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arXiv:0901.4695 · Physical Review A

Multimode states in decoy-based quantum-key-distribution protocols

Wolfram Helwig, Wolfgang Mauerer, Christine Silberhorn

Published Nov 19, 2009• 16 citations
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Abstract

Every security analysis of quantum-key distribution (QKD) relies on a faithful modeling of the employed quantum states. Many photon sources, such as for instance a parametric down-conversion (PDC) source, require a multimode description but are usually only considered in a single-mode representation. In general, the important claim in decoy-based QKD protocols for indistinguishability between signal and decoy states does not hold for all sources. We derive bounds on the single-photon transmission probability and error rate for multimode states and apply these bounds to the output state of a PDC source. We observe two opposing effects on the secure key rate. First, the multimode structure of the state gives rise to a new attack that decreases the key rate. Second, more contributing modes change the photon number distribution from a thermal toward a Poissonian distribution, which increases the key rate.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.80.052326

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Every security analysis of quantum-key distribution (QKD) relies on a faithful modeling of the employed quantum states. Many photon sources, such as for instance a parametric down-conversion (PDC) source, require a multimode description but are usually only considered in a single-mode representation. In general, the important claim in decoy-based QKD protocols for indistinguishability between signal and decoy states does not hold for all sources. We derive bounds on the single-photon transmission probability and error rate for multimode states and apply these bounds to the output state of a PDC source. We observe two opposing effects on the secure key rate. First, the multimode structure of the state gives rise to a new attack that decreases the key rate. Second, more contributing modes change the photon number distribution from a thermal toward a Poissonian distribution, which increases the key rate.
In recent years tremendous research progress was made in the field of quantum key distribution (QKD). By now a variety of protocols exists for which security has been proven even for realistic imperfect devices. The proofs based on the idea of Shor and Preskill, provide us with a lower bound on the secure key generation rate. The security of BB84 relies on the fact, that well defined single-mode photonic states are prepared by the sender and used as information carriers. However, potential sources for QKD implementations like parametric down conversion (PDC) sources emit states with a multi-mode spectral distribution. These states have to be described in a higher-dimensional Hilbert space. We investigate to what extent these spectral properties affect the security considerations. We further present a comparison of the theoretical bounds on the secure key rates for different protocols and the dependence on various experimental imperfections, e.g., dark-counts, detector efficiency, channel attenuation etc. Only single-photon signals contribute to the secure key, but unfortunately such sources don't exist at present. Hence we consider different photon statistics in our simulations.
Parametric down-conversion (PDC) sources can be used as triggered single photon sources in quantum key distribution (QKD). Recently, there have been several practical proposals of the decoy state QKD with triggering PDC sources. In this paper, we generalize the passive decoy state idea, originally proposed by Mauerer and Silberhorn. The generalized passive decoy state idea can be applied to cases where either threshold detectors or photon-number-resolving detectors are used. The decoy state protocol proposed by Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi and Imoto (AYKI) can be treated as a special case of the generalized passive decoy state method. By simulating a recent PDC experiment, we compare various practical decoy state protocols with the infinite decoy state protocol and also compare the cases using threshold detectors and photon-number-resolving detectors. Our simulation result shows that with the AYKI protocol, one can achieve a key generation rate that is close to the theoretical limit of an infinite decoy state protocol. Furthermore, our simulation result shows that a photon-number-resolving detector appears to be not very useful for improving QKD performance in this case. Although our analysis is focused on QKD with PDC sources, we emphasize that it can also be applied to QKD setups with other triggered single photon sources.
The decoy-state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two experimental approaches to generating the decoy states with different intensities: modulation of the pump current of a semiconductor laser diode, and external modulation by an optical intensity modulator. The former approach shows a side channel in the time domain that allows an attacker to distinguish s signal state from a decoy state, breaking a basic assumption in the protocol. We model a photon-number-splitting attack based on our experimental data, and show that it compromises the system's security. Then, based on the work of Tamaki et al. [New J. Phys. 18, 065008 (2016)], we obtain two analytical formulas to estimate the yield and error rate of single-photon pulses when the signal and decoy states are distinguishable. The distinguishability reduces the secure key rate below that of a perfect decoy-state protocol. To mitigate this reduction, we propose to calibrate the transmittance of the receiver (Bob's) unit. We apply our method to three QKD systems and estimate their secure key rates.
A parametric down-conversion (PDC) source can be used as either a triggered single-photon source or an entangled-photon source in quantum key distribution (QKD). The triggering PDC QKD has already been studied in the literature. On the other hand, a model and a post-processing protocol for the entanglement PDC QKD are still missing. We fill in this important gap by proposing such a model and a post-processing protocol for the entanglement PDC QKD. Although the PDC model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. Since an entangled PDC source is a basis-independent source, we apply Koashi and Preskill's security analysis to the entanglement PDC QKD. We also investigate the entanglement PDC QKD with two-way classical communications. We find that the recurrence scheme increases the key rate and the Gottesman-Lo protocol helps tolerate higher channel losses. By simulating a recent $144\text{\ensuremath{-}}\mathrm{km}$ open-air PDC experiment, we compare three implementations: entanglement PDC QKD, triggering PDC QKD, and coherent-state QKD. The simulation result suggests that the entanglement PDC QKD can tolerate higher channel losses than the coherent-state QKD. The coherent-state QKD with decoy states is able to achieve highest key rate in the low- and medium-loss regions. By applying the Gottesman-Lo two-way post-processing protocol, the entanglement PDC QKD can tolerate up to 70dB70\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{dB}70dB combined channel losses (35dB35\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{dB}35dB for each channel) provided that the PDC source is placed in between Alice and Bob. After considering statistical fluctuations, the PDC setup can tolerate up to 53dB53\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{dB}53dB channel losses.
A quantum key distribution with decoherence-free subspaces has been proposed to overcome collective noise to the polarization modes of photons flying in quantum channels. Prototypes of this scheme have also been achieved with a parametric down-conversion source. However, the photon-number-splitting attack we propose will make practical implementations of this scheme insecure since the parametric down-conversion source may occasionally emit multiphoton pairs. We propose a decoy-state method to make these implementations immune to this attack. With this decoy-state method, both the security distance and key bit rate will be increased.
We propose an efficient quantum key distribution protocol based on the photon-pair generation from parametric down-conversion (PDC). It uses the same experimental setup as the conventional protocol, but a refined data analysis enables detection of photon-number splitting attacks by utilizing information from a built-in decoy state. Assuming the use of practical detectors, we analyze the unconditional security of the new scheme and show that it improves the secure key generation rate by several orders of magnitude at long distances, using a high intensity PDC source.