arXiv:0810.1259 · Physica Scripta

Is quantum theory predictably complete?

Marian Kupczyński

Published Jul 1, 2009• 18 citations

Abstract

Quantum theory (QT) provides statistical predictions for various physical phenomena. To verify these predictions a considerable amount of data has been accumulated in the 'measurements' performed on the ensembles of identically prepared physical systems or in the repeated 'measurements' on some trapped 'individual physical systems'. The outcomes of these measurements are, in general, some numerical time series registered by some macroscopic instruments. The various empirical probability distributions extracted from these time series were shown to be consistent with the probabilistic predictions of QT. More than 70 years ago the claim was made that QT provided the most complete description of 'individual' physical systems and outcomes of the measurements performed on 'individual' physical systems were obtained in an intrinsically random way. Spin polarization correlation experiments (SPCEs), performed to test the validity of Bell inequalities, clearly demonstrated the existence of strong long-range correlations and confirmed that the beams hitting far away detectors somehow preserve the memory of their common source which would be destroyed if the individual counts of far away detectors were purely random. Since the probabilities describe the random experiments and are not the attributes of the 'individual' physical systems, the claim that QT provides a complete description of 'individual' physical systems seems not only unjustified but also misleading and counter productive. In this paper, we point out that we even do not know whether QT is predictably complete because it has not been tested carefully enough. Namely, it was not proven that the time series of existing experimental data did not contain some stochastic fine structures that could have been averaged out by describing them in terms of the empirical probability distributions. In this paper, we advocate various statistical tests that could be used to search for such fine structures in the data and to answer the title question of this paper. In our opinion a proper understanding of the statistical character of QT and of its limitations is crucial in the domains such as quantum optics and quantum information.

DOI: 10.1088/0031-8949/2009/t135/014005

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