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arXiv:0905.3859 · European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Causation, measurement relevance and no-conspiracy in EPR

Iñaki San Pedro

Published Oct 25, 2011• 13 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s13194-011-0037-3

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In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions present in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these can not be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. Violations of measurement independence thus need not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). This new reading of measurement dependence provides the grounds for an explicitly non-factorizable (in the sense of Bell’s factorizability) common cause model for EPR. 1

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In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions present in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these can not be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. Violations of measurement independence thus need not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). This new reading of measurement dependence provides the grounds for an explicitly non-factorizable (in the sense of Bell’s factorizability) common cause model for EPR. 1