Decompositions of the world into systems have typically been regarded as arbitrary extra-theoretical assumptions in discussions of quantum measurement. One can instead regard decompositions as part of the theory, and ask what conditions they must satisfy for self-consistency. It is shown that self-consistent decompositions that specify a measurement context (i.e. von Neumann decompositions) must represent apparatus as containing internal decohering environments and as having known pointer components and ready states. Under these circumstances a von Neumann decomposition can function as a component of the ready state of the observer. Minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics supplemented by these consistency requirements on von Neumann decompositions avoids the measurement problem.
Decompositions of the world into systems have typically been regarded as arbitrary extra-theoretical assumptions in discussions of quantum measurement. One can instead regard decompositions as part of the theory, and ask what conditions they must satisfy for self-consistency. It is shown that self-consistent decompositions that specify a measurement context (i.e. von Neumann decompositions) must represent apparatus as containing internal decohering environments and as having known pointer components and ready states. Under these circumstances a von Neumann decomposition can function as a component of the ready state of the observer. Minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics supplemented by these consistency requirements on von Neumann decompositions avoids the measurement problem.
Abstract In quantum mechanics, pointer states are eigenstates of the observable of the measurement apparatus that represent the possible positions of the display pointer of the equipment. The origin of this concept lies in attempts to fill the blanks in Everett’s relative-state interpretation, and to make it a fully valid description of physical reality. To achieve this, it was necessary to consider not only the main system interacting with the measurement apparatus (like von Neumann and Everett did) but also the role of the environment in eliminating correlations between different possible measurements when interacting with the measurement apparatus. The interaction of the environment with the main system (and the measurement apparatus) is the core of the decoherence theory, which followed Everett’s thesis. In this article, we review the measurement process according to von Neumann, Everett’s relative state interpretation, the purpose of decoherence and some of its follow-up until Wojciech Zurek’s primordial paper that consolidated the concept of pointer states, previously presented by Heinz Dieter Zeh. Employing a simple physical model consisting of a pair of two-level systems—one representing the main system, the other the measurement apparatus—and a thermal bath—representing the environment—we show how pointer states emerge, explaining its contributions to the question of measurement in quantum mechanics, as well as its limitations. Finally, we briefly show some of its consequences. This paper is accessible to readers with elementary knowledge about quantum mechanics, on the level of graduate courses.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
In a close form without referring the time-dependent Hamiltonian to the total system, a consistent approach for quantum measurement is proposed based on Zurek's triple model of quantum decoherence [W. Zurek, Phys. Rev. D 24, 1516 (1981)]. An exactly solvable model based on the intracavity system is dealt with in detail to demonstrate the central idea in our approach: by peeling off one collective variable of the measuring apparatus from its many degrees of freedom, as the pointer of the apparatus, the collective variable decouples with the internal environment formed by the effective internal variables, but still interacts with the measured system to form a triple entanglement among the measured system, the pointer, and the internal environment. As another mechanism to cause decoherence, the uncertainty of relative phase and its many-particle amplification can be summed up to an ideal entanglement or a Shmidt decomposition with respect to the preferred basis.
Both classical and quantum mechanics assume that physical laws are invariant under changes in the way that the world is labeled. This Principle of Decompositional Equivalence is formalized, and shown to forbid finite experimental demonstrations that given pointer states |p1> and |p2> refer to the same physical system S. It is then shown that any extra-theoretical assumption that given pointer states |p1> and |p2> with indistinguishable coefficients in a Schmidt basis for the universe refer to the same physical system S is stronger than the assumption of classicality. Standard interpretations of quantum mechanics make such as assumption in analyzing measurement; hence they are logically inconsistent.
Abstract The concept of the collapse of the wave function was introduced into quantum theory by John von Neumann in the early 1930s and has since become an integral part of the theory’s orthodox interpretation. But if we were to ask ourselves what evidence we have that this collapse is a real physical phenomenon, we would have to admit that we have none. The notion of a collapse is necessary to explain how a quantum system initially present in a linear superposition state before the process of measurement is converted into a quantum system present in one, and only one, of the measurement eigenstates after the process has occurred. It was introduced into the theory because it is our experience that pointers point in only one direction at a time.
Quantum Mechanics represents one of the greatest triumphs of the scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. The stunning success of quantum theory has led to many revolutionary inventions and its extraordinary concepts describe the heart of several important real world applications like transistors and lasers. The theory makes accurate predictions about a wide range of physical phenomena and has historically withstood the tests and scrutiny of every experimental investigation. However, inspite of the fact that quantum theory is widely regarded by the scientific establishment as the fundamental theory of nature and is immensly successful and useful, its conceptual framework makes many predictions which are difficult to comprehend “classically. The theory is, pardoxically, powerful and confusing at the same time. Quantum theory’s unusual predictions originate from its basic formailsm which involves concepts like probability amplitudes and the linear superposition principle(Dirac, 1947). The quantum view appears abstract and counterintuitive and at odds with classical perceptions. Many of the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics are encompassed in what is known as the quantum measurement problem(Peres, 1986; von Neumann, 1932; Wheeler & Zurek, 1983). Conventionally, the measurement paradox is supposedly ’resolved’ by forcing a notion of a sudden collapse of the state vector of the system being measured. However, the nature of this mechanism is at odds with the basic tenets of quantum mechanics and hence may lie outside its realm thus questioning the validity of the theory it self. Closely related with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is the question of its connection with the emergence of classicality and the elusive boundary between quantum and classical worlds. What is the connection between the ‘classical’ and the ‘quantum’ worlds? Is there a definite relationship? Are classical mechanics and quantum mechanics two mutually exclusive incompatible theories or are they two aspects of the same underlying philosophy? Classical objects are eventually composed of elements of the microworld which can be described quantum mechanically. So, how and where can there be a boundary between the two worlds? In the following section we begin by introducing the quantum measurement problem. In the next section we will discuss attempts to understand and explain away the underlying paradoxes in quantum theory as highlighted in the quantum measurement problem and the question of the quantum-classical connection. From among the various explanations that seek a resolution to the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, we focus on the ‘environment induced decoherence theory’ an approach that employs the methods developed by several authors to analyse the quantum mechanics of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis