Quantum mechanics has enjoyed a multitude of successes since its formulation in the early twentieth century. At the same time, it has generated puzzles that persist to this day. These puzzles have inspired a large literature in physics and philosophy. There are two distinct approaches. One is to assume that quantum theory is exact, but that the interpretive postulates need modification, to eliminate apparent contradictions. The second approach is to assume that quantum mechanics is not exact, but instead is a very accurate approximation to a deeper level theory, which reconciles the deterministic and probabilistic aspects. We will focus on this second approach.
Quantum mechanics has enjoyed a multitude of successes since its formulation in the early twentieth century. At the same time, it has generated puzzles that persist to this day. These puzzles have inspired a large literature in physics and philosophy. There are two distinct approaches. One is to assume that quantum theory is exact, but that the interpretive postulates need modification, to eliminate apparent contradictions. The second approach is to assume that quantum mechanics is not exact, but instead is a very accurate approximation to a deeper level theory, which reconciles the deterministic and probabilistic aspects. We will focus on this second approach.
Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics? By ‘exact’ I do not of course mean ‘exactly true’. I mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist … until workable approximations are needed in applications. By ‘serious’ I mean that some substantial fragment of physics should be covered. Non-relativistic ‘particle’ quantum mechanics, perhaps with the inclusion of the electromagnetic field and a cut-off interaction, is serious enough. For it covers ‘a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry’. I mean too, by ‘serious’, that ‘apparatus’ should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum mechanics. The question, ‘… should we not have an exact formulation …?’, is often answered by one or both of two others. I will try to reply to them: Why bother? Why not look it up in a good book ? Why bother? Perhaps the most distinguished of ‘why bother?’ers has been Dirac. He divided the difficulties of quantum mechanics into two classes, those of the first class and those of the second. The second-class difficulties were essentially the infinities of relativistic quantum field theory. Dirac was very disturbed by these, and was not impressed by the ‘renormalisation’ procedures by which they are circumvented. Dirac tried hard to eliminate these second-class difficulties, and urged others to do likewise.
The history of the quantum theory has received rather uneven treatment from professional historians of science. There has been a great deal of emphasis on the early period from 1900 to 1926, during which time the classic formulations of the so-called old and new quantum theories were laid down. But there have been many important subsequent improvements in the underlying theory, its applications and interpretation. The present article attempts a more balanced perspective on the whole theory from the initial inception to its ongoing development. The subject is necessarily a technical and mathematical one, and no account, worthy of any pretensions to accuracy, can avoid reference to some technical matters. An attempt has been made to keep these to a minimum, but it is not entirely possible to eliminate them. This probably helps to explain why the more recent history has largely been dealt with by practising physicists, rather than by historians.
Physics has often advanced by revealing that concepts once regarded as fundamental are instead emergent manifestations of deeper organizing principles. Forces gave way to fields, gravitation became the geometry of spacetime, and quantum mechanics replaced deterministic particles with probabilistic wavefunctions. The Relational Primitive Hypothesis (RPH) asks whether this progression may continue one step further. Rather than treating particles, fields, spacetime, or geometry as the primitive constituents of physical reality, RPH proposes that evolving relational structures constitute the primitive ontology from which familiar physical quantities emerge. The objective of RPH is not to replace established physics, but to investigate whether a simpler primitive ontology can provide a common foundation from which established physical theories may naturally emerge. Within this framework, matter is interpreted as stable relational organization, mass as persistent relational stability, spacetime as emergent relational geometry, and physical interactions as consequences of evolving relational dynamics. This work does not present a completed physical theory. Instead, it establishes a conceptual framework and a structured research program. It defines a proposed ontology, formulates a minimal set of postulates, identifies the mathematical objectives required to develop a predictive theory, examines the physical consequences expected from the proposed framework, and establishes scientific criteria by which the hypothesis must ultimately be evaluated. The Relational Primitive Hypothesis neither replaces nor contradicts established physical theories. Rather, it investigates whether General Relativity, quantum mechanics, and other successful physical theories may themselves emerge as effective descriptions of a more fundamental relational dynamic. The ultimate success or failure of the hypothesis depends not upon its philosophical appeal, but upon the development of a mathematically consistent framework capable of reproducing established physics while generating new, experimentally testable predictions. Until such a framework is achieved, the Relational Primitive Hypothesis should be regarded as a structured research program whose validity remains an open scientific question.
In this article the problem of understanding in physics is considered. Until the early twentieth century world view is represented by purely mechanistic and an explanation of any phenomenon was solved to a visual image. But with the advent of quantum mechanics visual representations largely disappeared. Thus the problem of understanding become aggravated sharply. In this paper, we have separated the basic physical concepts of primary and secondary. Two aspects of the definition of primary concepts as the operational and the intuitive ones are considered. Particular attention is given to the physics of the microworld. It has been considered a combination of deterministic and probabilistic pattern at this level. The concept of probabilistic determinism was introduced. In this article there is an analysis of not material, not physical, but the pure mathematical nature for de Broglie wave and probability waves. Perhaps, this is a fundamentally new type object, on that so far little attention was paid. Interpretation of all these aspects is based on the fundamental experiment for diffraction of alternately flying electrons carried out by V.A. Fabrikant in 1949 year