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arXiv:0810.3832

Addendum to "Experimental demonstration of a quantum protocol for Byzantine agreement and liar detection" arXiv:0710.0290

Sascha Gaertner, Mohamed Bourennane, Christian Kurtsiefer, Adán Cabello, Harald Weinfurter

Published Oct 21, 2008• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Gao et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 208901 (2008)] have described a possible intercept-resend attack for the quantum protocol for detectable Byzantine agreement in Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 070504 (2008). Here we describe an extension of the protocol which defeats such attacks.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0810.3832

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