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arXiv:0906.1671

Two-Party Quantum Protocols Do Not Compose Securely Against Honest-But-Curious Adversaries

Louis Salvail, Miroslava Sotáková

Published Jun 9, 2009• 8 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper, we build upon the model of two-party quantum computation introduced by Salvail et al. [SSS09] and show that in this model, only trivial correct two-party quantum protocols are weakly self-composable. We do so by defining a protocol Π, calling any non-trivial sub-protocol πN times and showing that there is a quantum honest-but-curious strategy that cannot be modeled by acting locally in every single copy of π. In order to achieve this, we assign a real value called "payoff" to any strategy for Πand show that that there is a gap between the highest payoff achievable by coherent and local strategies.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0906.1671

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In this paper, we build upon the model of two-party quantum computation introduced by Salvail et al. [SSS09] and show that in this model, only trivial correct two-party quantum protocols are weakly self-composable. We do so by defining a protocol Π, calling any non-trivial sub-protocol πN times and showing that there is a quantum honest-but-curious strategy that cannot be modeled by acting locally in every single copy of π. In order to achieve this, we assign a real value called "payoff" to any strategy for Πand show that that there is a gap between the highest payoff achievable by coherent and local strategies.
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness — guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only — we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol implementing a non-trivial classical primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.
Abstract Secure multi-party computation (SMPC) protocols allow several parties distrusting each other to collectively compute a function on their inputs, without revealing the input values. In this paper, we introduce a protocol that lifts SMPC to its quantum counterpart—secure multi-party quantum computation (SMPQC) for classical inputs and outputs—in a composable and statistically secure way, even for a single honest party. The soundness error—the maximum cheating probability of malicious parties—is shown to be proportional to the inverse of a polynomial with respect to the number of rounds in the protocol, and can be further decreased to a negligible quantity for bounded-error quantum-polynomial-time computations. Unlike previous SMPQC protocols, our proposal only requires very limited quantum resources from all but one party. In addition, the protocol exhibits some noise robustness that can facilitate small-scale implementations with near-future technologies. The protocol is based on a new technique for quantum verification that requires only the collective remote preparation of quantum states in a single plane of the Bloch sphere. To demonstrate the ability of verifying the computation with such limited clients, we uncover and use a fundamental invariance that is inherent to measurement-based quantum computing.
Known protocols for secure two-party computation that are designed to provide full security against malicious behavior are significantly less efficient than protocols intended only to thwart semi-honest adversaries. We present a concrete design and implementation of protocols achieving security guarantees that are much stronger than are possible with semi-honest protocols, at minimal extra cost. Specifically, we consider protocols in which a malicious adversary may learn a single (arbitrary) bit of additional information about the honest party's input. Correctness of the honest party's output is still guaranteed. Adapting prior work of Mohassel and Franklin, the basic idea in our protocols is to conduct two separate runs of a (specific) semi-honest, garbled-circuit protocol, with the parties swapping roles, followed by an inexpensive secure equality test. We provide a rigorous definition and prove that this protocol leaks no more than one additional bit against a malicious adversary. In addition, we propose some heuristic enhancements to reduce the overall information a cheating adversary learns. Our experiments show that protocols meeting this security level can be implemented at cost very close to that of protocols that only achieve semi-honest security. Our results indicate that this model enables the large-scale, practical applications possible within the semi-honest security model, while providing dramatically stronger security guarantees.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic primitive that lets a num- ber N of mutually distrustful parties compute a function f (x1, . . . , xN ) on their private inputs xi such that at the end of the MPC protocol, each honest party obtains the func- tion’s correct output and no adversary controlling a certain subset of parties learns any- thing about the honest parties’ inputs beyond what can be inferred from the function’s output value. In 2002, [Smi01] and [CGS02] introduced the notion of multi-party quan- tum computation (MPQC) in which arbitrary quantum circuits can be evaluated in a distributed manner, secure against a quantum adversary. Few protocols for MPQC are known. We present a fundamental study of the building blocks of MPC and MPQC in the information-theoretic setting with a focus on protocols built on top of (quantum) se- cret sharing schemes. In particular, we point out structural similarities and differences and compile an extensive list of theoretical feasibility results for the maximum number of corrupted parties within classical and quantum secret sharing and MPC protocols.
Multi-Party Quantum Computation (MPQC) has attracted a lot of attention as a potential killer-app for quantum networks through it's ability to preserve privacy and integrity of the highly valuable computations they would enable. Contributing to the latest challenges in this field, we present a composable protocol achieving blindness and verifiability even in the case of a single honest client. The security of our protocol is reduced, in an information-theoretically secure way, to that of a classical composable Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) used to coordinate the various parties. Our scheme thus provides a statistically secure upgrade of such classical scheme to a quantum one with the same level of security. In addition, (i) the clients can delegate their computation to a powerful fully fault-tolerant server and only need to perform single qubit operations to unlock the full potential of multi-party quantum computation; (ii) the amount of quantum communication with the server is reduced to sending quantum states at the beginning of the computation and receiving the output states at the end, which is optimal and removes the need for interactive quantum communication; and (iii) it has a low constant multiplicative qubit overhead compared to the single-client delegated protocol it is built upon. The main technical ingredient of our paper is the bootstraping of the MPQC construction by Double Blind Quantum Computation, a new composable resource for blind multiparty quantum computation, that demonstrates the surprising fact that the full protocol does not require verifiability of all components to achieve security.