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arXiv:1003.5209

QBism, the Perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism

Christopher A. Fuchs

Published Mar 26, 2010• 295 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This article summarizes the Quantum Bayesian point of view of quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on the view's outer edges---dubbed QBism. QBism has its roots in personalist Bayesian probability theory, is crucially dependent upon the tools of quantum information theory, and most recently, has set out to investigate whether the physical world might be of a type sketched by some false-started philosophies of 100 years ago (pragmatism, pluralism, nonreductionism, and meliorism). Beyond conceptual issues, work at Perimeter Institute is focused on the hard technical problem of finding a good representation of quantum mechanics purely in terms of probabilities, without amplitudes or Hilbert-space operators. The best candidate representation involves a mysterious entity called a symmetric informationally complete quantum measurement. Contemplation of it gives a way of thinking of the Born Rule as an addition to the rules of probability theory, applicable when an agent considers gambling on the consequences of his interactions with a newly recognized universal capacity: dimension (formerly Hilbert-space dimension). (The word "capacity" should conjure up an image of something like gravitational mass---a body's mass measures its capacity to attract other bodies. With hindsight one can say that the founders of quantum mechanics discovered another universal capacity, "dimension.") The article ends by showing that the egocentric elements in QBism represent no impediment to pursuing quantum cosmology and outlining some directions for future work.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1003.5209

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This article summarizes the Quantum Bayesian point of view of quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on the view's outer edges---dubbed QBism. QBism has its roots in personalist Bayesian probability theory, is crucially dependent upon the tools of quantum information theory, and most recently, has set out to investigate whether the physical world might be of a type sketched by some false-started philosophies of 100 years ago (pragmatism, pluralism, nonreductionism, and meliorism). Beyond conceptual issues, work at Perimeter Institute is focused on the hard technical problem of finding a good representation of quantum mechanics purely in terms of probabilities, without amplitudes or Hilbert-space operators. The best candidate representation involves a mysterious entity called a symmetric informationally complete quantum measurement. Contemplation of it gives a way of thinking of the Born Rule as an addition to the rules of probability theory, applicable when an agent considers gambling on the consequences of his interactions with a newly recognized universal capacity: dimension (formerly Hilbert-space dimension). (The word "capacity" should conjure up an image of something like gravitational mass---a body's mass measures its capacity to attract other bodies. With hindsight one can say that the founders of quantum mechanics discovered another universal capacity, "dimension.") The article ends by showing that the egocentric elements in QBism represent no impediment to pursuing quantum cosmology and outlining some directions for future work.
The author summarizes the Quantum Bayesian viewpoint of quantum mechanics, developed originally by C. M. Caves, R. Schack, and himself. It is a view crucially dependent upon the tools of quantum information theory. Work at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics continues the development and is focused on the hard technical problem of a finding a good representation of quantum mechanics purely in terms of probabilities, without amplitudes or Hilbert-space operators. The best candidate representation involves a mysterious entity called a symmetric informationally complete quantum measurement. Contemplation of it gives a way of thinking of the Born Rule as an addition to the rules of probability theory, applicable when one gambles on the consequences of interactions with physical systems. The article ends by outlining some directions for future work.
QBism is a recently developed version of Quantum Bayesianism. QBists think that the primitive concept of experience is the central subject of science. QBism refuses the idea that the quantum state of a system is an objective description of this system. It is a tool for assigning a subjective probability to the agent's future experience. So quantum mechanics does not directly say something about the "external world". A measurement (in the usual sense) is just a special case of what QBism calls experience and this is any action done by any agent on her external world. The result of the measurement is the experience that the agent gets from her action on her personal world. For Qbists, this way of seeing the measurement helps rejecting any non-local influences. We will examine if these claims are robust and will show that a certain number of issues needs to be clarified in order to get a coherent picture. Depending on the way these necessary clarifications are made, the global image given by Qbism can vary from pure instrumentalism to interpretations making the observer play a radical role.
In the quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory (or QBism), the Born rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, the argument is given that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, it is shown how to view the Born rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is exemplified by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete measurement. The extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the full state-space structure of quantum mechanics is explored.
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."
In the quantum-Bayesian approach to quantum foundations, a quantum state is viewed as an expression of an agent's personalist Bayesian degrees of belief, or probabilities, concerning the results of measurements. These probabilities obey the usual probability rules as required by Dutch-book coherence, but quantum mechanics imposes additional constraints upon them. In this paper, we explore the question of deriving the structure of quantum-state space from a set of assumptions in the spirit of quantum Bayesianism. The starting point is the representation of quantum states induced by a symmetric informationally complete measurement or SIC. In this representation, the Born rule takes the form of a particularly simple modification of the law of total probability. We show how to derive key features of quantum-state space from (i) the requirement that the Born rule arises as a simple modification of the law of total probability and (ii) a limited number of additional assumptions of a strong Bayesian flavor.
QBism regards quantum mechanics as an addition to probability theory. The addition provides an extra normative rule for decision-making agents concerned with gambling across experimental contexts, somewhat in analogy to the double-slit experiment. This establishes the meaning of the Born Rule from a QBist perspective. Moreover it suggests that the best way to formulate the Born Rule for foundational discussions is with respect to an informationally complete reference device. Recent work [DeBrota, Fuchs, and Stacey, Phys. Rev. Res. 2, 013074 (2020)] has demonstrated that reference devices employing symmetric informationally complete POVMs (or SICs) achieve a minimal quantumness: They witness the irreducible difference between classical and quantum. In this paper, we attempt to answer the analogous question for real-vector-space quantum theory. While standard quantum mechanics seems to allow SICs to exist in all finite dimensions, in the case of quantum theory over the real numbers it is known that SICs do not exist in most dimensions. We therefore attempt to identify the optimal reference device in the first real dimension without a SIC (i.e., d=4d=4d=4) in hopes of better understanding the essential role of complex numbers in quantum mechanics. In contrast to their complex counterparts, the expressions that result in a QBist understanding of real-vector-space quantum theory are surprisingly complex.