound randomness'' indicates non-locality is not always sufficient for DI randomness certification under standard spot-checking protocols. In conclusion, this thesis introduces key techniques in contextuality and non-locality for designing targeted correlations for various DI and SDI applications.
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world.Can this security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted?This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving device-independent quantum key distribution was first formulated.We answer this challenge by rigorously proving the deviceindependent security of a slight variant of Ekert's original entanglement-based protocol against the most general (coherent) attacks.The resulting protocol is robust: While assuming only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary's laboratory, it achieves a linear key rate and tolerates a constant noise rate in the devices.In particular, the devices may have quantum memory and share arbitrary quantum correlations with the eavesdropper.The proof of security is based on a new quantitative understanding of the monogamous nature of quantum correlations in the context of a multiparty protocol.