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arXiv:0910.4642

Identical Particles in Quantum Mechanics

Andrea Lubberdink

Published Oct 24, 2009• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

If, in a system of identical particles, the one particle state is defined by the partial trace to one of the component spaces of the total Hilbert space, then all one particle states are identical. The particles are indistinguishable. This is often thought to be a typical quantum mechanical phenomenon. I will show however that an analogous procedure to define particle states exists in classical mechanics, which results in classical indistinguishable identical particles. From this analogy it follows that the indistinguishability of identical particles depends on how we define particle states. It is not an inevitable result of the symmetry postulate. Indeed, if particles are defined by partial traces, consistent use of the symmetry postulate leads to the conclusion that all identical particles in the universe are indistinguishable, so that particles can never be pointed at, not even in the classical limit. This does not correspond to the way the term particle is actually used in practice. I will argue that a particle should be defined in such a way that in the classical limit the quantum particle state becomes the state of a classical particle. This will lead us to a definition of particles which is in line with the way the term particle is actually used by physicists.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0910.4642

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If, in a system of identical particles, the one particle state is defined by the partial trace to one of the component spaces of the total Hilbert space, then all one particle states are identical. The particles are indistinguishable. This is often thought to be a typical quantum mechanical phenomenon. I will show however that an analogous procedure to define particle states exists in classical mechanics, which results in classical indistinguishable identical particles. From this analogy it follows that the indistinguishability of identical particles depends on how we define particle states. It is not an inevitable result of the symmetry postulate. Indeed, if particles are defined by partial traces, consistent use of the symmetry postulate leads to the conclusion that all identical particles in the universe are indistinguishable, so that particles can never be pointed at, not even in the classical limit. This does not correspond to the way the term particle is actually used in practice. I will argue that a particle should be defined in such a way that in the classical limit the quantum particle state becomes the state of a classical particle. This will lead us to a definition of particles which is in line with the way the term particle is actually used by physicists.
According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. Classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by physical characteristics. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are in all circumstances indistinguishable from each other. This indistinguishability doctrine is motivated by the (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the assumption (``factorism'') that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space in the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particles system. Although the factorist assumption is standard in the literature, it is conceptually problematic. Particle indistinguishability is incompatible with the everyday meaning of ``particle'', and also with how this term is used both in classical physics and in the experimental practice of physics. The standard view requires quantum particles of the same kind to remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, so that a transition to the classical picture of the world seems impossible. Earlier we have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and that avoids these and other problems. We further explain and develop this proposal here. In our view, particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but \emph{emergent}. However, in those situations where the particle concept is applicable, quantum particles---identical or not---are distinguishable in the same way as classical particles.
Abstract According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity.
The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum particles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state—in clear conflict with what we know about classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles emerge , as new entities that do not correspond to the “particle indices” defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles , as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether many discussions in the literature about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided.
The treatment of identical particles in quantum mechanics rests on two (related) principles: the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate. In light of recent theories (such as q‐deformed commutators) that allow for ‘small’ violations of the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate, we revisit the issue of how quantum mechanics deals with identical particles and how it supports or fails to support various philosophical stances concerning individuality. As a consequence of the expanded possibilities for quantum statistics, we argue that permutation symmetry is best formulated as a formal property of the state function describing the system of particles rather than as a property of the individual particles.1 Introduction2 Philosophical background2.1 Important terminology2.1.1 Identity2.1.2 Indistinguishability2.1.3 Indiscernibility2.2 When are particles indistinguishable?2.3 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and quantum mechanics2.4 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and logic2.5 Particle history2.6 Transcendental individuality3 Some quantum formalism3.1 The Principle of Permutation Invariance and the Symmetrization Postulate3.2 The configuration‐space approach3.3 Commutators and anticommutators, and identical particle statistics3.4 Q‐mutators4 Identical particle statistics: a holistic point of view5 Conclusions
Particles in classical physics are distinguishable objects, which can be picked out individually on the basis of their unique physical properties. By contrast, in the philosophy of physics, the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are completely indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This standard view is problematic: Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable not only with the very meaning of "particle" in ordinary language and in classical physical theory, but also with how this term is actually used in the practice of present-day physics. Moreover, the indistinguishability doctrine prevents a smooth transition from quantum particles to what we normally understand by "particles" in the classical limit of quantum mechanics. Elaborating on earlier work, we here analyze the premises of the standard view and discuss an alternative that avoids these and similar problems. As it turns out, this alternative approach connects to recent discussions in quantum information theory.
Symmetries and wave functions An important difference between the classical and quantum perspectives is their different criteria of distinguishability. Identical particles are classically distinguishable when separated in phase space. On the other hand, identical particles are always quantum mechanically indistinguishable for the purpose of counting distinct microstates. But these concepts and these distinctions do not tell the whole story of how we count the microstates and determine the multiplicity of a quantized system. There are actually two different ways of counting the accessible microstates of a quantized system of identical, and so indistinguishable, particles. While these two ways were discovered in the years 1924–1926 independently of Erwin Schrödinger’s (1887–1961) invention of wave mechanics in 1926, their most convincing explanation is in terms of particle wave functions. The following two paragraphs may be helpful to those familiar with the basic features of wave mechanics. A system of identical particles has, as one might expect, a probability density that is symmetric under particle exchange, that is, the probability density is invariant under the exchange of two identical particles. But here wave mechanics surprises the classical physicist. A system wave function may either keep the same sign or change signs under particle exchange. In particular, a system wave function may be either symmetric or antisymmetric under particle exchange.