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arXiv:0909.3117

One way quantum bit commitment through classical correlation

Sriram Prasath E., Prasanta Kumar Panigrahi

Published Sep 16, 2009• 1 citation
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Abstract

A one way partial quantum bit commitment protocol is developed, using states with built-in classical correlation, completely independent of entanglement. It involves concealing information in a set of mutually non-orthogonal states and revealing it through measurements on a set of product states that are mutually orthogonal. Given $2^N$ choices to commit from, the protocol encodes each choice in a $N+1$ qubit state, from $2^N$ non-orthogonal states. A previously agreed upon $N$ qubit state corresponding to each choice, when coupled with the $N+1$ qubit state, yields an element belonging to a set of orthogonal product states, which can be deterministically distinguished. The protocol is demonstrated by implementing it for a `coin-toss' game. A procedure to enhance security of the protocol is explicated, increasing the number of qubits required. Thus a modification is suggested to reduce this required number.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0909.3117

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A one way partial quantum bit commitment protocol is developed, using states with built-in classical correlation, completely independent of entanglement. It involves concealing information in a set of mutually non-orthogonal states and revealing it through measurements on a set of product states that are mutually orthogonal. Given 2N2^N2N choices to commit from, the protocol encodes each choice in a N+1N+1N+1 qubit state, from 2N2^N2N non-orthogonal states. A previously agreed upon NNN qubit state corresponding to each choice, when coupled with the N+1N+1N+1 qubit state, yields an element belonging to a set of orthogonal product states, which can be deterministically distinguished. The protocol is demonstrated by implementing it for a `coin-toss' game. A procedure to enhance security of the protocol is explicated, increasing the number of qubits required. Thus a modification is suggested to reduce this required number.
Bit commitment is an essential primitive in quantum cryptography. It is the basic building block of many cryptographic protocols in which it provides security over distrustful parties. This paper proposes a secured quantum two-bit commitment protocol for any two classical bits. The protocol contains two parties - a committer and a receiver - who share both quantum and classical communication channels. The main phases of this protocol are commitment and revealing phases where the concealing and binding conditions are proved in order to accept the commitment message. The proposed framework utilizes different security layers to hide specific quantum states in a superposition alongside trivial one qubit operations. The secured unitary transformations are applied by the two parties to meet the concealing and binding conditions. To verify the success of the proposed protocol, the measured output of the two parties are compared. The protocol operates under the assumption that the two parties might cheat and the possible existence of an eavesdropper.
Although Mayers, Lo and Chau successfully showed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is impossible, we present a secure QBC protocol which is quite different from the model used in their proofs. If Alice wants to commit a bit b, she first encodes b into a series of classical bit strings of the same length. The requirement is that the modulo 2 sum of all bits in every bit string equals to b. Then Alice uses quantum one-way function to produce quantum states which are corresponding to the encoded classical bit strings and will be sent to Bob as evidence. The quantum one-way function used here is just that was successfully applied in Gottesman and Chuang's quantum digital signatures. When it comes to the unveilingtime, Alice only sends the bit strings to Bob. Finally, Bob generates quantum states form the bit strings by the same quantum one-way function and uses controlled-swap circuit to check whether the quantum states are identical with the evidence.
This paper proposes a quantum protocol for a cheat-sensitive commitment of a classical bit. Alice, the receiver of the bit, can examine dishonest Bob, who changes or postpones his choice. Bob, the sender of the bit, can examine dishonest Alice, who violates concealment. For each round-trip case, Alice sends one of two spin states |SSS\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩ by choosing basis SSS at random from two conjugate bases XXX and YYY. Bob chooses basis CCC \ensuremath{\in} {XXX,YYY} to perform a measurement and returns a resultant state |CCC\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩. Alice then performs a measurement with the other basis RRR (\ensuremath{\ne}SSS) and obtains an outcome |RRR\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩. In the opening phase, she can discover dishonest Bob, who unveils a wrong basis with a faked spin state, or Bob can discover dishonest Alice, who infers basis CCC but destroys |CCC\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}⟩ by setting RRR to be identical to SSS in the commitment phase. If a classical bit is coded in a block of mmm \ifmmode\times\else\texttimes\fi{} nnn qubit particles, impartial examinations and probabilistic security criteria can be achieved.
Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. We give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number of rounds, in which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may include aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be bound to a fixed ``honest'' strategy, so that ``anonymous state protocols,'' which were recently suggested as a possible way to beat the known no-go results, are also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows the sender to find a cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only approximately, the cheat goes undetected with a high probability, which we explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit formalization of general two-party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and an estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum channel. The result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that fall outside the standard setting of unlimited available technology and thus may allow secure bit commitment. We present such a protocol whose security, perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver's laboratory.
New relativistic quantum protocols realizing the bit commitment and coin tossing schemes are proposed. The protocols are based on the idea that spatially extended nonstationary orthogonal quantum states inaccessible for measurement cannot be unambiguously distinguished. As the states are transmitted from the region controlled by one party to the region accessible for measurement by the other party, the states become reliably distinguishable when accessed as a whole. Essential points of the protocol are both the quantum character of states and the existence of an ultimate signal propagation speed dictated by special relativity.